Arabs and Jews Path and Destiny 1920-2020

Joint Search

index

-Introduction

-Arabs, Jews and Great Britain

1914-1922

Omar Abd El , Sattar Mahmoud

– Arabs and Jews

From 1948 To 2018

Shahu Al , Quradaghi

Iraqi-Israeli relations after Wilayat al-Faqih

Muhannad Al , Alam

-Iraqi Sunni Arabs and Jews

Abd El , Nasser Al , Mahdawi

-Conclusion

Introduction to Conflict Theories and Research Hypotheses

Theories of conflict are based on the perceptions that social life consists of individuals, groups, and systems with different and overlapping interests that inherently generate conflict.

Social systems are not united and harmonious but rather disparate forms of power that tend to change in an effort to assert themselves, guarantee their rights and get rid of the class that controls them, all of which will only come from conflict.

Among the various forms of conflict, crisis, tension and conflict, there is a conflict of national and national wills, and there are differences and contradictions between the objectives of states and models of governance.

The three axes of conflict are: the first assumes the contradiction of interests or values between the parties to the conflict and their awareness of this contradiction, and the second assumes the inclusion of individuals, groups and states in the conflict.

The conflict of States falls within the third axis of the axes of conflict, which is the international conflict, which needs efforts and theories to prevent it from spiraling out of control, such as theories of decision-making, power, systems and others.

In order to reach a new Middle East amid the conflicts of its groups, states and models of governance, and in order not to get out of control of these models, Great Britain 100 years ago and then the United States managed the conflicts of different models of governance that have been going on with each other, since the end of World War II and still are.

As for the research hypotheses, they include more than one hypothesis, including

The relationship between Iraq and its multiple sects with the Jews of Israel has shaped the price that both sides must pay for this relationship. For Iraq, the possibility of ending Wilayat al-Faqih by Israel may restore relations with Iraqi Jews and return them to the property they left behind in Iraq in exchange for ensuring the existence of the State of Israel.

The other hypothesis is whether the Jews of Israel are one group with which peace can be negotiated or are there Jewish groups and groups that accept peace and others that cannot be trusted to reach peace?

Also, does the social history of the Jewish minorities in Iraq and Iran help to play a role in the next peace between them?

Can capital, trade, economy, growth and investment play a key role in the next stabilization and peace process after Velayat-e Faqih?

The division of Sunni communities in Iraq in particular and in the Middle East in general into multiple human "settlements" would have the most serious implications for the future relationship with Israel and even for Israel's existence as a democratic state in the Middle East. Thus, the unity of Iraq's Sunni community and its coexistence with its neighbors will have a direct impact on that relationship.

The long-standing liberal families with high levels of education and money on both sides can play a role in the future of relations between the two parties after the completion of the existential threat to them from the culture and orientations of the velayat-e faqih.

The future of dialogue and peace between Iraq and Israel is linked to several factors, including social and cultural factors, and depends on what will become of the conflict between Wilayat al-Faqih and Israel. This conflict will last for a long time and does not necessarily have to be in Israel's favor, and it is a cruel and destructive conflict for one of the parties, so the desired peace will not be achieved until the outcome of this conflict is resolved.

The research plan was divided into four sections after the introduction, the first section will talk about the path of Arabs and Jews under Great Britain from 1914 to 1922, the second section will talk about the course of the relationship between Jews and Arabs from 194802018, then the third section will talk about the possible course of the relationship between Jews and Arabs after the departure of Wilayat al-Faqih, and conclude with the research talking about the future relationship of the year of Iraq Arabs with the Jews and then the conclusion.

The Arab-Jewish Conflict Under Great Britain: Its Causes, Path and Possible Finances

Dr. Omar Abd El , Sattar Mahmoud

index

– Causes of conflict

– Arabs, Jews and Great Britain

– Parties to the conflict

– Conflict money

– Causes of conflict:

The continuation of the conflict between Arabs and Jews since 1920 to the present day, is due to the continuation of its political, economic and social strategic causes, which use all methods of conflict such as war, siege, alliance and incitement, and all its forms of crises, conflict and tension.

The reasons that have led to the continuation of the conflict in the Middle East since World War I are almost the same as those that continue to fuel the conflict between Middle Eastern states and groups today.

One of the causes of the conflict is the religious character that marked the course of the conflict on the one hand, which wrestled with the West Valea model brought by the British after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, both among the Jews and the belief of the Promised Land, and among the Arabs of the North and the belief that this is an occupation of the Holy Land.

The second cause of conflict is the obstruction of the right of nations to self-determination, which is one of the principles of the French Revolution that each nation should have an independent country, and with this principle these nations can, by obtaining an independent country, serve their interests and those of their neighbors.

The third reason for the conflict is to demonize the other on both sides, as Palestine has been and continues to be oppressed by the Jews and the Jews by the Palestinians, thus losing the ability of the two sides to coexist in light of the transition of the international order from one situation to another.

And you see this epilepsy clearly when explained by an Arab Jew, he finds the contradiction in his personality that resulted from the policy of cultural and social exclusion that came from the emigration of European Jews to Israel, that is, in the pressure between being a Jew or an Arab, says Professor Ella Habiba Shahout.

Chahout adds, "It's self-destruction, the duality of being an American Jew or a European Jew was not seen as a contradiction but to be an Arab Jew is a logical farce, it's existential destruction and deep schizophrenia," says Shahout.

In the American milieu in which I live, we face hegemony that allows us to recount only one Jewish memory, the European memory. For some of us who do not hide their Eastern identity under the title of an inclusive Jewish identity, being in the American milieu hostile to the very idea of Orientalism becomes more difficult.

Innate discourse in the West highlights Judeo-Christian traditions but rarely recognizes Jewish-Islamic culture in the Middle East and North Africa or in Spain before the expulsion of Jews in 1492.

But on the other hand, you see another reason for the conflict, when you compare the Arab models of governance in Israel's neighboring countries with the model of governance in Israel, and you find that the equation of "occupation + democracy" is much better than the equation of "tyranny + independence", a conflict in which Israel has triumphed over the Arabs.

The Jews had advanced the Arabs from the beginning with money, science, union and their network of relationship with the world of the West, in addition to their commitment to the borders of historic Palestine within the Sykes-Picot Agreement, unlike the Arabs, who were contesting jobs and crossing the border in their struggle with the Jews outside the framework of West Valea.

While Israel built a state of science, justice and sufficiency, the Arabs squandered all opportunities a century ago and still do, and faced the resurrection of Israel with a mazuma mentality and a cumbersome structure in science, politics, economics and society, and this has always led them to violence that they call jihad or resistance and the world calls terrorism.

The authoritarian Eastern mentality was also a cause of conflict, as Russians and Iranians inherited a sense of insecurity inlaid with a dictatorial revolutionary model of universal faith who insisted on igniting wars, and no other model insisted.

The old and new Western-Russian conflict is one of the causes of the conflict that has made some Middle Eastern countries and groups a fuel and arena for it, although they are not a party to it on the one hand.

On the other hand, yesterday's Europe and America, which was born and founded on the convictions and principles of thought and practice (democracy), is still, as Kissinger argues, seeking to export its Westphalian model of governance as the only viable approach in the world, going beyond the religious idea of Arabs and Jews and bypassing the Russian model.

In order for America's containment of the Russians to end, the people of the Middle East must learn from the lessons of the school of Western-Russian conflict, that the peoples and countries of this region are not parties to the Western-Russian conflict, but some of them because of their madness have made themselves a target in this conflict.

The days have proven that the fact that some of them were thrown into the Russian lap to confront the West, as the Arab nationalist regimes or the regime and system of velayat-e faqih did today, was a mirage of a spot calculated by the guarantee as water.

Arabs, Jews and Great Britain:

During the nineteenth century, the Middle East was the focus of Western politics, as it is the arena on whose territory the struggle of the Great Game takes place, as the authority of the Persian Shah and the Ottoman Sultan was living its last days.

But Great Britain's interest in it after its reversal in World War I was not what the decimal century seemed to be, as it sought to support civil regimes that it contributed to the establishment of to prevent European expansion, so it did not want to control the region, but rather to prevent the control of another European state.

Therefore, throughout the nineteenth century, Great Britain followed a policy of supporting the crumbling kingdoms to protect them from European interference, but found that its Russian adversary was on the way, so its goal became to defeat the Russian goal and role and this game became called the Great Game.

Queen Victoria said that the issue is the question of Russian or British sovereignty over the world, which began in 1829, with the control of Afghanistan to keep Russia away from it.

The British found themselves in urgent need as they fought the Ottoman Empire to ally themselves with the Arabs who claimed a shackled Arab kingdom in West Asia, as well as with the Jews who wanted a national home in Palestine.

But the division of the Arabs into several sides between Iraq, Syria, Jazeera and Egypt, their rejection of the British Mandate over them, their insistence on drawing the borders of their independent Arab kingdoms, and their claim to Palestine, at a time when the Jews had a single movement with one goal, enabled the British to bypass many Arab demands.

The British understanding of Palestine was to be a single state, as Lloyd George, Britain's prime minister, said in 1917, rejecting its division with France in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, saying, "The partition of Palestine distorts it, and in the case of the restoration of Palestine it must be one indivisible in order to renew its greatness as a living entity."

With British support for the Arabs, and no mention of the Sykes-Picot Agreement for the Jews, except for placing Palestine under an international order, Mark Sykes contacted Herbert Samuel, the British Home Secretary who is Jewish, to find out something about Zionism that dominated the Ottoman Empire through Young Turkey.

Britain thought of a deal to give them an arrangement on Palestine in exchange for withdrawing from its support for Young Turkey, the same condition that the English had asked the Arabs, at a time when Arabs in Syria and Jews in Palestine were facing the meaning of Jamal Pasha, so that Jamal Pasha expelled Arabs and Jews at the end of 1917 from Jaffa and announced his intention to expel the Jews from Jerusalem, and he did so and only a third of them remained.

Returning to the Jews, it is worth mentioning that David Ben-Gurion and Isaac Ben-Zavi were Ottoman citizens, law seekers at the University of Constantinople and leaders at the same time in the Zionist movement, so they asked Cemal Pasha to form a Jewish army in Palestine to defend the Ottoman Empire, but Jamal Pasha refused.

Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi went to America for the same purpose, but in 1918 they joined a Jewish army alongside Britain to fight against the Ottoman Empire, two years before Sharif Hussein's revolt in the Hejaz, after he and the Jews were convinced that the officers of Young Turkey were opponents of both sides.

Mark Sykes even explained his vision for the future, saying, "I want to see a British-French understanding of an alliance with Jews and Arabs that makes Islam harmless, and one of the results of this British vision was the Balfour Declaration.

The Balfour Declaration, which was issued after much thoughtfulness, with the consent of America and France and in consultation with Italy and the Vatican, for which the British did not expect a hostile response from the Lord, because they surrounded King Hussein and Prince Faisal on their plans to recreate a Jewish homeland in the Holy Land, was in line with Britain's vision of a single Palestine under the British Mandate and a national home for Jews and respectful of the religious and national rights of non-Jews.

Britain found that an alliance with Arabs and Jews was idealistic that would serve Britain's needs for war and peace, and that the two things would not be a divergence under a British vision that Mesopotamia, Arabia and Palestine would be part of its empire that in the future would be more like a mini-League of Nations.

A ceremony held at the London Opera House organized by the British Zionist Union on 2-12-1917, attended by Mark Sykes, Arabs, Armenians and Christians, witnessed a number of words that emphasized the need for Jews, Arabs and Armenians to help each other and move forward in harmony.

When World War I ended and the Good Conference was held in Paris, Britain found only France with it after the Bolshevik Revolution pushed the Russians away, Wooder Wilson lost the midterm congressional elections, Italy withdrew from the Peace Conference, and the Peace Conference was a French-British one.

Lloyd Gore, the British Prime Minister who spent three years after the war and attended 33 international conferences, to draw a post-war world, says of this conference, that the peoples did not gain as much freedom in a war as they did in the conference of the good, especially the Arabs who gained the independence of Iraq, Al-Jazeera, Syria and Jordan, although most Arabs, including the Arabs of Palestine, fought with the Turkish rule.

This happened as soon as the war ended and the peace conference erupted revolutions in Iraq, Syria and Palestine against the British and French presence, which led to Faisal bin al-Hussein leaving Syria for exile and France controlling Syria, and Ibn Saud took control of the island and Sharif Hussein went out into exile.

The British rulers of Jerusalem saw Palestine as a multi-national country under British auspices, at a time when British officers did not sympathize with Zionism even in this context, and they saw that London's policy was designed to provoke unrest and this is a sacredness that indicates that there is more than one Britain, as we find today more than one America.

The Jews saw Britain's policy as vacillating and hostile to them, and Chaim Weizmann was trying to convince the Arabs that Palestine accommodated everyone, and the Arabs were divided between the Husseini family and the Nashashibi family and between integration with Syria or loyalty to Britain, which was pushing the Arabs not to make concessions.

Violence between Arabs and Jews exploded, and the British rulers of Palestine stood with the Arabs against the Jews, until Churchill came in 1922 and issued the White Paper, which guaranteed the Jews a national home and others full rights.

Churchill tried to convince the Arabs that Jews were not enemies and that Palestine could accommodate everyone, but the Arabs' lack of understanding of the existence of strangers who shared their livelihood, their division and the emergence of Amin al-Husseini sparked the conflict again.

Europe, which swept through the catastrophe of 1914-1918, changed faster after the war than it had before in decades or centuries, and imperialism seemed to a growing number of Europeans, Americans (Wooder Wilson) and Russians (Lenin) concepts of an obsolete era.

Even Britain after 1922 was no longer Britain in 1914, and the settlements of 1922 did not reflect what Britain wanted, which in turn led to the Second High War that removed Britain and France and brought the Soviets as a prince in a new world order.

It is as if Britain, after occupying the region, had left it to a creative chaos just as America had done after the occupation of the race in 2003, and therefore the model of creative chaos experienced by Iraq and the region after 2003, has been British in roots since 1922, as it ended the old Middle East and created a new Middle Eastern question.

The political future of the Kurds in Iraq and the region and the political destiny of the Arabs in Palestine are still intractable, although Britain divided the land into independent secular states based on national citizenship, but they realized that the authority of religion in the region is the main characteristic of the political map that they have to face.

Europe needed 1,500 years to resolve the crisis of its social and political identity after the demise of the Roman Empire, including a thousand years for the political system to stabilize in the form of a nation-state, 500 years to decide which nations have the right to form states, and so is the case of the Middle East, which has entered its historical junction since World War I and its separation is still open.

It is true that the crisis of the Middle East is not as deep as the crisis of Europe and the length of time, but its subject is similar to that of the crisis of Western Europe, in how diverse peoples can regroup themselves to create new political identities for themselves after the collapse of a long imperial system to which they are accustomed.

4. Parties to the conflict

In addition to the Western-Russian and Western-Iranian conflict, the Arab and Jewish conflicting parties can be divided into two fronts, the Arabs of the North and Israel on one side and the Arabs of the Jazira and Israel on the other, namely the front of cross-border religious models, and the front of Westphalian realist models that includes Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Revolutionary models of all kinds are hostile to the international system, unlike Saudi Arabia and Israel, which are allies of the international system, but the models of the Westphalian realistic front suffer from a constitutional flaw, which almost puts them in one front.

Israel, for example, has been a state without a constitution for seventy years, with insistence in the Declaration of Independence that it is a state for the Jewish people wherever it is and this is a religious form, and the recent nation-state law proves this, and Saudi Arabia may move with Vision 2030 to a constitutional monarchy outside the era of 1979.

Perhaps the Middle East will not settle on a new Middle Eastern security and cooperation system, which will resolve its conflicts and integrate it into the international system, until two things are achieved, the first of which is the disappearance of cross-border religious revolutionary factors, and the emergence of a new Middle Eastern security and cooperation system, and then the conflict between the Arabs of the North and the Jews may remain hot and under American administration so as not to get out of control.

– Conflict money

The worst, most dangerous and biggest scenario of the Arab conflict with the Jews is the dominance of the religious character of this conflict from the very beginning, from Mufti Amin al-Husseini to Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, and therefore it is a religious war that turns Muslims around the world against Israel, at a time when international relations have gone beyond the religious idea.

Britain encouraged Mufti Amin al-Husseini for self-determination, but al-Husayni marked his conflict with the Jews with a religious character, and demanded that Palestine join Syria and Jordan, which exacerbated the conflict.

Al-Husayni then met with Hilter, as the Yuzam Hamas and Hezbollah meet Iran, and Husseini tried to persuade Hitler to extend the Nazi program to the Middle East but Hitler refused, saying that the time was not right so Husseini lost and the British defeated him and Hitler so Hitler went to rally Muslims against Jews internationally until he died in 1974.

Therefore, this conflict continued until it reached a stage where there was no longer an Arab-Israeli conflict since Camp David in 1978 and the Wadi Araba Agreement in 1994, and the rest of the Arabs no longer considered themselves in a state of conflict with Israel and the Gulf States had never been a factor in this conflict, since it erupted in the beginning of the twentieth century.

The Arab-Israeli conflict reached its most intense with Nasser, Saddam and Hafez al-Assad, but after the fall of Saddam in 2003, Iraq was preoccupied with internal conflict, and Syria entered an internal war that occupied Bashar, although he and his father kept the border quiet since 1974.

The IRGC has restored the religious character of the conflict with Israel, and with it and the Islamist movements that rose to prominence with the advent of Wilayat al-Faqih, to win public opinion and thus make themselves defenders of Palestine, as did Arab nationalists and the PLO before, albeit a national framework.

The only danger on the border has been with Lebanon and Hezbollah since 1982, and Gaza since 2006, where four wars with Israel took place, with the number of Arab wars before Camp David, and the dilemma of Iran-linked Hezbollah and Hamas lies in the intention to eliminate Jews and not just the state.

Although international relations have transcended the religious idea since the West Valley Agreement of 1648 as a model of governance, the people of the Middle East, due to the velayat-e faqih and the Muslim Brotherhood movement, still live the concepts of Europe during the Thirty Years' War, even though they left the era of the Imperial Osman since 1920.

The international community has granted the Jews the right of Israeli sovereignty over Palestine, and Israel has taken control of the land after several wars, and they say in the words of Abba Eban: We do not need anyone to give Israel the right to exist or negotiate with us because we own it as any country as America and Saudi Arabia, and they associate their right with the right of Saudi Arabia and America, a libertarian nationalist movement as America liberated from Britain and Saudi Arabia from the Osman.

Just as Britain allied itself with the Arabs and Jews during World War I, America allied with them after the Second High War, not to darken their eyes but to use them and have roots in Middle Eastern societies as they wrestled with the Russians, former Osman, Russians and Iran today, and Jews and Arabs would not have gotten what they got yesterday and today, except that America would ally with them today as Britain allied with them 100 years ago.

This equation is important in international alliances, i.e. for alliances to succeed, great powers must ally with a small or medium-sized group or state, not vice versa, and Saudi Arabia and Israel have succeeded in this rate.

It was Arab independence and the establishment of the Jewish state that shaped the region during the first half of the twentieth century and still is, but the change of the international order and the emergence of the bipolar order, stopped the formation of the region under the British umbrella, and pushed the Soviet-American conflict into the Middle East arena to find its resonance in a conflict that is still raging or almost today, but the leadership of the United States of the international system may help find a solution.

The countries and groups of the Middle East are suffering from a historical dispute over religious and national identity, which has made them the focus of an international, regional and local conflict that has not ceased throughout history, and that the attempt of Great Britain to ally with them yesterday and America's attempt to repeat it with them today, may be the basis of the great game.

The shortcut to the big game is the establishment of a Western-sponsored Middle Eastern regional security and cooperation organization that blocks the way for the Russians and is an alternative to the conflict of Middle Eastern countries and groups with each other or an alternative to the difficulty of allying with each other.

Britain found religion to be of great importance in the Middle East, and just as the Soviets created communism as an alternative to religion, the British cultivated nationalism or loyalty to ruling families as an alternative to religion.

The demarcation of the border in Sykes-Picot was the basis for Arab independence, but the biggest problem that stopped the course of the Great Game after the Middle East was overturned was that Britain had changed after the end of the Revolutionary World War and no longer trusted the outcome of the war or the program it had worked to implement.

The Middle East conflict erupted and remains, both between Arabs and Jews, whom Britain considered its two main allies in the Middle East, and among the rest of the components of the Middle East, as if Britain had sown in the Middle East a creative chaos, which America repeated again after 2003 in Iraq and the region, after it implemented the program of the American Ministry of Defense and left the program of the American Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Creative chaos continues to plague the Middle East, although it has produced two opposing fronts, one of which is the model of Israel, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and the front of Arab, Kurdish and Iranian revolutionary models, both nationalist and religious.

Central religious and ethnic models have failed to solve the identity dilemma, and the Federalist: Confederation: Westphalian system born in 1648 and whose opponents have not been able to overthrow it from Napoleon's wars until the wars of Velayat-e Faqih, seems to be the solution to this dilemma.

The federalism of the Middle East is the geopolitical weapon in which America today and Great Britain yesterday are fighting the central Russian model, having triumphed over the central Soviet model in the Cold War, as it had triumphed before it over Hitler's model and is now facing the model of the velayat-e central religious jurist loyal to the Soviet.

A new social contract with a homeland state and citizenship, not a new geographical border that divides the Middle East, is the objective solution based on people's awareness of the importance of the nation-state away from violence, bloodshed and religious revolutions that cross the boundaries of religion, the state and the blood of the people.

Just as people returned to the Westphalian nation-state after the Great Arab Revolt of Arabia against the Ottoman Empire 100 years ago, people may return to the nation-state with a major Arab-led revolt led by Arabia against the empire of Iran, in alliance with the United States.

Sources

Professor Ella Habiba Shahout: Jewish-Arab Tamilat: The Conflict of Identity between Deeth and Ethnicity.

Johnny G. Mearsheimer:Steve M. Walt:2006

The Hijacked America, the Israeli Lobby and the Policy of the United States of America

David Fromkin: Peace Beyond Peace, Third Edition, 1992, pp. 107-627

Karam al-Helou: The Arab-Zionist Conflict from a Different Perspective: Life:24-11-2017

Michelle Brand 2017: myths and facts:AGıde to arab Israeli conflict: pp. 13-27

Chapter Two: The Conflict of the Arabs with the Jews

From 1948 To 2018

Shahu Al , Qaradaghi

Boot:.

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Palestine was subject to the British Mandate from 1920 until 1948 with the borders decided by France and Britain after the First World War in the Treaty of Sèvres, and in 1922 the League of Nations formally recognized the Mandate based on the Balfour Declaration (support from the British government for the right to establish a national home for Jews in Palestine) and the Mandate area covered the Palestinian territories, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Transjordan area.

In 1947, Resolution No. (181) was issued, which divides Palestine with the approval of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and ruled to end the British Mandate of Palestine and divide the territories into three new entities with the aim of resolving the Arab-Jewish conflict by establishing two states: a Jewish state and an Arab state on the land of Palestine with the internationalization of the Jerusalem area (i.e., making it an international area, not belonging to a particular state and placing it under international rule), and in general the Israelis welcomed this division while Arabs and Palestinians felt Unfairly. (1)

After the Jewish Council proclaimed the establishment of the State of Israel on 14-5-1948 and the recognition of the State of Israel by the United States of America on May 16 of the same year, the Arab-Israeli conflict entered another juncture where the forces of five Arab countries, namely Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq, entered Israel to prevent its establishment on the land of Palestine, known as the Palestine War or the "Nakba" and Israel called it the "War of Independence", and military operations continued until January 1949, when Israeli forces succeeded in taking control of the theater of operations, and the war practically led to the confirmation of the partition of Palestine, the departure of more than 400,000 Palestinians from their homes to become refugees and the Arab-Israeli conflict to begin.

The battles between the two sides continued until the intervention of the United Nations Security Council and the imposition of a ceasefire on June 10, 1948, which included the prohibition of supplying arms to any of the parties to the conflict and the attempt to reach a peaceful settlement. (2).

A year after the cessation of the battles and in 1949 a set of agreements were concluded called armistice agreements between Israel and all of Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria to end the Arab-Israeli war and establish armistice lines between Israeli forces and Jordanian-Iraqi forces, and each country signed the agreements separately, and negotiations began on the Greek island of Rhodes with the mediation of the United Nations between Israel on the one hand and each of Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria on the other, while Iraq shelved The truce was not signed. (3)

After the Israeli presence became a fait accompli on Arab lands, the failure of the Arab states to defeat Israel in the military confrontations that took place between the two parties in 1948, and the entry of the Arab states into armistice agreements with Israel to end the fighting, another chapter of the Arab-Israeli conflict was the coming of nationalists to power in the Arab countries, who came through military coups and carried out wars with Israel without a positive result for the Arab side and was Loss is a share of these wars that ended with the Camp David Accords of 1979.

.

First: The Rise of Nationalists and Arab-Israeli Wars

1. The 1956 war "Suez War" or tripartite aggression:.

After the Arab defeat and the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, a group of Egyptian officers formed and commanded a secret group in the Egyptian army that called itself the nationalist "Free Officers", and Gamal Abdel Nasser was elected head of the organization's leadership committee.

On July 23, 1952, the Free Officers Organization succeeded in carrying out a military coup called the "Army Movement" and then became known as the "July 23 Revolution," which resulted in the expulsion of King Farouk, the end of the monarchy, and the proclamation of republic.

In 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser became the elected president of the Egyptian Republic after receiving 99.8% of the then five million votes in a popular referendum.

Egypt signed an agreement with the Soviet Union to provide Egypt with advanced and advanced weapons with the aim of strengthening the armed forces to deter Israel, in addition to the important step of nationalizing the Suez Canal announced by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser on July 26, 1956, which prevented England from profiting from the canal it operated before the nationalization.

France, England and Israel coordinated a full-scale attack on Egypt that began on October 29, 1956 with the entry of Israeli forces into Sinai, which France and England considered an excuse to intervene in the Canal Zone, and despite the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Sinai, international pressure (Soviet and American) and Egyptian resistance led to the end of operations on November 6 and Israel's withdrawal in 1957 from Sinai. (4)

The results of the war: it is the replacement of Britain by the United States of America in the region, the establishment and consolidation of Israel after the destruction of the Egyptian army and its Soviet weapons, and Israel owned navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba, and made what it obtained in 1948 uncompromising, with the freezing of the situation between Egypt and Israel for ten years until 1967. (5)

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2. The 1967 War:

It is known in the Arab world as the setback, while Israel and international writings call it the "Six-Day War" and one of the reasons for this war is Egypt's demand to withdraw the United Nations forces from Sinai and start mobilizing its army in Sinai, and close it on May 22 the straits of "Tiran" in the Red Sea in the face of Israeli navigation, which caused the siege of the Gulf of Aqaba, and this is what Israel considered as an official declaration of war on it.

On June 5, 1967, as a preemptive measure, Israel bombed Egyptian air bases, then Israeli tanks began to move towards the Egyptian border, after which the Arab countries declared war against Israel, and in the middle of the night of the same day Tel Aviv announced that it had completely destroyed the Egyptian Air Force by disabling at least 400 aircraft between 300 Egyptian and 50 Syrian aircraft.

Although the Israeli view considered this war the first major Arab attempt to eliminate the young Hebrew state once and for all, the results of the war were disastrous on the Arab side and the war lasted only six days, which led to the great defeat of the Arab parties, the occupation of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, the destruction of the majority of Arab military equipment, which reached 80%, the displacement of thousands of Palestinians from the West Bank, and the unleashing of settlement in the Palestinian territories, including It has East Jerusalem.

3. The 1973 war (the Sixth of October War, Israel calls it the "Yum Kippur War (Feast of Atonement)

Both Egypt and Syria sought to retake the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula and the Syrian Golan Heights, which Israel occupied in the 1967 war, and failed international peace efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli crisis, especially after Israel's rejection of Roger's second plan presented by the United States of America, which provides for Israel's withdrawal from the Arab territories it occupied in 1967.

As part of a joint military plan, Egyptian and Syrian forces launched a surprise offensive against Israeli forces in Sinai and the Golan, smashing Israel's first lines of defense on October 6, 1973 and continuing the war until October 26 of the same year.

One of the results of the war was the restoration of full Egyptian sovereignty over the Suez Canal, the recovery of part of the territory in the Sinai Peninsula, and the return of navigation to the Suez Canal in 1975, and was a prelude to the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel.

Camp David Accords

After these wars and conflicts that have occurred between the Arab countries and Israel since the proclamation of the State of Israel in 1948, a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt was drafted at the Camp David presidential residence in 1978 where the talks lasted 12 days, and was officially signed in 1979 in Washington in what is known as the peace process, by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Israeli Prime Minister Menahmebegen, and US President Jimmy Carter, as a witness to the agreement after three Decades of war and hostilities.

Among the most important elements of this agreement are the end of the state of war between Egypt and Israel, the establishment of friendly relations between them, the withdrawal of Israel from the Sinai occupied in 1967, the guarantee of the passage of the Suez Canal by Israeli ships, the consideration of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba as international waterways, in addition to the start of negotiations to establish an autonomous area for Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 242, which called for "the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from the territories." occupied by it in the recent conflict and respect for the sovereignty, recognition, territorial integrity, political independence and right to live in peace under secure and recognized borders free from any threats or actions by the use of force" (6)

The Egyptian motives for carrying out this agreement are represented by the assertion that the Israeli presence has become a regional and international reality, the major powers including the former Soviet Union and the United States of America are committed to ensuring its security and protecting the legitimacy of its survival, and that the Arab countries have agreed to resort to peaceful means by accepting to participate in the Geneva conference.

It is clear that Sadat realized that previous wars with Israel did not provide positive results for the Arab countries involved in the war and the Palestinians, and therefore there would be no point in continuing in the state of conflict and wars if the results were counterproductive in favor of Israel, especially since the economic conditions of Egypt were in a significant decline, which prompted Sadat not to link Egypt's interests to the will of the rest of the Arab countries, especially Syria, where Hafez al-Assad's position was strict and rejecting dialogue with Israel.

Sadat believed that former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser had made a mistake in challenging the West and siding with the Soviet Union and that Nasser had wreaked havoc on Egypt, so he felt that the way to get the Egyptians out of the difficulties they faced was to reach an agreement with Israel and re-establish good relations with the West where improving the economic reality was one of Sadat's motives for moving towards peace.

It seems that the nationalist regimes that dominated the Arab countries, whether in Egypt in 1952, or in Syria and the advent of the Baath Socialist Party in March 1963, or in Iraq with the emergence of the Baathists in 1968, and the dissemination of nationalist ideas and the attempt to unite and slogans against Israel, but in the end they succumbed to the fait accompli and somehow tried to reach bargains with Israel or were preoccupied with the internal situation because of its wrong policies and this led to This nationalism demanding to fight Israel has disappeared among the countries of the region, and in return a new thought has emerged, namely the velayat-e faqih in Iran, which holds the same ideas towards Israel but with the same sectarianism and religion and not nationalism.

Second: Wilayat al-Faqih and the wars against Israel

A year after the Camp David Accords, the region was with another event, the emergence of the regime of the Wali al-Faqih in Iran, where Khomeini returned from exile in France to the capital Tehran on February 1, 1979, and a popular referendum on the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran was held on April 1, 1979 and officially announced.

The new Iranian regime, unlike the previous regime, was a revolutionary regime that tried to export the revolution abroad and became an ideological state that works to export ideas and intervene in the countries of the region by forming armed militias and spreading terrorism and chaos in order to expand political influence.

Khomeini's position was rejecting the Israeli presence and was calling for the complete end of the State of Israel, and this was embodied in his speeches where he says in a speech in 1979, "For almost twenty years now, I have been recommending that the Arab countries unite and expel this corruption material Israel, because if there is an opportunity, it will not be satisfied with occupying Jerusalem, it is the germ of corruption."

He was also attacking Egypt over the Camp David Accords, saying that "Israel and its good friend Egypt are today thinking of finding a central seed in the region in order to eliminate Muslims and their high intellectual values." (7)

In 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon to destroy the PLO, marginalize Syrian influence, install a friendly government in Beirut, and within days Tehran deployed the Revolutionary Guard Corps in eastern Lebanon to show support for the Shiite community in Lebanon and open the door to greater Iranian intervention, and Iran trained and equipped an armed group that developed into the Iranian Hezbollah group in Lebanon. Israel succeeded in occupying parts of southern Lebanon that lasted until 2000, destroying PLO bases.

- War of 1993 "Settling of Account"

It is a seven-day military campaign launched by the Israel Defense Forces in July 1993 in southern Lebanon to limit the firing of Hezbollah rockets at Israeli communities, and the spring of 1993 witnessed the firing of rockets from Hezbollah centers along the Lebanese side of the border as well as clashes between Israeli forces and Hezbollah elements, which prompted Israel to declare a military operation against the group's strongholds in which more than 27,000 shells were thrown and Launching a thousand rockets and damaging Lebanese infrastructure.

After one week of fighting, the United States of America was able to broker a ceasefire between Israel, Syria, Lebanon and Hezbollah and included a series of truce understandings negotiated by Lebanon and Syria pledging to limit Hezbollah's activities in their territories and to give Israel the right to retaliate by any means possible in the event that Hezbollah resumed firing rockets at Israel.

- July 2006 War

The July War (Lebanon War 2006) began when special forces from the Lebanese Hezbollah carried out an operation to capture two Israeli soldiers on July 12, 2006, which led to Israeli forces penetrating the Lebanese border with the occupied territories to be received by an explosive device that destroyed a tank and killed 8 soldiers, effectively starting the 33-day war between Hezbollah and Israel, in which the Israeli Air Force launched violent raids on Hezbollah positions, and the war ended with the withdrawal of the Israeli army. From Lebanon after the adoption of UN Resolution 1701.

This war formed part of the major strategic confrontation in the Middle East between Iran and its allies and the United States of America and its allies, and it was clear that Israel was facing Iran in the war and it was not like the war it fought against the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1982 but the war was Iranian, where it participated alongside Hezbollah Hamas in Gaza also by firing mortar shells at Israeli army positions along the border with the Gaza Strip, and the operation was The militarism carried out by Hezbollah is similar to the kidnapping by Hamas of an Israeli soldier (Gilad Shalit), which means increased rapprochement and coordination between Hezbollah and Hamas at the time because of the existence of a quadripartite relationship between them and Iran and Syria, and according to expectations that the actions of Hezbollah and Hamas cannot come without the tacit consent of Tehran. (8)

Gaza War 2008-2009

On 27 December 2008, Israeli forces declared war on the Gaza Strip under the title "Cast Lead" and the conflict began in 2008 and ended in mid-January 2009.

The relationship between Iran and Hamas was clearly demonstrated during the war, when Iran provided Hamas with financial support, weapons stockpiles, and combat capabilities used by Hamas to combat Israeli forces in the 2008-2009 conflict, and U.S. and Israeli officials claim that many of Hamas' rockets, especially long-range ones, were made in Iran, and Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal paid a visit to Tehran on February 2, 2009 and thanked Iran for its assistance during the Gaza conflict and described it as a "partner in the Gaza conflict." Victory."

During the 2008 Gaza war, Iranian leaders, including Supreme Leader Khamenei, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, and President Ahmadinejad provided continued rhetorical support to Hamas, saying "Iran will not abandon the group," as IRGC commander Ibrahim Jaafari hinted in July 2008 that "Iran will use Hezbollah or Hamas to respond if Iran is attacked".[9]

Iran provided important training to Hamas during 2008, and several reports indicate that at least 150 Hamas operatives trained in Iran in March 2008, and seven to ten members of Iran's Quds Force also entered Gaza to train Hamas operatives to use weapons smuggled into the Strip and search areas bordering Israel using forged Iraqi passports to cross the Rafah crossing (10).

The "Protective Edge" war of July 2014 or "Storm Eaten:.

This war lasted 51 days and ended on August 26, 2014, and the aim of the war was to destroy the capabilities of the Palestinian factions and the infrastructure of the Gaza Strip, and the Israeli forces launched about 60,000 air, land and sea raids on the Strip, and caused significant damage to the Strip and financial losses estimated at $ 5 billion.

On August 26, 2014, Israel and the Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip, under Egyptian auspices, reached a truce that ended the war and the terms of the truce included the resumption of indirect Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and the entry into force of the ceasefire.

It seems that this war has returned blood to the artery of relations between Hamas and Iran where it has witnessed a lukewarm due to differences between the two sides on the reading of the Syrian scene and the position on the events in Syria after 2011, but this war has returned Hamas to the Iranian home, Bassem Naim, a leader in Hamas, said that the new Iranian leadership is keen to obtain additional power cards in its negotiations with the West by strengthening its relationship with the forces in the region, and Hamas is considered the head of the A bayonet in these forces, in order to take advantage of their relationship as a pressure card in the upcoming final negotiations" (11).

Is it possible to see Camp David or another peace agreement similar to the Egyptian-Israeli agreement in 1978 but this time between and Iran?

After the major powers signed the nuclear deal with Iran on July 14, 2015, the talk was about the possibility that the Iran deal with other countries would be a new Camp David! Some have been pinning hopes on the deal for a shift in the regional order and be the beginning of a reorganization of the regional order, and not remain limited in the narrow nuclear field, but after the withdrawal of the US president from the nuclear agreement on May 8, 2018 and his imposition of economic sanctions against Iran with to sit down and negotiate with Iran's leaders or reach another agreement between the two parties, the attention will be on the way Donald Trump deals with Tehran, and it is certain that the experience of Camp David Although it carries strong political challenges to the American, Israeli and Egyptian arenas and the great political opposition to the agreement, it has succeeded in building peace between Egypt and Israel and developing strategic relations, and the United States of America has come up with how to manage the structure of the alliance that included both Israel and Egypt along with the Gulf states that consider Israel hostile, so Camp David may be a possible model for application, and it is possible to change the region without the condition of changing Public positions, provided that the United States of America can integrate Tehran into a regional order that balances relations with other partners as it did for decades after Camp David. (12).

Despite the incursion of Iran's militias into the region and the introduction of chaos in many countries in order to expand Iranian influence and the enthusiastic speeches of the leaders of the Revolutionary Guards, Tehran suffers from difficult economic conditions, a collapse in the currency rate and an internal popular revenge against the wrong economic policies that have caused many crises and problems, and therefore Tehran is expected to change its behavior in order to get rid of these problems, despite the existence of all scenarios, including a change in the region. Behavior by the current regime or regime change due to internal or external factors, reaching a comprehensive peace agreement is possible with the United States of America can be called Camp David II.

Sources

(1)https://mawdoo3.com/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1_%D8%B9%D9%86_%D9%82%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%A9_%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86

(2)http://hebroo111.over-blog.com/2015/09/1948-1.html

(3)http://www.wikiwand.com/ar/%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%A9_1949

(4)http://www.aljazeera.net/specialfiles/pages/fe0a1b90-669d-4870-b46e-c3e7f93f9635

(5)http://melhamy.blogspot.com/2014/11/1956.html

(6)http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2013/07/130729_timeline_history_mid_east_peace_talks

(7)http://nedaalbahrain.com/iran-i15368

(8)https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/13/world/middleeast/13mideast.html

(9)“IRGC Commander Warns of ‘Very Quick,’ ‘Crushing’ Response to Enemy Attack,” Jam-e-Jam, July 2, 2008, http://wnc.dialog.com/.

(10).https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-hamas-relationship-in-2008#_ednd92864b279fa358a0058f3032e965bb045

(11)http://www.islamist-movements.com/3092

(12)https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/07/14/can-the-iran-deal-be-a-new-camp-david/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.2598daf7c15f

Chapter Three...

Iraqi-Israeli Relations After Wilayat al-Faqih

Muhannad Al , Allam

Jewish groups in Iraq and Iran....

Class division and functional differentiation

The Jewish groups within both Iraq and Iran were not cohesive and united, they were subject to the class and cultural conflicts that characterize any human society, including the rich and poor, some of them benefited economically from the entry of colonialism and the emergence of the new Western economic sector, some of them fell victim to it, some of them absorbed and integrated into the extraneous Western culture, and some of them failed to do so, although the first team was much larger than the second.

The Jewish community in Iraq included three classes. At the top of the class ladder are a number of wealthy aristocratic families known for their wealth, status, status, and strong relationship with the ruling elite, among them Crulu, Soares, Harare, Chicorel, Sednaoui, Adass, and other bankers, businesses, large landowners, and prominent landlords in public life.

This class, which included the wealthy and financiers, is followed by a middle class, headed by exporters and importers, shopkeepers and self-employed professions in Baghdad and Basra. A large number of Jewish employees in the offices of some institutions that had a high percentage of Jews also belonged to this segment. This segment competed with the super-rich class, but the members of each of these classes were completely connected to Britain, language and culture.

Then finally comes the poor Jews, who were street vendors and small artisans and mostly Arabized Jews. Most of these poor people live in Baghdad; in Jewish shops in Saadoun or in the Ras al-Qarya neighborhood, for example.

The children of Arabized Jews would go to the Alliance schools and obtain the European culture necessary to enter the Western economic sector. It can be added here that although there are poor members of the Jewish community, if the average income of the members of the Jewish community were compared to the average income of the members of the Jewish community in Iraq, it would be shown that the average income of the Jewish Iraqi was higher than the average income of other Iraqis, and it would be clear that the Jews knew extreme poverty only in very small numbers.

As for the functional, professional or economic situation, the picture was composite. In the Kurdish-dense areas of Iraq, Jews worked as shepherds and farmers. But, in general, members of Jewish communities are not present as workers or peasants, i.e. they were far from the base of the productive pyramid.

Among them were artisans who worked in some handicrafts such as goldsmiths, dyeing and glass handicrafts, as well as liquor making. There were large numbers of them, in middle-class occupations, working in medicine, pharmacy and journalism, including university professors. They have worked as government employees, and individuals in Iraq and Iran have reached the posts of ministers, and have elected and appointed members of parliament such as Sasson Heskel, a member of parliament and finance minister of Iraq, and Menachem Daniel, a senator in Iraq as well.

Also in Iraq, Jews contributed to domestic and international commercial economic activity and to financial activity, both at a small usurious level and at the modern banking level. There were banks such as Zalkha Bank and Credit Bank. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, some important financial and commercial figures had emerged in Baghdad (such as Sheikh Sassoon bin Saleh, dean of the Sassoon family that later settled in India, Isaac the Banker, and Menachem Aini), and the economic conditions of members of the Jewish community flourished after the opening of the Suez Canal as the trade line between England and India ran through Basra.

One of the most important financial figures in Basra during the second half of the nineteenth century was Khoja Yacoub and Adun Abdullah. The Jews almost dominated the trade of exports and imports and a high proportion of the retail trade, and they also monopolized the trade of the most important goods in Iraq's markets such as the manufacture of simplers, mats, furniture, shoes, timber, medicines, weapons, fabrics, tobacco, rice and sweets, as well as major dealers of precious stones and jewelry and of major goldsmiths.

The owners of Baghdad's largest companies (Kadoorie and Ezra Medlawi) were the only agents for importing the fats and greases of the American petroleum company Mobil Oil with its branches in Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk. Basra's Jews had a monopoly on 95 percent of the country's business in 1914. Although the percentage declined slightly, it remained 90-85 percent in 1933 and 65-75 percent in 1946. 95% of Iraq's imports before World War II (but only 10% of its exports) were in the hands of Jews. Most of them, which were called "Manchester goods", were imported from Manchester, England.

Members of the Jewish community made great fortunes by re-exporting these goods to Iran. Iraqi Jews have benefited from their network of commercial and financial ties abroad, especially with Iraqi Jews who have settled in India, the Far East, and England such as the Sasson and Ezra families.

After 1948, the proportion fell to 20 percent of Iraq's imports and 2 percent of its exports. The same is almost noticeable in Iran, where Jews are concentrated in business and finance. In the 1947 census, 46.5% of them work in trade, 36.1% practice various industrial occupations, 7.6% in self-employed and 4.1% work in agriculture.

The Kadoori Family

A Jewish business and financial family of Iraqi origin settled in the Far East where they made a fortune by working in banking, transportation, construction and construction, and contributed to the development of Shanghai and Hong Kong.

The founder of the family was Saleh Khadduri, who was one of Baghdad's richest. His son Sir Ellis Khadduri was born in 1865-1922 – in Baghdad where he was educated at the Alliance Israel Universal School.

In 1880, he moved to Bombay, India where he worked administratively in the offices of the Sassoon family, then began to establish and develop his own business and business in Hong Kong and China and made a great fortune. Ellis was awarded the title of "Sir" in 1917 in recognition of the services he rendered to the British colonialist in the Far East.

He made significant financial contributions to many Jewish and non-Jewish institutions, supporting Alliance Israel Universal and the Anglo-Jewish Association, and founding two agricultural schools for Jews.

Arabs in Baghdad also contributed to the establishment of other schools in Baghdad and Bombay. After his death, Ellis recommended that part of his wealth be allocated to the construction of schools bearing his name in Palestine and Iraq, in light of which the Khadduri Agricultural College in Palestine was established in 1931.

His brother Sir Elly (Eliezer Silas) Khaduri (1867-1944), born in Baghdad, moved with his brother to the Far East and founded the Ai Foundation. S. Khadduri & Co. in Hong Kong and Shanghai, was also a partner of the Ai Foundation. S.S. Khadduri and his sons. He was awarded the title of Sir in 1926. Sir Illy and his brother co-founded several educational institutions and hospitals in the Far East and Iraq. However, he paid special attention to the Zionist project in Palestine, especially since 1900, heading the Palestine Foundation Fund in Shanghai, contributing to the establishment of a number of agricultural schools in Palestine, and contributing a large sum to the construction of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

His two sons, Lawrence (1899) and Horas (1902), ran the family business in Hong Kong and supported its small Jewish community.

Like other wealthy Jewish families in the Far East, India and some Middle Eastern countries, the Khadduri family acted as the intermediate functional group whose interests were linked to their presence in these regions, linked to the interests of colonialism translated into financial, commercial, real estate, transport and other activities within the framework of the Western capitalist project that sought to deplete the resources of this country and its peoples and which found in many religious and ethnic minorities, including Jewish groups, a certain good to achieve its purposes. The Jewish community in Iran...

The Safavid dynasty, a Shia Persian dynasty, ruled Persia from 1502 to 1736, making Shia the state religion, and the Shia clerical class (mullahs) made its backbone. Its rule was characterized by the persecution of minorities, and it applied to Jews the Shia concept of the impurity of dhimmis.

Under the Qajar dynasty (1795–1925), the repression of Jews increased, as was the case in Mashhad in 1839. Islam was forced on some members of the Jewish community, who turned into undercover Jews, i.e., lined Judaism and showed Islam, and called them "new Islam." A Jew who converts to Islam has the right to inherit the property of all members of his family who have remained in their religion.

The U.S. intervention on behalf of Iran's Jews began in 1897 when the U.S. Consul General in Tehran attempted to appear their protector and defender of their rights.

With the beginning of the century, the first reference to members of Iran's Jewish community appears in U.S. diplomatic documents. In 1918, the U.S. State Department diverted some U.S. Jewish aid to Persian Jews, and then Joseph Shaul Confield, a Jewish rabbi and representative of the United States, continued to do so.

Tehran, in intervening on behalf of the Jews of Iran in 1924 and this was accompanied by a movement by the Alliance group, which consisted of the opening of Jewish schools, where one school was opened in 1898 in Tehran, another in Isfahan in 1901 and a third in Shiraz in 1903.

After World War II, the United States contributed to funding Jewish education in Iran. The status of Jews under the Pahlavi dynasty (1925–1979) then changed, and with the advent of tendencies towards the introduction of Western and secular values, the Iranian ruling elite emerged.

But with the advent of Khomeini's 1979 revolution, the Jewish-Iranian relationship changed and nearly an alliance between Israel and Iran was established, with the Iran-Contra scandal revealing the truth of their relationship far from the slogans of death to Israel.

Today, Iran's President Rouhani's statement in Vienna last week about the Jewish-Iranian relationship, which has been ongoing since it saved the Jewish knight from Babylon, according to the official Iranian statement.

Jewish Communities in Iraq and Iran

And its transformation into a settlement element

After the end of World War I, British colonialism in Iraq attempted to expand its influence among the population by imposing protection on members of minorities and giving them rights and privileges that were not available to members of the majority so that the minority would turn into a population enclave whose interests and aspirations would be linked to the colonial protectors and would turn into an intermediate functional group between the colonial power and the local population, a process called the "minority protection" process.

The protection of minorities means that one of the major powers that have ambitions in a state declares its responsibility for a minority living within the borders of the target state and places it under its "protection", that is, interferes in the affairs of the state in which the minority lives under the pretext of defending the interests of that minority. This minority may be religious such as Catholics in Lebanon and Copts in Egypt, ethnic Kaldruz in Lebanon and Syria, or religious ethnicity such as Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.

This idea of protection is aimed at convincing members of a minority that its interests differ from those of its surroundings and that the best way to protect these interests is to ally with the friendly West, that is, the West (by protecting the minority) turns it into a functional group that works for it.

The concept of protecting Jews is well established in Western civilization, as a functional group, Jews were close to the ruling elite, which gave them covenants and privileges in exchange for serving and making gains for them. The concept was revived with the advent of Zionism, Zionism is a reproduction of the relationship of the functional group with the ruling elite and takes the form of the relationship of the functional state with the imperialist patron.

The protection of Jews was one of the mechanisms by which the Jews of the Arab world were converted from local Jews and immigrants to settlement material, a process that was not limited to Jews or to Palestine; it included members of other religious minorities and the entire Arab world.

To understand the struggle of Western countries over the protection of minorities, we must examine the religious dimension of the Western colonial process. Western imperialism, like all secular formats, has used religious texts as preambles to recruit its masses and to mobilize armies. In this sense, we are talking about the religious dimension of Western colonialism as a secular, non-religious employment of religion.

The Western colonial project began with Catholic, Portuguese and Spanish colonialism, which achieved the first impulse through which South America was colonized. However, after this impulse, the Catholic colonial formation came to a halt as Spain and Portugal had entered a stalemate, Italy was fragmented, and there was no Catholic colonial power other than France. But the French Revolution and the defeat of Napoleon slowed down the French colonial project, which was only active again in Africa in the sixties of the last century, but the emergence of Germany was eliminated in the seventies which made it largely satisfied with the role of a vassal of England.

As the Catholic colonial project declined, the Protestant colonial project emerged and the center of gravity shifted from the Mediterranean basin to the Atlantic Ocean. The Netherlands emerged as a colonial power, followed by England, which grew stronger and became the center leader in the world. Germany had crowded it out for some time at the end of the nineteenth century.

But the emergence of the United States as the capitalist superpower favored the Anglo-Saxon formation within the Protestant colonial formation. In the eighteenth century Russia emerged as an Orthodox colonial power.

It is noted that the tripartite religious division: Catholic Protestant Orthodox, is offset by a tri-ethnic division: Latin Anglo-Saxon Slavs, which shows that religion is nothing but a preamble and a thin shell covering economic interests and ethnic visions.

The conflict between the various colonial powers in their religious preambles expressed itself, with each state trying to protect a religious minority and preserve its rights, which in fact meant placing it within the sphere of influence of the protecting Power and turning it into its own human material.

France supported and protected Catholics, and Russia supported the Orthodox. They thought that, with the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Catholic and Orthodox subjects would claim Palestine for their sponsoring states, so the Zionists were keen to convince the Italians and French that Zionist activity would not endanger their interests.

But the most active colonial powers were the Prussian and English Protestant powers, and where there were no Protestant Arabs, a minority had to be sought "to protect", and a strong Protestant missionary activity took place among Arab Orthodox and Catholic Christians, a deeply meaningful fact in the field of basic Western missionary activity not Muslims but Arab Christians, and members of Jewish communities became candidates to play the role of a protectable and caring minority.

A deep rivalry has arisen between colonial powers to protect their minority. The number of Jews who enjoyed foreign protection in Palestine increased by the mid-fifties to five thousand, meaning that half of Palestine's Jews became protectorate Jews versus Ottoman flag Jews, and foreign consulates worked to prevent the Ottoman authorities from enforcing laws that were intended to limit the flow of Jews into Palestine.

These consulates also assisted them in the process of circumventing the law so that they could buy agricultural land. The protection of minorities continued until the beginning of the First World War. In 1914, the German Foreign Office intervened to protect Russian Jews in Palestine from expulsion, culminating in the Balfour Declaration, the Mandate and the establishment of the state, and the Strategic Cooperation Agreement between Israel and the United States.

This pattern of minority protection process is the first form of settler colonialism by transforming an integrated local minority into a strange element that owes allegiance to a strange Western power! Western Jewish institutions, especially Zionist-oriented Alliance, played a key role in this.

Alliance founded a series of schools across Iraq and was entered by Jewish children from all communities, both local and expatriate. In Iraq, they did not learn the language of their country (Arabic), but mainly English, French and other European languages, which led to the Westernization of most members of the Jewish community, their isolation from their compatriots and their cultural, social and economic marginalization.

This trend towards economic and cultural marginalization was deepened by the presence of Jewish elements from the West, sometimes outnumbering local Jews. The expatriate element was, of course, a strong attraction for local elements as the expats had the competencies to deal with the dominant colonial power and with the emerging modern economy.

Thus, the local element quickly acquired a Western character until it became difficult, in many cases, to distinguish local Arabized Jews from expatriate Jews.

But Iraqi Jews were an exception to this rule, as large numbers of them did not join the Jews of the Western world and retained their Arab identity. There was a segment that acquired Western culture in the Alliance schools and relied on by the British occupation authorities to serve in their new administration in the aftermath of World War I.

The members of the Jewish community do not seem to differ much in their behavior from some members of the ruling elite in the Arab countries or from some members of other marginal classes of society who leave their national culture and identity, acquire the culture of the invader and learn his language. In fact, they aim to achieve social mobility, and end up fully uniting with this invader and then leaving with him when the hour comes.

Minority members are more vulnerable to this process than majority members because of their marginality with regard to the basic symbols of society. It is ironic to note that the emancipation and modernization of the Jews of the Arab world took place outside the scope of Arab society itself and at rates different from those of its modernization, and it was carried out through invading forces. Therefore, while emancipation and modernization in the West led to the integration of Jews into their societies, the political and social process itself was completely opposite in Arab society.

Many Jewish citizens decided to take advantage of the laws of privileges, naturalizing themselves as one of the European nationalities where some Western countries encouraged this trend to create a bridgehead for them. In Algeria in particular, French citizenship was given to all Algerian Jews in an attempt to increase the French human density within Algeria, and this was part of the settler-colonial scheme. With the outbreak of the Algerian Revolution, the majority of the Jews of Great Algeria were French citizens. The number was lower in Tunisia and Morocco because the French government did not encourage this trend there.

After Britain's occupation of Iraq following World War I, members of the Jewish community in Iraq sought British citizenship, applying to that effect to the British High Commissioner in 1921 but Britain did not respond to their request.

Iraq's 118,000 Jews numbered 77,000 in 1947 and concentrated in Baghdad. There were also a high percentage of them in Basra and Mosul, meaning that most of Iraq's Jews were urban dwellers, although this excludes Kurdistan's 18,000 Jews.

Another element that has contributed to deepening the trend toward Westernization is the functional and economic composition of members of Jewish communities, especially among expatriates. They were concentrated in certain commercial occupations (international trade), finance (usury, brokerage and stock exchange business) and craftsmanship (liquor making), professions that transformed them into intermediate functional groups mainly linked to the Western economic sector and to the dominant power.

It was no coincidence that most Arabization or nationalization decisions had always harmed the interests of members of the Jewish community and other quasi-European communities, such as Greeks, Italians and Maltese, who were expatriates or who had been culturally and economically marginalized.

This process of marginalization increased with the increasing activity of the Zionist movement, which tried to identify Jews not as Arabs or even Westerners but as Jews who owe allegiance to the Jewish people and then to the Zionist state.In the twenties, the Jewish Agency formed a spy network in the Arab world that used legitimate Jewish institutions and organizations (such as Maccabee clubs) as facades that concealed their hostile and illegal activity.

In the thirties, the Jewish Agency established an intelligence service followed by an Arab division headed by Moshe Sharett. In 1937, the Mossad established a center to train some Arab Jews in espionage against their country, called the "Arab Boys."

After the establishment of the state, some Arab-Jewish elements were recruited to carry out acts of sabotage that served their interests, as happened in the Lavon incident when some Egyptian Jews were recruited to harm relations between Egypt's new revolutionary government in 1952 and those of Western countries. The establishment of the Zionist state, which claims to be a Jewish state that represents all the Jews of the world, including the Jews of the Arab world, brought the process of marginalization to its climax.

However, the majority of Iraq's Jews have been spared the aforementioned process of marginalization for some time, so they enjoyed a great deal of stability and economic prosperity and benefited from the country's economic prosperity during the years of World War II, and Jews were exposed to only some sporadic events that came as a reaction either to developments in Palestine or to the escalation of anti-British sentiment.

The most serious of these events was the unrest of 1941, which followed the defeat of Rashid Ali al-Kilani's forces to British forces and the fall of his regime. Between 170 and 180 Jews and a larger number of non-Jews were victims of these unrest, known as the Farhuds, and after these events, things were restored.

Therefore, the Zionist movement found it very difficult to encourage them to emigrate to Palestine, and eventually had to resort to terrorism against them when it pushed its agents to place explosives in synagogues and in the gathering places of the members of the group so that it would appear as if society was beginning to move against the Jews.

It is also known that Iraqi Jews played a remarkable role in the establishment of the communist movement in Iraq. These movements were anti-colonial activities. There was a remarkable Jewish presence in the communist movement in Iraq, such as the Jewish journalist Naim Kattan, Murad Ammari and others who adopted an anti-Zionist stance and founded an organization called the Anti-Zionist League.

When the Iraqi communist movement decided to play a more active role in its Arab surroundings, it asked Jewish leadership members to resign, and they did so by influencing the party's interest over their own self-interest.

The constitutions of Iraq and other Arab states have guaranteed Jews equal religious, political, and economic rights. Each Jewish community had its own schools, newspapers, Arabic, English, and French, and courts.

It is ironic that has the deepest significance that the Jews of the Arab countries constituted a very small minority that was irrelevant to the Jews of the world, and now they constitute the majority of Israel's population. Jews of Iraqi origin numbered 129,499, the most famous of which was Shlomo Hillel. They were joined by 130,000 Jews from Iran and 100,000 Kurdish Jews.

Immigration of members of Jewish communities in Iraq and Iran

Country

1948-1951

1952-1954

1955-1957

1958-1960

Iraq

121.512

1.382

361

233

Iran

24.804

5.750

2.035

7.230

Jewish groups and the feasibility of dialogue and peace with them...

Members of Jewish communities in the Arab world do not constitute a religious, cultural, or linguistic unit. Jewish groups can be divided into Arabized Jews who speak Arabic and belong to the Arab-Islamic civilizational formation as the Jews of Yemen. There are Sephardic Jews who speak Ladino, and there are Ashkenazi Jews who speak Yiddish. Western Jews who speak their country's various languages such as French, English and German. There are Berber Jews in the Atlas Mountains who speak various Berber languages.

The Jews of Kurdistan in Iraq and Iran are the ones who speak Kurdish and Aramaic. Although some of them spoke Arabic, they were considered Arabized Jews.

This heterogeneity manifests itself in the form of conflict between different Jewish groups. In Morocco, Sephardic Jews coming to Morocco referred to indigenous Jews as "Tochavim," that is, indigenous or local populations, a phrase that carries some slanderous overtones. The original Jews, in turn, referred to the expatriates as "Majurashim", i.e. exiles or outcasts!

While the Jews of Sana'a in Yemen look with contempt at the Jews of the mountains and consider them inferior to them. Nor were the two groups intertwined with each other. In Egypt, the Sephards and Ashkenazi viewed the Arabized Jews of Egypt with some condescension. The Sephards also referred to the newcomers from the Ashkenazi as "Shacht", that is, the bad guys, because of the involvement of a large number of them in suspicious activities, especially prostitution, and they viewed them with great condescension.

These attitudes were in most cases a reflection of similar attitudes in society that prevailed among members of the majority. A sharp conflict then broke out between the advocates of Zionism and its enemies. Indeed, the division of Arab Jews was prominent in the regulatory framework as it was not characterized by any centralization or unity unless the state imposed it, as happened in Egypt.

Members of Arabized Jewish communities are culturally integrated into the Arab-Islamic cultural environment of each group. The Jews of Morocco were Moroccans or Berbers with the same folklore as Moroccans or Berbers and the same cultural and civilizational level, visiting the Jewish parents, and there were even many cases where Muslims and Jews blessed and visited one poly. The pro-Nazi Vichy government has asked the Moroccan government to extradite members of Jewish groups to the Nazis for extermination, as has happened with large numbers of French Jews. But Morocco's King Mohammed V confronted them, leaving the Jewish community at risk of extermination. The same goes for the Jews of Libya, Algeria, Egypt and other Arab countries.

But there were, of course, non-Arab Jewish elements that were mainly linked to Western and then colonial civilizational formation. The Sephards were among these elements. And also, of course, the Ashkenazi who settled in the Arab world with increasing Western influence and with the faltering modernization of Russia beginning in 1882. The concentration of members of Jewish communities in the cities is noted because of their occupation of professions and their concentration in certain economic sectors.

Thus, the future of dialogue and the achievement of peace between Iraq and Israel is linked to several factors, including social and cultural factors that have been explained in detail in the past of this research, including depending on what will become of the conflict between Wilayat al-Faqih and Israel.

This conflict will last for a long time and does not necessarily have to be in Israel's favor, and it is a cruel and destructive conflict for one of the parties, so the desired peace will not be achieved until the outcome of this conflict is resolved.

Iran sometimes exaggerates the "death to Israel," which is more propaganda than my belief. Officials boast of it as a picture of Iranian influence in Iraq, provoking angry reactions among Iraqis and Israelis alike. The Iraqis are angered by this slogan and provoke them because it reminds them of the military methodology favored by Iran, and Israel is angered by this slogan because it will not produce decisive military results.

Israel's restraint, however, is an affirmation that Iran continues to play a significant military role in Iraq, at least as long as this slogan still exists and poses an imminent threat, and that Iraq proves unable to deal with this threat on its own.

Geography, politics, economics, and religion have ensured that Iran retains significant influence in Iraq. There will always be Iraqis willing to partner with Iran for practical, ideological, or mercenary-related reasons, especially as long as Iran is seen as a rising power and leader of the region's most cohesive interlocutor.

It is Iraqi nationalism, Iran's own policies, and Tehran's sometimes condescending behavior that constitute the most powerful constraints on Iranian influence in Iraq. But without U.S. and Israeli efforts determined to remove the Iranian presence, Iran will remain the most influential external power in Iraq. Peace with Israel will therefore not be achieved.

Proven Sources:

Ahmed Sousse, Arabs and Jews in History, Freedom House, 5th Edition, Baghdad, 1981.

Arima Belkhader, Contemporary Political Fundamentalism through the Zionist Vision - A Critical Analytical Study - University of Algiers Ben Youssef Ben Khadda, The Mechanism of Political Science and Media, Institute of Political Science and International Relations, "Thesis for Master's Degree in Political Science and International Relations, Branch of Political and Administrative Organizations of the University of Algiers Benyousef Ben Khadda".

Hanan al-Hashimi, Fundamentalism in Jewish and Contemporary Christian Religious Thought and its Impact on the Muslim World, and Ways to Confront It, Faculty of Da'wah and Fundamentals of Religion, um Al-Qura University, 2009.

Said Abdel Fattah Ashour, History of East-West Relations in the Middle Ages, Arab Renaissance House, Beirut, 1972.

Ali al-Shami, The Crusader Movement and its Impact on Western Orientalism, Journal of Arab Thought, Journal of Arab Parts for the Humanities, Beirut, No. 32/April-June, 1983, Year 5.

Kamel Saafan, Jews History and Doctrine, Dar al-I'tissam, Beirut, 1988.

Mamoun Kiwan, Jews in Iran, Dar Bissan, Beirut, 1st Edition, 2000

Section IV

Sunni Arabs and Jews

Dr. Abd El , Nasser Al , Mahdawi

4.1 Muslims and Jews in Iraq

Shared Dating

As we speak of the Jews of Iraq, it is necessary to define their own history, their thought and their coexistence with their compatriots in Iraq in order to reach the commonalities of suffering and destiny with the Iraqi people in all its colors and spectrums. The writer Mir Basri,1 one of the last flags of the Jews who left Iraq (1974), says;

After the Balfour Declaration was proclaimed, and the indifference of the notables of Iraq's Jews to it, when polled by the then British deputy governor of Iraq, the Tigris newspaper wrote on July 3, 1921: "What we have mentioned in some of our issues about the Zionists has nothing to do with our Mosawi citizens. The Jews of Iraq, in our view, are Arabs and Iraqis, and each of them dies in his Arabic to the Jewish-Arab Samual, whose famous illiteracy in our hearts has descended the status of the Iliad in the hearts of the Greeks, and the poems of Shakespeare in the hearts of the children of the English language."

At the beginning of his book, Mir Basri wrote more of the verses of Iraqi Muslim poets who were alerted early on to attempts to exploit religious division to strike at Iraqi unity. Foremost among them is the house of Marouf al-Rusafi: "And are they in religion of disagreement? Christians or Jews and Muslims."

A house by the poet Muhammad Sadiq al-Araji: "Despite the difference in religion, we will be misled. A homeland united by its constitution." Other texts cited by the author to console himself, as he lives his Baghdadi diary in his old age home in London, are surrounded by the translations of Iraqis, their writings and the files of their personal letters to him, which continue from Baghdad until before his death, echoing the house of his fellow poet and lawyer Anwar Shaul: "O Diarra, love her Timi. You have in my heart an eternal love," he said, who died in 1984 away from Iraq as well.

We conclude from the foregoing that the majority of Iraqi Jews cherished their Iraqiness and did not recognize the extraneous Zionist ideology and lived in Iraq and before it under the Ottoman Empire for hundreds of years without feeling alienated in their country.

This statement confirms the Israeli Foreign Ministry's website2 that the Umayyad state in Spain with its capital Cordoba welcomes Jews and allows them to enter all professions, and the tolerance of Islamic Spain attracts many Jews from other countries.

Jews were expelled from Iraq only after suspicious campaigns were waged against them globally, and Jewish communities continue to decay as anti-Jewish legislation increases, and persecution increases. Synagogues are sometimes destroyed, communities are pressured and sometimes forced to convert to Christianity, and acts of violence are carried out occasionally against Jewish individuals and groups.3

To be sure, Iraq as part of the world has suffered Iraqi Jews from what their people have suffered in other countries, in Iraq's contemporary history Jews have inhabited the big cities, Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. They had neighborhoods known by their names, such as the Jewish Cake or the Bataween in Baghdad, a recent clip of which is pictured. These areas flourished and were considered beautiful and rich.

However, after the Jews left Iraq and their property was looted in what became known as the Farhud, these areas suffered from severe neglect and had not witnessed any maintenance or reconstruction since the forties of the last century.4

4.2 Muslims and Jews who participated in building the Iraqi state

In the cities of the large Iraqi cities Baghdad, Mosul and Basra, Sunni Arabs lived as part of the people of these provinces where Muslims, Christians and Jews lived without distinguishing between one citizen and another at the expense of his religion, sect or belief, and under the Iraqi state founded by Sunni Arabs Jews were part of this state, and even the first minister of finance in the Iraqi government in 1921 was a Jew, Haskeel Sasson (5). Most Jews had been displaced in a very bad way from farhud, murder, imprisonment and revocation of citizenship, leaving behind very rich traces of their 2,500-year-old history and having contributed significantly to the construction of Iraq and the formation of its institutions. In fact, the archive of Jews in Iraq clearly illustrates the status of Jews in various political, social and economic aspects.6

The Sunni Arabs in Iraq are statesmen in general, the modern Iraqi state was established on their shoulders in 1921 and even the Iraqi opposition to the occupation then understood with the king in ending the British mandate, because Iraq's political leaders focus on ending the mandate instead of focusing on the right to independence, King Faisal sought the cooperation of opposition leaders after independence

Shortly after Iraq's entry into the League of Nations, Nouri al-Said, who had been prime minister since 1930, resigned after an interim administration that King Faisal Rashid Ali al-Kilani, an opposition leader, called for the formation of a new government.

After the American occupation in 2003, Sunni Arabs were excluded from the arena of political influence except from the décor of sowing ashes in the eyes, and sectarian parties dominated the capabilities of the modern state in Iraq after the occupation and to this day Sunni Arabs in the colors of their spectrum suffered all that they suffered by the Jews of Iraq and increased

The aim of targeting Jews in the past is to force them to emigrate to the Promised Land as dreamed of by global Zionism, which is rejected by most of Iraq's Jews, and the goal of targeting Sunni Arabs is also in the long run to contribute to changing the demographics of the region in favor of sectarian parties and in favor of the Iranian exclusionary project in order to empty Iraq of the elements of Arab-Sunni influence that has preserved Iraq as a land and people for almost a century.

Today, far from lamenting the tragedy of Sunni Arabs, and with an objective, neutral view, how will Sunni Arabs benefit from Iraqi Jews? They are the ones who influence the world, after everyone knew that the Jews in Iraq in particular, and in the Islamic world in general, lived happily, and did not suffer under successive Islamic countries from the Rashidah Caliphate through the Bani al-Abbas, the Umayyad Empire and even in the Ottoman Empire on the land of Iraq.

They have not been harmed as much as the Sunni Arabs in Iraq under the hateful sectarian project, so will the Sunni Arabs, in order to escape the abhorrent sectarian rule, dare to align themselves with any party that targets the sectarian project and its proxies in the new Iraq? The answer to this central question will be for the recipient after we will know in the interviewer what the Sunni Arabs in Iraq are.

4.3 The "Sunni Arabs" are lost and separated under the sectarian project

In a previous article by the writer, he asserted that the "Sunni Arabs" after the occupation in Tayeh are very similar to the wandering of the Israelites when they violated the commands of Allah the Almighty and His Messenger, as well as the wandering of this nation when it moved away from God's method, and the wandering is a symbol of distance from purpose, purpose and empowerment.8 The Israelites had forty years away from the land that God had written for them.

The wandering of this Islamic Ummah was also in the distance from the promise promised by Allah of empowerment in the land, and that this religion would enter every house of mud and righteousness., As for the Iraqis, this wandering will keep them away from their unity, progress and liberation, and getting out of this limbo for the "Sunni Arabs" in Iraq will be a hope desired for them over the coming generations if they are unable to in this generation.

And the children of Israel came out of the limbo after forty years, and they responded to God's command through their prophet, so God enabled them, and the exit from the labyrinth may last for years, and may replace the generation with another, as happened with the Israelites, or even generations, and we will not get out of this limbo unless we evaluate our past experience, diagnose the present, and collectively seek to build a clear-cut vision that is clear and clear of features to get out of this limbo with an equivalent project that possesses the elements of revival again, not at the level of the "Sunni Arabs" in Iraq. Not only at the level of all components of the Iraqi people.

From the occupation to this day, there is no important and fateful issue on which the "Sunni Arabs" have not parted, they are different in the political process between a participant, a passage, and a paused, and they differ in the position on the occupation between a warrior and between an observer or a dealer, and they are different in the constitution between an agreeer and a supporter and between an opponent, an infidel and a disbeliever, and they are different in establishing a territory for them that preserves their lives, identity and money between a supporter, an opponent and an opponent who accuses the other of claiming partition.

They disagree on the priority of hostility and its arrangement, whether in the sectarian project and its outlaw militias that slaughtered their sons, regardless of the institution to which these militias belong, legal or otherwise, the act is the same with the hateful sectarian project, and between the project of the Zionist entity and Israel, which targeted the Palestinian Arabs and settled their country.

Perhaps even their successive governments are more merciful than some of the governments of the authoritarian Arab regimes, and certainly they are better than the sectarian governments that succeeded in ruling Iraq after the occupation, there is not a single part agreed upon by the "Sunni Arabs" except that they are ruminating on their pain, tragedy and victims, in which the sectarian project did not differentiate between a politician and a passage, nor between a supporter of the constitution and a signatory or an opponent, as the exclusionary sectarian project does not differentiate between Zaid and Amr but everyone unless subject to it is targeted.

4.4 Priority of hostility for Sunni Arabs

What concerns us from this difference today is to monitor the orientation of the "Sunni Arabs" towards the priority of hostility, is it for the exclusionary sectarian project that has shed their blood, money and country, or is it for the Zionist settler occupation and the establishment of the State of Israel? The fact that the impact of hostility is monitored must be monitored on a single scale for both parties and in each field of tragedy.

To be sure, addressing all the fields of tragedy will be greed for the uncoveted in a small section because neither volumes nor books are enough, so we may focus on the most important field, which is man and the waste of his blood only, because in Islamic thought it is the biggest crime, because (whoever kills a soul without a soul or corruption in the earth is as if he killed all people and who revived it, it is as if he revived all people)... As Allah the Almighty says in His Holy Book.

To be objective and neutral and not to cast a shadow of our backgrounds on the scene, we will speak with sharp impartiality, and here if we talk only about the "Sunni Arabs" in Iraq, the analogy may be given that Iraq and the Iraqis are not aligned with the State of Israel and therefore the "Sunni Arabs" did not suffer from the oppression of Jews in it.

Therefore, we will go beyond this detail and bring the pain of our Palestinian people in the occupied territory to the Iraqi "Sunni Arabs" for being one nation, provided that we avoid the historical conflict, neither the Iraqi-Iranian war in the last century we invoke nor the wars witnessed in the Palestinian arena we will invoke them, but the monitoring will be from 2003 to the present day, and we will focus on talking about the killing of man as a major crime in the human heritage.

In the most difficult and important issue at the global level and at the level of the Islamic intellectual system, for which they falsely and falsely claim to have connected the sectarian project, and by this issue we mean man, killing man in the system of Islamic thought is uglier than the demolition of the ancient house, the holiest place for Muslims around the world, which is confirmed by the sacred texts of Muslims in the Qur'an, Sunnah and the sayings of scholars.

If we observe the number of deaths targeted by the sectarian exclusionary project in Iraq from the "Sunni Arabs" and other components of the Iraqi people over the past fifteen years, whether it was in the sectarian war after the bombing of the shrines in Samarra in 2006, or in the systematic killings carried out by outlaw militias, or by militias infiltrating the security services, or what occurred as a result of the hostilities against blind terrorism that controlled approximately 44% of the Iraqi territory, which included most of the predominantly Sunni Arab provinces such as Mosul, Anbar, Diyala, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, and part of the Baghdad belt.

To be sure, most of the Iraqi people and its various components have suffered greatly as a result of the wrong sectarian policies, it is true that the "Sunni Arabs" have made more sacrifices than other components of the Iraqi people because most of the decision-makers with most of the security services follow the brothers of the "Shia Arabs" with the presence of armed militias that control the citizens

As for the Kurdish brothers, they have preserved their component in a territory that they manage themselves away from the sectarian strife caused by the sectarian project, if we measure the sacrifices made in Iraq and from the occupation to this day, and from all the components away from the sectarian trench, we will find that they are equivalent to the sacrifices made by the Palestinian people as a result of the policies made by the Zionist occupation from 1948 to this day, and even the sacrifices of the Iraqi people exceed the sacrifices of the Palestinians by tens of times, so that the words are not just a guess and appreciation We attach according to the estimates of the officially proven location of the victims of Iraq, considering that the unproven is many times this number.

4.5 Victims of Iraq and Syria under suspicious sectarian projects

The site of the victims of Iraq(9) has counted the civilians killed by the occupation and for the current year, considering that the graphs are based on the highest number in the totals. Gaps in registration and reporting indicate that the totals available so far may be missing many of the civilian deaths from the violence whose deaths have not been officially documented.

To be sure, the victims are from the various members of the Iraqi people, and did not include all the dead terrorists or combatants if they were from the ranks of the Iraqi armed forces or other militias, whether legal or outlawed. The statistic is only for civilian victims whose deaths have been documented...

Civilian deaths per month as a result of violence as of 2003

January

February

March

April

May

June

July

August

September

October

November

December

2003

3

2

3977

3438

545

597

646

833

566

515

487

524

12,133

2004

610

663

1004

1303

655

909

834

878

1042

1033

1676

1129

11,736

2005

1222

1297

905

1145

1396

1347

1536

2352

1444

1311

1487

1141

16,583

2006

1546

1579

1957

1804

2278

2593

3298

2865

2565

3037

3095

2900

29,517

2007

3032

2679

2726

2566

2851

2216

2696

2481

1387

1324

1124

996

26,078

2008

858

1092

1667

1315

914

753

639

704

612

594

540

586

10,274

2009

372

407

438

589

428

563

431

653

350

441

226

478

5,376

2010

267

305

336

385

387

385

488

520

254

315

307

218

4,167

2011

389

254

311

289

381

386

308

401

397

366

288

392

4,162

2012

531

356

377

392

304

529

469

422

400

290

253

299

4,622

2013

357

360

403

545

888

659

1145

1013

1306

1180

870

1126

9,852

2014

1097

972

1029

1037

1100

4088

1580

3340

1474

1738

1436

1327

20,218

2015

1490

1625

1105

2013

1295

1355

1845

1991

1445

1297

1021

1096

17,578

2016

1374

1258

1459

1192

1276

1405

1280

1375

935

1970

1738

1131

16,393

2017

1119

982

1920

1816

1871

1858

1498

597

490

397

348

291

13,187

2018

474

410

402

303

229

209

It is known that the sacrifices of the Palestinians as a result of the occupation are known and proven individually, and the sacrifices of Iraqis because of the sectarian project cannot be monitored and counted because of its large number, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis are still missing and have no fate, perhaps in graves, or still under the rubble in destroyed cities, or in countless secret prisons, or some of them may have died without their families knowing where they are, while Israeli prisons where hunger strikers are monitored and learned of All details.

In an approach that falls within the exclusionary sectarian project in Syria, where thousands of Iraqis defend the existing regime with iron and fire, the Palestinian writer Muhammad Khair Musa[10] says, have all Palestinian resistance factions without exception, Islamist and non-Islamic, heard of informing the Syrian regime of the martyrdom of 540 Syrian Palestinians on one list?

!

If the issuance of a list of the martyrdom of seven thousand martyrs at once, including a thousand in Darayya alone under torture, is "an internal Syrian affair"; how harsh is the phrase "internal affairs in the presence of tortured souls", what about the silence applied to the martyrdom of hundreds of Palestinians under torture?

!

Imagine if the Zionist occupation had reported the martyrdom of 540 prisoners in its prisons at once; what would you have done?

Is the lesson you have in the killer or in the murdered?!!

Aren't these martyrs Palestinians?!

Or are they outside your geopolitical calculations?

How many statements, statements, press conferences, media alerts and political movements would we have seen if one-tenth of this number had been martyred under torture in the prisons of the criminal Zionist entity?!!

This duality of attitude predicts that your attitudes are related to the killer and not to the victim, the victim who is supposed to be here part of your people who are fighting, struggling and struggling for their rights and their return to their land from which the Jews drove them out.

With these harsh words that the international community is blocking its ears, one of the Palestinian writers reveals the magnitude of the tragedy presented by the Palestinian people on the altar of the sectarian project in the region, and I conclude this by saying that I heard from one of the greatest Palestinian scholars abroad when I tried to compare what the Jews of Israel are doing to the Palestinian people with what the sectarians are doing in Iraq and Syria. At that time, this Palestinian scientist said that human Jews reside for the other year as a consideration and stop... Sectarians, on the other hand, are not human beings but criminals who do not consider anything.

The bottom line

After that, does a sane person doubt that Israel's targeting of Iran's militias in Syria serves the general humanitarian reality more than it serves the people of Iraq and the Levant, as the countries suffering from the epidemic of Iranian intervention (11) were in a deplorable state before and after the revolutions; Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen. Every country in which Iran has infiltrated has been endowed with administrative and political corruption, and has been referred to an incubator of terrorism.

Iraq remains the most easily accommodating country for Iranians to fabricate, as it did in Mosul in the north four years ago and enabled ISIS to occupy it and the central government and allied countries have been preoccupied with the war on the group ever since. Today, it raises obstacles and problems in the south to spread chaos, prolong the crisis and threaten neighboring countries.

Iran is waiting for tough days in November, the timing set by US President Donald Trump to hit Iran's oil trade, with alternatives to Iranian oil guaranteeing the availability of energy supplies, and it has entered a spiral of difficulties since the announcement of the President Trump withdraw from the nuclear agreement, and is waiting for economic crises that will blow into the flames of popular anger that has not stopped since last December. Iran is trying to showcase its gains and power in the region, asserting itself as a regional power that is not easy to besiege in the category of US sanctions against it, the Trump administration states that it has a place in Iraq that is difficult to overcome.

The human being remains the real criterion between two benevolents or between two evils, as he who considers his legitimate rights and right to life deserves understanding and dealing no matter how hostile he is before, hence the search for a permanent and just peace project for the Palestinian people with "Israel" is a legitimate and legal demand, which is the hope that life will go smoothly and easily for all Palestinians, and salvation from criminality against human humanity in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen is a legitimate demand that deserves sacrifice, as it deserves understanding and jurisprudence with traditional enemies, and this day is Iraqis dream of being saved from the abhorrent sectarian system because of which Iraq has claimed hundreds of thousands of victims, and today our people in the south suffer what our people in the center and the western region meant because of it, there is no salvation or liberation from the bondage of slavery to sectarianism unless we get rid of this system not only for "Sunni Arabs" but for all Iraqis.

Knowledge Site, Iraqi Jews:

https://www.marefa.org/%D9%8A%D9%87%D9%88%D8%AF_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82.

2. Website of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://mfa.gov.il/MFAAR/InformationaboutIsrael/TheJewishReligion/ChildrenOfAbraham/Pages/jews%20and%20aspx.

3.Ibid.

4.http://www.projetaladin.org/ar/%D8%A2%D8%AB%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D9%87%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1.html

5. Knowledge Site, The Jews of Iraq, Ibid.

6. Dr. Nabil Al-Haidari, Iraqi Jewish Archive A History Full of Glories, Elaf website, 23/12/2013, http://elaph.com/Web/opinion/2013/12/858745.html

7.http://www.iraqena.com/aniraq/new.htm .

8. See http://www.alukah.net/culture/0/22269/.

9. See https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/ .

10. Quoting Muhammad Khair Musa's personal account.

11. Amal Abdul Aziz Al-Hazani, Iraq and the Expected Destiny, Middle East, 17/7/2018, Issue 14476.

https://aawsat.com/home/article/1333666/ Amal-Abdul-Aziz-Al-Hazani/Iraq-and the Future-Expected Destiny

Conclusion of the joint research

Arabs and Jews

Path and Destiny

From 1920-2020

The values, interests, resources, alliances and goals of Arabs and Jews, as well as the rest of the components of the Middle East – Shiites, Kurds, Armenians and Christians, individuals, groups and regimes – have controlled their course since 1920 until today, they have different and overlapping values and interests that are inherently generated and exacerbating the conflict, as they emerge from the Ottoman Empire and enter an Arab national world, and then into the world of Wilayat al-Faqih.

The systems and mentalities of these social, religious and political components are not united, but rather disparate forms that tend to struggle in order to assert themselves, guarantee their rights and get rid of the other, and this can only be achieved by conflict under an unstable regional system, an international order that moves from multiple to bilateral and then unilateral, and today it seems that they are moving again to multiple.

Therefore, you find that the nature of the conflict of the two parties that has been going on for a century has been characterized and continues to be characterized by crises, tensions, conflicts and wars, and the means of conflict between Arabs and Jews have multiplied, so there have been more than eight wars, and the causes of the conflict have multiplied, so they were local, regional and international, and they were religious, political, economic and social.

Israel, like other minorities in the Middle East, such as Christians, Alawites, Shiites, Kurds and Armenians, is counting on an alliance with the Sunni Arab majority that believes in the West Valea model of governance and does not dream of returning to the Ottoman or Iranian system of empires, which pushes these minorities to look for a coalition of minorities that protects them from the oppression of empires.

It seems that the possible solution to this complex conflict, with its international, regional and local dimensions, is in a system of security and Middle Eastern cooperation consisting of federal or confederal regimes that respect the Westphalian model, ensure the non-return of imperial regimes, whether national or religious, respect the religious and national rights of the people, and end the domination of a majority over a minority and vice versa.

Author Dr.Omar Abdul Sattar Mahmoud

الكاتب د.عمر عبدالستار محمود