Embedded Files
حلقات يوميه على اليوتيوب
Introduction
Chapter One
Repercussions of elections and protests
On the formation of the largest mass
Omar Abd El , Sattar
Chapter Two
Caretaker scenario
Political partnership scenario
Abd El , Nasser Al , Mahdawi
Chapter Three
National majority scenario
Scenario of a salvation government
Muhannad Al , Allam
Chapter IV
Scenario of a Shiite House
Scenario of an expanded government
Mr. Shahu Al-Qardaghi
Conclusion
Introduction
Fundamental differences
The end of ISIS in July 2017, the withdrawal of Trump from al-Nawawi on May 8, 2018, the uprising of the Shiite public against its political class on July 9, 2018, the entry of the first Trump sanctions package against Iran on August 7, 2018, and the announcement of Abaya commitment to it, caused a new political map that disrupted the formation of the largest bloc, after the fifth parliamentary elections held since 2005.
These factors represented fundamental differences in Iraq 2018, which did not exist in previous years, and with which Iraq entered 2018 perhaps a stage that may be a watershed between two Iraqis, an Iraq linked to Iran's regional axis, and an Iraq linked to the international coalition against ISIS.
Iraq has also moved from the stage of the Shiite House monopoly on power in Iraq since the first parliamentary elections in 2005, regardless of the results of the elections, to an Iraq where the monopoly of the Shiite House of power has become part of the past, especially after the elections produced two Shia blocs that were unable to integrate at the time of writing this paper.
The association of the Shiite center with the factors of terrorism may be considered from the Iraq of 2018, which may resemble the association of the Sunni center with it after 2003, and this may indicate the possibility of the Shiite center entering the path that the Sunnis followed after 2003, which led them to a Sunni-Sunni conflict on the one hand, and a conflict between them and the government on the other, and between them and the international coalition on the other.
This may mean that Iraq has entered into a new political map, represented by a Sunni-Kurdish rapprochement and a Shia-Shiite conflict, which may open the era of a new political equation that did not exist in previous years, as it was based on a Sunni-Sunni conflict and a Kurdish-Shiite alliance, which may qualify the Kurds and Sunnis to be the balance of the next parliament and government.
The emergence of the conflict between Najaf and Qom to the surface represented another fundamental difference, as the positions of the two sides on the uprising of the Shiite street indicate the divergence of the positions of the two sides, and the fact that the Najaf crowd stood by Abadi unlike the Hashd al-Muhandis, who decided to withdraw from the Sunni provinces, without coordination with the General Command of the Armed Forces and the command of joint operations, may mean the possibility of an armed conflict between the two crowds.
The sixth fundamental difference may be a possible Iranian breakdown in Iraq and the region, coinciding with the 2018 elections that coincided with Trump's withdrawal from the nuclear deal, a breakdown preceded by the uprising of Iraq's Shiites in July 2018, which may resemble its uprising following the breakdown of Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait.
This could mean that Iraq's Shiites, who rose up in 1991, after Iraq was broken down following the invasion of Kuwait, and demanded a Jafari ruler, are now rising up at the gates of a possible Iranian breakdown after the invasion of Syria, against the Jaafari ruler for whom they paid a heavy price 28 years ago, after being ruled 16 years after 2003.
The seventh fundamental difference may be that the disintegration of the Shiite house and the inability of its parties to restore its cohesion may push Iraq to enter a new chaos scenario, repeating the scenario of Samra, Mosul or Yemen, according to the equation of Ibrahim al-Jaafari, who says that when experience threatens, the genie comes out of the bottle and smashes the bottle, and the indications of this were clear in the disagreement between the Hashd and Abadi and then the withdrawal of the Hashd and Baghdadi's speech.
This paper discussed the repercussions of these fundamental differences on the formation of the largest bloc in its first chapter, then talked about the caretaker scenario or the scenario of a political partnership in the second chapter, and the third chapter talked about the scenario of the national majority and the scenario of a salvation government, and the fourth chapter concluded the paper by talking about the scenario of the return of the Shiite house or the scenario of an expanded government.
Chapter One
Repercussions of elections and protests
On the formation of the largest mass
Dr. Omar Abdel Sattar Mahmoud
The period from the announcement of the preliminary results of the elections, which came a week after Election Day, to the final announcement that came after 90 days, witnessed a series of remarkable political repercussions that we try to summarize in the following points.
1. Loss of the Dawa Party
The Sairoon and Fatah lists have advanced on the Victory and Law lists representing the Dawa Party, which monopolized the post of prime minister from 2005 to 2018.These results have further divided the parties of the Shiite house, which entered the elections with five lists, namely Sauron, Al-Nasr, Al-Fatah, Al-Qanoun and the Wisdom Movement.1
This is happening for the first time, since Shiites entered the first elections in January 2005 with one list 169, December 2005 with one list, list 555, entered the 2010 elections with two lists, Law and Liberals, and entered the 2014 elections with three lists of Law, Citizen and Liberals.
While the parties of the Shiite house seized power in Iraq, regardless of the results of the elections from the first to the fifth parliamentary elections, the repercussions of the 2018 elections seemed to be heading to make a fundamental difference, not only in the question of Iraq's association with the axis of Iran or the international coalition, but also in the end of the era of the monopoly of power in Iraq by the Shiite house.
The two prominent Shiite blocs, the Victory Bloc, Sairoon and Hikma, along with the Wataniya, and the Fatah and Maliki blocs, are competing today for an alliance with the Kurds and the Sunni axis, each offering the Kurds and Sunnis rivalries and guarantees to join this or that Shiite bloc.
Because of the rivalry of the two Shiite blocs for the largest bloc that is taking place in light of an escalating US-Iranian conflict, Iraq entered July 2018 with a caretaker government without a new parliament or government, where America supports Abadi, while Iran insists on the Fatah and Maliki bloc, and this conflict may lead to the continuation of the caretaker government, until the maturation of the developments of the US-Iranian conflict.2
2- Shia Street Movement
He entered Iraq at the beginning of July 2018 under a caretaker government, and the Shiite movement began on the ninth of July, from Basra to Baghdad, passing through all the provinces of the Middle and Southern Euphrates, prompting Hadi al-Amiri to apologize to the demonstrators and that he had received their message of boycotting the elections and their uprising in the street, a speech similar to the words of the Arab rulers when the masses rose up against them during the Arab Spring.
The Shiite movement in July 2018 was the second of its kind since the Shia uprising after the Iraqi army was broken from Kuwait in 1991, and although the Shia uprising after the breakdown of the Iraqi army in 1991 called for Shia rule by Ha'fari, the uprising of Iraq's Shiites after the breakdown of ISIS called for the removal of the Shia political and religious class from power.
The reasons that led the Shiites of Iraq to rise up on both occasions may be similar, if the first is against a national regime and the second against a religious regime, and they have been separated by 28 years.There is a security and political vacuum that accompanied Saddam's breakdown after his invasion of Kuwait and like him today accompanies the breakdown of Iran and its possible withdrawal after its invasion of Arab capitals, and both times there was a gap between the Shiites of Iraq and Saddam's regime in 1991 and between them and the regime of Wilayat al-Faqih in 2018.3
Just as Saddam violently suppressed the uprising of Iraq's Shiites in 1991, they sought refuge in Saudi Arabia where they were nationally sponsored in Rafha camps and then distributed to countries as refugees, Iran may suppress the uprising of Iraq's Shiites today.But the opportunity of Iran, which it seized after the uprising of Iraq's Shiites in 1991, may be repeated in the form of a human bomb that hits the semi-uninhabited Sunni Arab provinces, after any security turmoil in the central and southern provinces of Furt, and this may pose a challenge and opportunity in Iraq in 2018 and beyond.
While Sadr and Abadi were in harmony with the uprising of the Shiite street in their own way, the alliance of Fatah and Maliki, they were closer to complaining than to harmonize with the Shiite street movement, Sistani's authority supported the protesters, calling on them to be angry and take their rights by force, and even to develop the methods of their demonstrations if the next government does not like them, and this may mean that any future government will be under the pressure of a rising street and a new political map locally, regionally and internationally.
Abadi's position on Trump sanctions
After the cruelty to which the Shiite street was subjected by the forces of Badr and Asaib, the killing of dozens and the arrest of hundreds, a package of sanctions entered the first Trump on the seventh of August 2018, Abadi's actor committed to it, and Abadi's announcement, whose announcement coincided with the approval of the Federal Court for the final results of the elections, faced a violent response from most Shiite and Sunni political actors, who accused him of not being loyal to Iran, and promised his position as the straw that broke the chances of him obtaining a second term.
Abadi's stance on Trump sanctions against Iran has been striking and inconsistent with his political behavior since taking office in August 2014, but it has been in harmony with the series of political repercussions that began after the end of ISIS and continues to continue.Abadi has been known for caution and lack of direct contact with more necessary issues, such as corruption issues, the return of displaced Sunnis to their areas, the fate of thousands of them abducted by militias, and turning a blind eye to a direct Iranian administration of political consultations between Iraqi Shiite forces. After the recent parliamentary elections, which violated the essence of sovereignty"4.
The fundamental question here is: Is Abadi's position (accused of courtesy of the Iranians and their allies in Iraq from influential militias and parties) on Trump sanctions against Iran a fundamental difference not only after the 2018 elections, but also in the course of governance in Iraq after 2003, which was taking place within the axis of Iran?
Abadi appeared to have laid all his eggs in the American basket, after Iraqi prime ministers since 2005, including Abadi after 2014, laid all their eggs in the Iranian basket.
Iranian anger at Abadi's announcement was represented by a storm of Iranian and Iraqi political and media positions, including what was published by Khabar Online, which is close to the speaker of the Iranian parliament, Ali Larijani.Khabar Online said that Abadi eliminated his chances of remaining in the post of prime minister, after ignoring common interests with Iran and all his efforts to form a government are on the verge of collapse because of his position on Iran.
The Iranian newspaper Quds, which is close to Khamenei, reported that Abadi (a 99-centimeter-long dwarf) had become prime minister with a single signal from an Iranian general who would leave office and face execution, a fate Saddam faced and that Iran after Saddam sacrificed dearly for the sake of Iraqis, but days have proven that they are a people who do not depend on him.
Iranian Vice President Masouma Ibtikar and Deputy Speaker of the Shura Council, Mahmoudi Sadeghi, also issued Iraq to pay the bills of the eighties war, which the Iranian official estimated at more than a trillion dollars, while the former Iranian Interior Minister, Abdullah Ramadan Zadeh, also used Twitter to call on his country not to reject the partition of Iraq.
Mojtaba al-Husseini, Khamenei's representative in Iraq, issued a statement describing Abadi's position as irresponsible and expressing his defeat before America.Iranian anger at Abadi's position was also represented by an undeclared Iranian refusal to receive Abadi, after news of his visit to both Ankara and Tehran had been published, the Iranian spokesman said that his country was not aware of Abadi's visit, followed immediately by an Iraqi announcement that the prime minister would only visit the Turkish capital without Tehran "because of the congestion of his agenda and the lack of integration of preparation." Therefore.
With the exception of Sistani, who has not yet announced a position, Shia parties and militias with the Islamic Party, the Sunni Waqf and the Mufti of the Sunnis and the Community in Iraq have rejected Iraq's commitment to sanctions, and considered Abadi's position not binding on the next government and has nothing to do with the Iraqi people, and this will make the coming wisdom under the pressure of commitment or not from Trump sanctions.
4. Sunni-Kurdish affinity
The convergence of the positions of the Kurdish and Sunni blocs, amid the inability of the Shiite house to restore cohesion between its parties on the one hand, and the race of its divided blocs on themselves to form the largest bloc, before the entry of the second Trump sanctions package on the fourth of next November, may be one of the most important political repercussions in Iraq 2018, which may be the cornerstone of the political process in the next four years.5
The new political map may constitute another watershed in the path of the new Iraq, which began in 1992 in the parliament of the Kurdistan Region and arrived in 2018 as it prepares for the elections of September 30, before the Federal Parliament of Iraq holds its first session, which may remain open to further notice.
The question is how did the Kurdish-Shiite alliance turn into a Sunni-Kurdish rapprochement and the Sunni-Sunni conflict into a Shia-Shiite conflict? The existence of the Kurdistan Region, and Iranian sponsorship of the Shiite home, made the course of the political process based on a Sunni-Sunni conflict that made the Sunni Arab provinces an arena of conflict between al-Qaeda and the Mahdi Army, and between ISIS and the Popular Mobilization Forces.
Iran has tried to influence the results of the parliamentary elections between 2005 and 2018, making the Shiite alliance with its various names the largest bloc, since the first elections held in Iraq in 2005, and its Shiites controlled the parliaments, for three consecutive sessions, indifferent to the results of the elections, and as Iran has set red lines that have been implemented since 2005-2018, summarized by a weak Iraq affiliated with it, through a Shiite house and a Shiite government loyal to it, ensuring the presence of a regional Iranian crescent, and preventing in this Iraq the convergence of components.
The presence of a region imposed on the ground before 2003, and under international auspices, may have enabled the Kurdistan Region to resist against Baghdad's central incursion, despite the existence of the Shiite Kurdish alliance, the relationship between Erbil and Baghdad was characterized by competition and conflict as well, between the government and the Kurdistan Parliament and the government of the Iraqi Parliament, which made the reality of Iraq contrary to its constitution, and led to the extinction of the Shiite Kurdish alliance and the Kurdistan Region went to the referendum, and Baghdad entered Kirkuk and the disputed areas in October 2017.
As for Iran's failure to influence the results of the 2018 elections as it did and the withdrawal of Trump from the nuclear, what worries Abadi the most, is the crisis between America and Iran, which is the biggest threat to the growing stability in Iraq, and Soleimani's control over the Shiite Popular Mobilization Forces, and the commander of the US forces in Iraq, and the US ambassador, sent a direct threat to Iran and the future Iraqi government, whether it leans towards Iran, when he said that "our forces are still present in Iraq and the next Iraqi government must choose between Iran and the international community).
The increased US military presence also worries Iran and its allies in Iraq, while the Kurds and Sunnis welcome it, and US intelligence officers have told Foreign Policy that another justification for the stay of US forces in Iraq after ISIS other than Iran's influence, is the confrontation between the central Iraqi government and the Kurds, so Iran and its allies in Iraq face unprecedented challenges today, from an unstable relationship between Erbil and Baghdad, and increasing American bases and insisting on survival, with a Shiite aversion of their religious parties. And an international insistence on preventing the emergence of ISIS, the uprising and fall of the riyal, and an escalation to get Iran out of Syria.
The option of escalation against Iran from Iraq, as stated in a study published by Dennis Ross, special assistant to former President Barack Obama at the Washington Institute for Near East Studies and one of the founders of United Against a Nuclear Iran, believes that the best way to confront Iran is to raise the costs of continued Iranian intransigence and reduce Iranian influence, through new political tracks, which restore to Washington the ability to manage the political process according to a new political architecture, different from what it has already done before and after its invasion and occupation of Iraq. The sketch of the political process drawn up by the 2018 elections with a Sunni Kurdish rapprochement and a Shia-Shiite conflict came in accordance with this geometric size7.
The United States, in coordination with the European Institute of Peace, supervised the organization of a conference in Geneva to discuss post-ISIS arrangements in Iraq, with the participation of General David Petraeus, the former head of US intelligence, and the most briefed American generals on Sunni and Iraqi affairs, and with the participation of former French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin, and other international figures, and the stated goal of the conference held on Wednesday (20/2/2017) in the Swiss capital, is to study the developments of the political situation in Iraq after ISIS.
It seems that the new map of political alliances will be the beginning of the organization of a new, cohesive political force, to lead Iraq as an alternative to forces that owe allegiance to Iran, which Washington orchestrated to empower it with power in Iraq, to ensure the eradication of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, and to secure another authority loyal to American influence in the country.
5- The withdrawal of the Hashd and Baghdadi's speech
In light of the faltering Shiite house blocs racing to form the largest bloc, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis issued a statement in which he decided to withdraw the Hashd factions from Sunni Arab cities, followed a day later by a surprise speech by Baghdadi, after news that he was in a state of clinical death, then Abadi rejected Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis's decision7.
Amiri, who began attacking Abadi after Abadi's dispute with Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, rejected any U.S. interference in the formation of the government, threatening to topple any government within two months otherwise.
Despite Albert McGurk's denials, Amiri's office said in a statement that the secretary-general of the Badr Organization, head of the Fatah alliance Hadi al-Amiri, met on Thursday with the envoy of the US president, Brett McGurk.The statement quoted Amiri as rejecting any US interference in the formation of the government, stressing that "if you insist on your intervention, we will consider any government formed by you as an agent and we will overthrow it within two months.Amiri asked earlier during his meeting with a number of journalists "Do we have the right to choose a policeman in Iran, Turkey or in If not, why would we accept that they choose a prime minister (8)?
Amiri pointed out that US Ambassador Sillyman Douglas and US envoy Brett McGurk once visited him and told them we do not allow you to interfere in Iraqi political affairs and we do not accept the imposition of names for the prime minister, and if you impose any name on us I will overthrow his government within two months.
Qais al-Khazali, leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haqq, also called simultaneously and in a tweet to replace Iraq's parliamentary system with a presidential one, warning of the return of ISIS to Sunni Arab cities after the withdrawal of the Hashd, and of Iraq's transformation into Afghanistan again.
A second Afghanistan that Khazali means may mean repeating the scenario of Samarra 2006, Mosul 2014 or Yemen 2014, in light of the challenges facing Iran and its loyalist militias in Iraq.Iran and its regional axis have become accustomed to defending themselves when their experience is threatened, says Ibrahim al-Jaafari, when the war is threatened, the genie comes out of the bottle and smashes the bottle.
It is certain that the series of repercussions of the end of ISIS and the results of the May 2018 elections will continue, but it is also certain that Iraq will not stabilize until Iran gets out of Syria and Iran enters the spiral of creative chaos, and Abadi can activate the constitution, prevent the return of ISIS and dismantle the Popular Mobilization Forces.
Iran's behavior and axis could pose another serious challenge to Abadi after challenging his commitment to Trump sanctions against Iran, whether he remains caretaker prime minister or receives a second term. Baghdadi's speech, the withdrawal of the crowd from Sunni cities, and Abadi's attempt to exclude the engineer from the leadership of the Hashd, may be two sides of the coin of repeating chaos scenarios that follow any political and security vacuum in Iraq and the region.
6- The end of ISIS and confronting Iran
Despite Baghdadi's recent speech, which may be an indication of the possibility of a return to chaos similar to that of 2014 in Iraq, the end of ISIS and the confrontation with Iran can be considered one of the most prominent achievements of the international coalition formed in August 2014 within the Security Council resolution 2170, which was issued under item VII only, and one of the most important reasons for the repercussions referred to above.
The reason why we linked the repercussions to the achievements of the international coalition against ISIS is that the Abadi government was its local ally in confronting ISIS in Iraq, but it did not meet all the requirements of the local ally of the international coalition, and some of its parties were even opponents of the international coalition because of the association of 80% of the Popular Mobilization militias with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps system.
The failure of the local ally to meet the requirements of its alliance with the international coalition may necessarily lead to obstacles and challenges for the Abadi government on the one hand, and for the pillars of the Shiite house and their relationship with the government on the other, and their relationship with their street on the third hand, and Iran on the fourth hand.
Under Trump sanctions against Iran after withdrawing from the nuclear deal, the Abadi government, the Shia home parties or any future Iraqi government have no choice but to either be with Trump against Iran or be with Iran to repel Trump, and this reminds us of Bush Jr.'s slogan, either with us or against us, after the declaration of the World War on Terrorism in 2002, following the September 11, 2001 attacks.
U.S. policymakers seem to recognize that this kind of confusing balance is the best they can hope for, and that Abadi's pragmatism and commitment to the Middle Earth policy represents Iraq's safest path toward regional stability and reintegration.9
Sources
1- Two electoral lists for the Dawa Party.. Has the split begun?
2- Electoral lists resume their discussions to form the Iraqi government
3- The Shiites of Iraq between two uprisings - the center of the new Iraq
4- Iraq and the controversy of US sanctions on Iran
5- The Kurds are between Sunnis and Shiites.. Iraq as a model
6. Possible Repercussions of the Parliamentary Elections (2018)
7- From Baghdad, the strategist Ahmed Al-Sharifi
About the differences between Abadi and the engineer
8. Ameri to McGurk: I will drop any
A person imposed by Washington as prime minister
9- How did Washington learn to love Abadi?
Scenario of a caretaker government
National Partnership Government
The second section
2.1 Caretaker Government Scenario
The concept of caretaker government is not a fad in the systems of government, but is addressed in the Iraqi Constitution in its constitutional articles.
The Permanent Iraqi Constitution of 2005 mentioned the concept of caretaker government in only two places, the first in Article (61/VIII/D) and the second in Article (64) thereof.
In article 61, paragraph VIII;
In the event of a vote of no confidence in the entire Council of Ministers, the Prime Minister and the Ministers shall continue in office to conduct daily matters for a period not exceeding thirty days, until the formation of the new Council of Ministers in accordance with the provisions of Article 76 of this Constitution.
Article (64) stipulates that
First, the Chamber of Deputies shall be dissolved by an absolute majority of the number of its members, at the request of one third of its members, or at the request of the Prime Minister and with the approval of the President of the Republic, and the Council may not be dissolved during the period of questioning the Prime Minister.
Secondly, upon the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, the President of the Republic shall call for general elections in the country within a maximum period of sixty days from the date of dissolution, in which case the Council of Ministers shall be deemed to have resigned and shall continue to conduct daily affairs (1)
The elections of the fourth session of the Iraqi Parliament in May 2018 are one of the most frequent elections that have witnessed tug-of-war and rivalries and the sayings of many of them rise to be facts, and in another topic that will affect the political scene a lot, which is that these elections do not represent the Iraqi street, but the facts and facts indicate the participation rate of them is very low, which was recognized by the politicians and leaders who won the elections such as Amiri and others, all indicators indicate the participation of only 4% of the Iraqi people, and in the best possible possibilities reach Only 18% and nothing else, but otherwise contradicts the truth, in addition to that the claims of forgery, coercion and the influence of weapons in determining the destination of the MP were transmitted by Rukban.
To give one example, we say; is it reasonable for a city besieged by militia weapons to elect one of the candidates of the faction that governs them and bring him to parliament and there is not a single citizen of the component of this candidate as well as his party and faction, as for the details of the coercion witnessed by the majority of the inhabitants of this city, let alone this and look at the official positions, it was authorized to cancel the ballot boxes in Baghdad Rusafa after the fabricated fire, which constitutes 10% of the votes of voters at the level of Iraq, how will the losers accept it? In this election? How will elections gain legitimacy when 10% of the votes are wasted? As well as what was reported by all investigative committees from the high-level cabinet committee to the parliamentary committee headed by former member of parliament Adel Nouri, who appealed to judges to take their desired role, MP Adel Nouri, head of the parliamentary committee in charge of investigating the claims of electoral fraud, revealed in an article begging the justice of the judges delegated to stand a position that invalidates these rigged elections, and MP Nouri asked the judges to invalidate their results by saying "We are waiting for your judge's blow" after he listed hundreds of suspicions, and demonstrated the mental and transport arguments on A big fact that the elections were rigged and did not reflect the will of the Iraqi voter, but political activists revealed through satellite channels that the percentage of fraud could reach 70% in fact.
If we consider the low participation rate, with the rate of fraud achieved, even if the disagreement is in a specific percentage of fraud, which is a reality that is recognized by insiders, in addition to the subjection of the areas liberated from ISIS to the weapons of militias and factions of the Popular Mobilization Forces, which made these areas give their votes by force of arms, and with frequency of transmission and frank reason, these areas are mostly "Sunni Arabs" and caused the rise of candidates of the factions of "Shiite Arabs", what logic can accept this issue? It is accepted only by Maliki's logic when he reaped the votes of prisoners during his reign.2
However, these appeals went unheeded when the judges finished counting and counting the limited manual counting, the Federal Supreme Court, on Sunday 19/8/2018, approved the final results of the elections of the House of Representatives (3) despite all the suspicions and sayings that accompanied these elections, which led the Iraqi list led by Ayad Allawi to cancel the results of the elections and establish a caretaker government until fair elections are held(4) days after the elections were held, which witnessed many accusations of fraud, buying and selling Sounds.
After the completion of the third session of parliament on 30/6/2018, the current government became a caretaker government already from 1/7 until the convening of the new parliament and the formation of a new government, which was confirmed by legal experts (5).
After the demonstrations in the southern provinces, the Americans highlighted the presence of infiltrators trying to use these demonstrations to benefit their parties, so we find the Americans tend to dedicate the presidency of Mr. Abadi to another term or extend his rule.
Informed sources (6) said that Washington began to create a political atmosphere on the (sizes) of those who support its orientations in Iraq and began to warn politicians of "chaos" occurring in Baghdad, the southern provinces of Iraq and the Middle Euphrates because of the "infiltrators" who diverted the peaceful demonstrations from their reform path, and the sources indicated that Washington is trying in the coming period to convince the Iraqi political blocs to extend Abadi's mandate for two more years and form an emergency government in which the (outgoing) prime minister will be its president, especially since Shiite parties accused Abadi Before holding elections in May 2018, he was seeking to extend the government's work for two years.
In Iraq after the occupation and to this day this regional actors, led by Iran, and international actors, led by the United States of America, are the real influences in the political scene, and perhaps the two parties (America and Iran) serve their legislators under former US President Barack Obama, but the issue under the Republicans and Trump is completely different from the past, the United States and Trump today exert real pressure on Iran and its proxies in the region, especially in Iraq and Syria, and at the level of the Iraqi political arena, the American influence is great, this time It may not allow Iran to be unique in making the scene. It will even have the final say in the formation of the government, what are Washington's options in Iraq?
In a previous article by the researcher (7) To put the dots on the letters more clearly, the five Shiite entities are concerned with the formation of the largest bloc, the selection of the prime minister and the distribution of portfolios in a way that does not stray far from their predecessors, and with the appearance of their disagreement, but their declared and undeclared orientations are the same, everyone rejects sectarian trenching, and a sectarian majority government on Maliki's scale has become a thing of the past, and the alternative to it is raising the slogan of Sadr and Hakim "a national majority government" while Maliki and Amiri returned to call for a government of national partnership, not Analysis but all the news, statements and fever of negotiations suggest it.
Today, there are two points of view of these blocs, the first winning alliance "Sairoon" is closer to the wise and flounders between Abadi and Amiri, and does not support a particular candidate, but supports a specific program and description of who will hold the post of prime minister in the future according to the forty qualities that he must have, and for safety if there are any political figures who fit forty Sadr when Iraq has reached what it has reached.
On the other hand, we find the alliance of Fatah and the State of Law is actively seeking to form the largest bloc and making the concessions made by Maliki previously to the Kurdistan alliance, while the Sunnis are dependent on a reference from him, and the position of Mr. Abadi is not clear, but rather a rotation between Sadr and Amiri and covets a second term, or chaos that enshrines his rule for two years as the United States wishes, as some say.
America today has one of two important options, the first will support Abadi by forming the largest bloc with Sadr and Hakim and catch up with their Kurdish and Axis passengers, and this is the most obvious possibility, or it will exacerbate the scene and mix the cards to extend Abadi's mandate, and the second act may be an Iranian industry, but the one that will eventually reap its fruits is the American, it is the owner of the theory of creative chaos.
In the event that the situation in Iraq returns to new chaos, whether through the inability of the winning blocs to form the largest bloc, or if regional and international actors are able to hinder the formation of this bloc and thus the constitutional situation will be disturbed, and the country will enter into a real radical constitutional vacuum that can only be overcome by maintaining the current situation as it is, and here the current government will necessarily be without constitutional authority and take over the affairs of the country as a caretaker government.
2.2 Government of National Partnership
In Iraq for the electoral entitlement does not authorize the winning and formed entities of the largest bloc to bypass others and form the government in isolation from them, even if constitutionally prepared for it, and this has been the course of custom in the political arena after the occupation, and this is only to spread the system of political quotas in the distribution of positions after 2003, all parliamentary blocs participate in the government, and no bloc has declared its desire to be part of the parliamentary opposition, in political work in Iraq experience has proven that joining the government is better than opposing it, because the concept of opposition In Iraq, it is still under the influence of totalitarian regimes that have been on Iraq for decades, inherited from them by the inexperienced and knowledgeable people who ruled Iraq after the occupation and to this day.8
Therefore, all the winning alliances and entities seek to be part of the largest bloc, because only in this way they guarantee their interests at all the upper (national) levels, and these are rare in Iraq today, and narrow factionalism, whether it is personal or partisan interests or for one component at the expense of other components, and these are what push everyone to this frantic race, and the constitution does not prevent the absorption of winners in the formation of the government despite the diversity that exists, the important problem in the subject is the weakness of this government because it does not move away Much about the previous consensual governments that perpetuated corruption and protected the corrupt by their parties.
The researcher Hashim al-Hashemi says;(9) Many aspire that the next government will be based on the saying of multiple cultures and identities, and the idea of multiple identities while respecting the symbols and rituals of each individual identity, whether national or religious... A multi-identity government is not rejected by the lists of victory, patriotism, wisdom, conquest, will, decision, Kurdish lists and Karbouli lists, but is fundamentally acceptable, while the differences imposed by reality are behavioral differences and not hostile, and a multi-identity government is generally accepted by all 26 winning lists out of 88 lists.
To know what it is and how to form the largest bloc, it is necessary to know the topography of the new parliament in its fourth session in post-occupation Iraq.10 The number of seats in the new House of Representatives is (329) seats, including: (320) general seats and (9) quota seats for minorities, winners according to priority in terms of the number of seats in parliament (taking into account the background of their leaders from one component) as follows; Sairoon Alliance: The total (54) seats: 52 seats for the National Integrity Party, two seats for the Iraqi Communist Party. Al-Fatah Alliance: Total (48) seats: 21 seats for the Badr Organization, 15 seats for Sadiqoun (Asaib Ahl al-Haqq), three other factions of the Hashd at the rate of two seats each, and seven other factions at the rate of one seat per faction. Victory Alliance: The total number of (42) seats: 13 seats for the Victory and Liberation Bloc, which is four organizations of the Dawa Party, 7 seats for the Virtue Party, 5 seats for the Ataa Party (Falih al-Fayyad), 5 seats for the Iraqi Islamic Party, four entities on two seats, and four other seats for entities on one seat. State of Law Alliance: The total number of (25) seats: 14 seats for the Together for the Law bloc, including 4 organizations from the Dawa Party, 6 seats from the Al-Bashaer Movement, and 5 seats from the Dawa Party of Iraq. National Wisdom Movement Alliance: Total (19) seats, namely: 18 seats for the National Wisdom Movement, one seat for the revolutionaries of the popular uprising. It is these alliances that will decide who will be the largest bloc.
The entities of the Kurdistan Alliance were as follows; the list of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 25 seats, all of which were for the KDP, the list of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (18) seats all for the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the Movement for Change of Kurdistan (5) seats, the New Generation Party (4) seats, the Islamic Union of Kurdistan (18) seats, and the Islamic Group two seats. There are three seats on quotas supported by the KDP.
The national axis consists of the National Alliance: the total number of (21) seats: 7 seats for the Islamic Party (Action 2 + Civic Gathering4 + Masar Party 1), 4 seats for the National Accord Front, 3 seats for the Dialogue Front (Saleh al-Mutlak), 3 seats for the Progress Party, and four entities on one seat each. Decision Alliance: Total (15) seats: 5 seats for the Arab Project Party, (Khamis al-Khanjar).4 seats for the Party of Iraq United Osama al-Nujaifi, two entities on two seats and three other entities each with one seat. Identity alliances led by the Solution Party: 13 seats: 8 seats for the Solution Party (Jamal Karbouli), Kayan two seats and three others each with only one seat.
Most of the winning alliances are incoherent except for Sairoon, Hikma and the Kurds, while the rest can detect unprecedented displacements that are in favor of one party at the expense of another, and according to the data of the expected political scene, most are looking for narrow factional interests and are not concerned with their alliance with which they entered the course of the electoral race, but who will achieve these interests? Therefore, moving to its passengers is very easy, and certainly shows the positive positions of the new entity and will be removed from the truth despite its knowledge from most of Iraqi society.
In light of the converging results and the lack of a bloc getting big votes, this means that the next government will be weak and will be swept away by the volume of concessions to partners, as well as the prime minister will be forced to make concessions and accept the conditions of others, and this is worrying in light of the challenges facing the next government, from the war on terrorism, the fight against corruption, reconstruction and investment, and most importantly Iraq's commitments to the International Monetary Fund.
In other words, if the government of the national political partnership does so, it will respond to the requests of the winning blocs according to two principles; the first is the electoral merit, and this will be through the distribution of all sovereign positions to the winners, each according to the number of seats, and they will adopt the old method of calculating points for each position, and the second thing will be satisfactory to international and regional actors (America and Iran). The problem that this method will face is that the next government will be as lazy as the previous governments and corruption will continue to spread again, which is no longer acceptable neither locally, regionally nor internationally, in addition to the large blocs that have prepared programs and specifications for those who hold large positions such as Sairoon... and others.. Will they back down? Or can it be intertwined? According to the protection of entities and parties for their corrupt candidates, the end result will be nothing new because the inputs are the same, so how will the change take place?
Where did the Iraqi Constitution mention the concept of a caretaker government, Al-Sumaria News, 30/6/2018, https://www.alsumaria.tv/news. And http://www.niqash.org/ar/articles/politics/5949/ is seen
The Signs of the Largest Bloc and the Formation of the Expected Government in Iraq, New Iraq Center, 18/8/2018, https://www.newiraqcenter.com/2018/08/12.
https://www.alghadpress.com/news .
https://www.alsumaria.tv/mobile/news/236502 .
Seen http://www.irna.ir/ar/News/82958232 .
Seen https://www.alghadpress.com/news.
The biggest block precursors... , previous source.
Parliamentary Opposition in Iraq, New Iraq Center, 22/8/2018, https://www.newiraqcenter.com/.
Hashim al-Hashimi, Al-Naba Forum for Dialogue Discusses Scenarios for Government Formation 2018, https://annabaa.org/arabic/reports/15434.
The article on the topography of the parliament in its fourth session in Iraq is considered by the researcher at the Center for the New Iraq.
See Dr. Watheq Al Hashimi, Al Naba Forum, Previous Source
Chapter Three
Expanded Government Scenarios+
Scenario of a salvation government
Dr. Muhannad Yousef
08/08/2018
Research hypotheses
The political process gave the Shiites what they did not dream of in terms of privileges, positions, power, and administration to direct government under the pretext of historical injustice and the rights of opposition to the former national regime. Thus, they do not believe and do not allow in any way to violate the constitutional rules or the current political process such as the formation of a national salvation government and so on, even if it is against their doctrine or belief.
What are the scenarios for forming the next government after the 2018 elections?
A partisan quota government?
A government of national unity?
A national salvation government?
A government with a political majority that represents all components but not necessarily all political entities?
The Government of National Salvation or the Government of National Unity are two political concepts that are not linked to the Constitution, yet what is happening in Iraq is the formation of a government according to the constitutional framework, as the parties of the Shiite alliance will resolve the controversy on the outstanding issues in the political process to overcome any obstacle to the agreed constitutional frameworks.
A national government means that there is a catastrophe in the political process because of the repercussions of the matter because it is tantamount to returning to scratch and emptying the constitutional process of its content.
In 2014, when ISIS reached the outskirts of the capital Baghdad and directly threatened the Green Zone, we find that Shia politicians in particular and most others did not call for the formation of a national salvation government outside the framework of the constitution because they feared losing their place in power and the political process in general.
Chapter VII of the UN Charter allows it to form a national salvation government in countries that suffer from chaos and confusion that cannot form a government for them and thus affect the state of peace of neighboring countries in particular and the world in general. But this does not apply to Iraq, as politicians and legal observers consider it a repeal of elections and the constitution.
The term national salvation government.. Between the Iraqi Constitution and Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
The constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the formation of a "national salvation" government lies in the fact that the Iraqi constitution does not address a national salvation government, an emergency government or any other form except for the caretaker government, which is based on two cases, the first when the government is withdrawn and the second when the parliament is dissolved, and all these cases did not occur in Iraq.
The government according to the constitution continues even in times of war and emergency with its full powers, competencies and formations, and therefore there is no room for the formation of this government under the provisions of the Iraqi constitution.
While Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations allows it to form a national salvation government in countries that suffer from chaos and confusion that cannot form a government for them and thus affect the state of peace of neighboring countries in particular and the world in general.
This is not the case for Iraq, as politicians and legal observers consider it an abolition of elections and the constitution. Iraq, since it has a constitution approved after being questioned by the people, as well as the existence of a parliament that resulted in elections in which all components and spectrums of the Iraqi people participated, according to constitutional formulas, there are no terms for a national salvation government, participation or consensus, but these terms are put forward to remedy national crises and to end the danger to which the States concerned are exposed.
This means that a national salvation government means a white internal national coup, the cancellation of election results and the non-recognition of the provisions of the constitution. He took the reins from the side that formed the government by a greater lobbyist to form the government according to its own standard.
The one who forms the National Salvation Government is the one who pulls the rug out from under the forces that wanted to form a government, so such a term means canceling the results of the elections and not recognizing what the constitution stipulates.
The authority of the United Nations or the Security Council is not considered to be an authority above the powers of States, and the legal meaning of this is that neither the United Nations nor any other party has the right to impose the type of government to be formed in a State.
But there is a provision in the UN Charter that allows them to impose guardianship over states if their situation threatens peace and imposes a situation of danger to the world.
If the United Nations wanted to intervene, it must return to the principle of trusteeship applied after the Second World War, since most of the countries were colonial, which led the United Nations to place it under trusteeship until it regained its full sovereignty and arranged its situation.
The transition to UN tutelage is through the annulment of election results and constitutional provisions.
The concept of a national salvation government... Some analysts, politicians and jurists say that Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations allows the formation of a national salvation government in countries that suffer from chaos and confusion and those that cannot form a government, and its repercussions may affect the state of civil peace of neighboring countries in particular and the world in general.
While some argue that the authority of the United Nations or the Security Council is not considered to be an authority above the powers of states, the legal meaning of this is that neither the United Nations nor anyone else has the right to impose the type of government to be formed in a state.
Others believe that there is a provision in the Charter of the United Nations that allows them to impose guardianship over States in the event that their situation threatens peace and imposes a situation of danger to the world.
They explain this by saying that if the United Nations wants to intervene, it must return to the principle of trusteeship applied after the World War, since most countries were colonial, which led the United Nations to place it under trusteeship until it regained its full sovereignty and arranged its status.
Therefore, a country that was occupying Iraq, namely the United States, has no right to establish an emergency or national rescue government, especially in Iraq, except through the window of the United Nations, then we move to the trusteeship of the United Nations and the results of the elections and the provisions of the Constitution are canceled, and that the National Salvation Government in this case means a national coup against a national entitlement or a coup on the one hand on the one hand to form a government away from parliamentary entitlements.
A government of national salvation or a government of national unity?
There is a difference between the terms "national salvation government" and "national unity", the first means a national coup against a national entitlement or a coup on the one hand on the one hand to form a government away from parliamentary entitlements, while the government of national unity is a government consisting of the winning blocs in the elections according to the electoral merit and taking into account the national entitlement or meaning a government in which most of the spectrum of the country is represented.
The government of national unity means the formation of a government according to the constitution and according to the outcome of the elections by the main winning blocs, while the government of national salvation means the cancellation of the results of the elections and the constitution and their disregard and the government of national salvation is formed after the failure of the formation of the government by the blocs.
Despite the disagreement that has occurred in the past on defining the meaning of a government of national unity, politicians and followers of the political process agreed that the term national salvation government means the annulment of the results of the elections and the non-recognition of what is stipulated in the constitution and therefore an infringement on democratic laws and mechanisms.
National salvation is the worst solution for the Shiites, as the National Salvation Government is something that all Shiites reject because it goes beyond the limits of the democratic frameworks legislated by the occupation, whether in its referendum on the constitution or its election to those who represent it, and everyone must respect the opinion of the Iraqi street.
When politicians are unable to reach logical solutions to form a government despite the presence of politicians who have weight in making political decisions, especially as the Iraqi situation is going from bad to worse, this gives justifications for putting forward the so-called national salvation government, which is the worst solution, with everyone optimistic that this will be the last solution that we would like not to reach and take as a principle.
The National Salvation Government and its formation mechanism are made by national figures and under international supervision, and raising the issue of the National Salvation Government is only tangible proof that proves the failure of politicians to lead the country.
Although there are no terms in all the constitutions of the world for a national salvation government, partnership, consensus or even a government of national unity, there is a government consisting of the presidencies of the Republic, the head of government and the parliament.
These designations refer to the redress of national crises in countries to remove them from danger, as the term national rescue is a Western term and not an Arab term and is an infringement on the Constitution and the law.
The term is intended from the constitutional and legal point of view to involve other groups that have not obtained parliamentary proportions or seats and to give them more votes so that they can participate effectively in the formation of the government,
The cancellation of elections is not legally permissible and the intervention of the United Nations should be limited to guidance and a statement of opinion for the formation of the government and not interference in the formation of the type of government, unless a resolution is issued in accordance with its powers and what is stipulated in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations that the United Nations may impose its trusteeship and form a government in the event of a threat to world peace and then it shall be considered effective.
In the situation of Iraq and the outcome of the elections, there is no need to apply this paragraph, so the interference of the occupation forces in the formation of the government will not work.
Many believe that a "national salvation" government is a disaster in the political process, as such a proposal is maneuvers and political pressure on the parties involved in the political process to accelerate the formation of the national government.
The Government of National Salvation or the Government of National Unity are two political concepts that are not linked to the Constitution, yet what will happen in Iraq is the formation of a government according to the constitutional framework, because if what was said about a national government actually happens, it means that there is a catastrophe in the political process because of the repercussions of the matter because it is tantamount to returning to scratch and emptying the constitutional process of its content.
While the government of national unity, from the point of view of those interested in political science, is a government consisting of the winning blocs in the elections according to the electoral merit and taking into account the national merit or meaning a government in which most of the spectrum of the country is represented.
In all the constitutions of the world there are no terms national salvation government, partnership, consensus or even national unity government, but there is a government consisting of the presidencies of the republic, the head of government and the parliament. These designations refer to the redress of national crises in countries to extricate them from danger, as the term national rescue is a Western term, not an Arab one, and it is an infringement on the Constitution and the law.
The term is intended from a constitutional and legal point of view to involve other groups that have not obtained parliamentary proportions or seats and to give them more votes so that they can participate effectively in the formation of the government.
The cancellation of elections is not legally permissible and the intervention of the United Nations should be limited to guidance and a statement of opinion for the formation of the government and not interference in the formation of the type of government, except in the event of a resolution in accordance with its powers and the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations that the United Nations may impose its trusteeship and form a government in the event of a threat to world peace and then it shall be considered effective.
In the situation of Iraq and the outcome of the elections, there is no need to apply this paragraph, and that the US-Western interventions in the formation of the government will not work.
Position of the parties involved in the political process towards the Government of National Salvation
The political process in Iraq is still in a state of chaos and parliamentary division and the expansion of the sit-in in the cities of the south with the disruption of the work of state ministries, this comes at a time when the Salvation Government will not solve the problem but will open the door to other crises.
The results of the Iraqi elections, which took place on May 12, 2018, will make the political blocs consider the results of these operations in the circle of doubts and criticism, despite their conduct under the supervision of seconded judges, which led some to demand the formation of a "national salvation" government after the emergence of differences in the results of some hand-sorted boxes.
One such is the Iraqi National Accord Party or the National List, headed by Iyad Allawi, which has called for the formation of a national salvation government in Iraq, due to "the serious mistakes inherent in the political process throughout the past period." The inability of this process to produce sound outputs for the worsening political crises and dilemmas, and that the formation of a national salvation government or a caretaker government is the prerogative of the Federal Court, and its guest is the commitment to re-run the elections with a reasonable degree of fairness and leading to a comprehensive review of previous political work experience, taking into account internal and regional equations, and taking it upon itself to return Iraq to its central role as an effective international player, and as part of the free world."
But the results of the manual count will not bring about major changes at the level of electoral lists, but they will constitute a milestone on the next parliament and its legitimacy," as the next parliament will be undernumbered and may hold its sessions with the rest of its members to be completed later.
The ruling Dawa Party believes that Iraq and Iraqis who now have a constitution approved by popular referendum see it as the guarantor, the mechanism by which the new government is chosen, while those who call for new names such as the National Salvation Government and other names have their well-known motives.
One of these motives is the lack of electoral entitlement for some to participate in the political process and enter the dome of the House of Representatives, while others believe that what they have obtained is not what is intended or required, and all of them are trying to return the political process to square one.
The position of the Dawa Party on this matter is consistent and it rejects any sideways that come out of the constitutional formulas agreed upon by all.. It will not allow the transgression of the principles established by the Constitution and imposed by the will of the people by choosing their representatives.
The interactions of the Iraqi situation and its accelerated collapses revolve in the pattern of contradiction and confusion in positions, even among the closest confidants, especially among the parties of the Shiite coalition, who consider themselves the largest bloc, and they themselves are behind most of the crises in the country and are the cause of their complexity, because of their links with Iran, which imposes its will on them on the one hand, and the lack of vision of their political coalitions for the way to reform the Iraqi situation from a deterioration due to their narrow selfish interests, and the fact that the matter between them reaches the point of raising arms against the other, if the interest requires that it be publicized. Each side arms against the other and declares it a vicious war that wants to force the other to surrender to the fait accompli, and then the Iranian side intervenes each time to calm the flames of conflicts, and tries as much as it can to hold the stick from the center before things slip into war between them.
One of the complexities of the Iraqi situation is the accusations and cases of widespread fraud that marred the recent elections, and then the parliament was forced before the end of its term to issue a decision to recount and count manually and not to adopt electronic counting, and what followed a few days after the issue of burning the warehouses of ballot boxes and the expansion of the call for the cancellation of elections and demands for the establishment of a national salvation government or (emergency government).
Some Shiite political analysts and legal experts point out that the situation in Iraq does not apply to the case of the establishment of a national salvation government, because Iraq has a constitution approved after being questioned by the people, as well as the existence of a parliament produced by the results of elections in which all components and spectrum of the Iraqi people participated, stressing that according to the constitutional formulas, there are no terms for a national salvation government, participation or consensus, but these terms are put forward to remedy national crises and to end the danger to which countries are exposed. Concerned by its conduct.
Others argue that a national salvation government means a white internal national coup, the annulment of election results and the non-recognition of the provisions of the constitution, and such a term means the annulment of election results and the non-recognition of what the constitution stipulates.
No one has the right to impose the type of government on political leaders, even if it is the United Nations, and if Iraqi efforts to form a government fail.
The National Salvation Government is the worst solution, something that everyone rejects because it goes beyond the limits of the democratic frameworks legislated by the people, whether in their referendum on the constitution or their election to those who represent them, and everyone must respect the opinion of the Iraqi street.
The fact that this issue was raised after months of negotiations following the elections confirms beyond doubt the failure of politicians to reach logical solutions to the formation of the government, and that the National Salvation Government and its formation mechanism will be by national figures and under international supervision, which is a tangible proof of the failure of the country's politicians to overcome the crisis.
This is evident in 2014, when ISIS reached the outskirts of the capital Baghdad and directly threatened the Green Zone, we find that Shia politicians in particular and most others did not call for the formation of a national salvation government outside the framework of the constitution because they feared losing their place in power and the political process in general.
Signs of a National Salvation Government in Iraq
Iraq needs to be saved. When we talk about rescue, we assume there is some danger or maybe more. The dangers to Iraq are many, including the civil war, which means burning Iraq and ending it through its division. The other danger is the disruption of the political process, including the practical freezing of the constitution and the actual annulment of the election results.
Today in Iraq there is no possibility of a military coup d'état whose leaders will declare martial law, suspend the constitution and form a national salvation government. Because of the inability to do so, some make similar proposals. There is nothing better than the formation of a government named after the Salvation that suspends the constitution and cancels the election results.
But the rescue is to strengthen the project of a civil, democratic, constitutional state and its electoral mechanism and to form a government based on the results of the elections that will truly save Iraq.
Some political analyses say that the partial recount of the current elections could open the way for the final approval of the results and the passage to the process of forming a new government, a process that concerns not only the Iraqi interior, but also regional and international parties, which since 2003 have been interfering in determining the shape of Iraqi governments, and it is in their interest in the current period to quickly grasp the issue of elections and bypass them in order to ensure the stability of the Iraqi situation in a manner that serves their interests.
The most dangerous thing for the political process described as democracy is to be lost in the corridors of the debate that is swarming between these terms, which come out and change with each legislative election. Controversy has no value if it does not proceed from lived reality, concrete problems and practical necessities.
Today, the large gap between the political class and the citizen seems to have widened; it has widened as time progresses, and it seems that the wounds thickened by successive wars and crises cannot be healed under the current conditions; in the multi-party multiplicity and the domination of political adolescents, the suffering of the citizen has increased, and the dream of change has not been realized, but the situation has become worse; and the media opposed to the assumption of the reins of power by the Shiites has become promoting news that the citizen may have almost believed, because of the loss of confidence and disappointment that overthrew the dream of eliminating dictatorship.
The Government of National Salvation and the Government of National Unity are two political concepts that are not linked to the Constitution, yet what will happen in Iraq is the formation of a government according to the constitutional framework, as the parties of the Shiite coalition will resolve the controversy on the outstanding issues in the political process to overcome any obstacle to the agreed constitutional frameworks.
A national government means that there is a catastrophe in the political process because of the repercussions of the matter because it is tantamount to returning to scratch and emptying the constitutional process of its content.
The establishment of a national salvation government, or an emergency government, comes after exhausting all means and methods of international and regional solutions and interventions in Iraq, and after the major powers, including the United States and the Security Council, sense that Iraq is heading towards a stage of civil war or worsening of its political situation and threatens the unity of the country and its territorial sovereignty. You don't know how to manage a crisis and end its complexities in the most rational and least lossless way.
The big blocs lurk behind the big seats they have obtained to consider themselves the "guardian" of others and are the ones who impose their vision on them, and that these parties are the ones promoting the civil war and are the ones who put the Iraqi public opinion in the predicament of despair of salvation from the status quo and its dangerous repercussions.
The current government can extend its powers for months without a "constitutional vacuum" and it remains with all the powers as long as the issue of elections is not resolved, and the controversy is over some of the results of the elections, and the accompanying fraud, can be resolved, and if there were no elections it would have turned into a "caretaker government", but the Iraqi situation now will not enter a constitutional vacuum as the jurists assert.
The large blocs can conform to the popular and regional desire to resolve the crisis with the least losses through understandings to resolve the crisis, and to involve everyone in the government, that is, a government representative of all national spectrums and whoever wants to be on the side of the opposition can resort to this option, and remains a pressure force on the government to correct its courses, and may have the opportunity to overthrow it if the government does not have the means to succeed and overcome crises.
The complexities of the Iraqi situation have puzzled not those who follow Iraqi political affairs and jurists, but have confused even the American strategic experts themselves, who are many doubts, signs of suspicion and concern about the accumulation of the Iraqi situation, and although they consider that the entire Iraqi situation is somewhat controlled, they do not exclude that Iraqis face fears that things in their country will get out of control.
U.S. Position on the National Salvation Government
Both the United States and regional parties are making tireless efforts to not get things out of control in Iraq, especially since the United States is facing other crises that have emerged, namely Iran, the issue of the Syrian situation and the relationship with North Korea, and does not have time to be preoccupied with other crises in Iraq, and therefore it remains supportive of the trends in which the Iraqi political blocs, large and small, enter into alliances, understandings and consensuses, and end that crisis in a few months to come, without resorting to the option of an emergency government or a salvation government. National.
The US administration has been urging Iraqi leaders to form a government that unites all Iraqis as soon as possible but has not called on Iraq to form a national salvation government, but Washington has developed a new scenario that includes presenting a national salvation government headed by Abadi as an alternative solution in the event that the elections fail to avoid their current crisis.
The U.S. administration is beginning to feel obsessed with the danger looming over Iraq and is trying not to start change from within and disagree on the rules of the game it has set. Washington is trying by offering a salvation government that it markets to the Iraqi people and political forces in order to mature it and pass it in parliament. This government will consist of ten ministers who will be the Salvation Government and will be accepted by the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.
Since US President Donald Trump took office, spinning messages have been continuing between opponents of the policy of Shiite parties and the new US administration, where Trump praised the role of Saddam Hussein in suppressing Islamists during a period of wisdom, especially since Trump had announced more than once during his election campaign his objection to the way to topple Saddam's regime, and what happened after 2003 and since then the Baath regime has been reviewing their services, to cooperate with the Americans, but it seems that the subject of Returning them to power again is about the attitude of the Americans themselves, and their conviction to turn back the clock and realize the dream of return.
The Shiite rejection of the American presence in Iraq may exacerbate the differences between them and the US administration, which announced that it will strive to seize Iraq's oil, which liberated it from a tyrant that destroyed Iraq throughout its rule, and in return the Americans received only messages of reassurance and no objection to the presence of friendly American forces, from Sunni-affiliated parties and inclined to return the Baathists to power, who in turn expressed their readiness for any role in the future, especially since they did not condemn any new American presence at the base of the United States. Ain al-Assad, Balad, Qayyarah and others.
Recently, lists with names have spread in several American media outlets and through social media pages, the publishers of which claim to be the names of a new governing council or a national salvation government as they call them, and the truth is that these names are of specialized professors who contributed to the study of the future of Iraq under the supervision of the Atlantic Center, a center for research and strategic studies in Washington.
This study is on the Center's website and has nothing to do with a project for new governance in Iraq, and was under the supervision of former US Ambassador Ryan Crocker and included a large number of personalities and institutions, including centers for Iraqi strategic studies, and these lists may be to feel the pulse of the Iraqi street, to study the acceptance or non-acceptance of the change of the current regime.
The Scenario of the Shiite House for the Formation of the Iraqi Government
Shahu Al , Qaradaghi
Boot
The Iraqi elections held on May 12, 2018 coincided with many international, regional and internal variables and events that directly affect the process of forming the largest bloc in the Iraqi parliament to form the next Iraqi government and make the process more complicated than previous cycles characterized by the unity and cohesion of the Shiite and Kurdish parties, but at the moment the Shiite and Kurdish parties also suffer from divisions and internal problems.
One of the most prominent reasons behind the complexity of the formation of the largest mass is:.
First: The American withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran, with an American intention to reduce Iranian influence in the region, especially in Iraq because it is one of the main strongholds of Tehran's allies of sectarian militias and political parties that are working to implement Iranian policies in Iraq and turn Iraq into a constant threat to American interests and neighboring countries of Iraq, and this deterioration in US-Iranian relations has caused a division within the Iraqi parties and parties between these two axes, and this will make it difficult to form a bloc The largest because of the presence of Iranian field influence and American pressure on political forces, which complicates the formation of the largest bloc, and on the ground Iranian General Qassem Soleimani is working intensively to influence the Shiite forces, while the US president's envoy in the international coalition McGurk makes shuttle visits to Iraq to form a front away from Iranian influence. (1)
Second: The boycott of the majority of citizens in Iraq of the election process due to the loss of confidence in the occurrence of real change through the elections due to the absence of any change as a result of the previous three elections, and after the holding of the elections appeared a wave of protests in the southern provinces that are considered the popular incubator of the Shiite parties that have ruled Iraq since (2005), and this continuous movement greatly affects the Shiite parties to determine their future policies because they fear the spread and expansion of demonstrations and the threat to the entire political process and this is what pushes them To take into account the protests and increase popular discontent against the government policies of the ruling Shiite parties.
Third: The winning blocs in the last elections have very close results unlike the election results in (2010) and (2014), where there were only three large blocs in the 2010 elections, namely the State of Law Coalition, the National Coalition and the United National Coalition, and in 2014 the difference between the State of Law bloc (Nouri al-Maliki) and the other blocs was very vast between the first bloc (State of Law) and the second bloc, the Ahrar, which got 34 seats and the difference between them It was (58) seats.
While in the last elections, the "Sairoon" alliance led by Sadr won (54) seats, the "Fatah" alliance headed by Hadi al-Amiri (48) seats, the "Victory" coalition headed by Haider al-Abadi (42), the "State of Law" headed by Maliki (25) seats, and then the "Wisdom Movement" headed by Ammar al-Hakim (20) seats.
Reviving the Shia Alliance
It is clear that there are many scenarios for the formation of the largest bloc between the political parties and the winning blocs in the elections, and among these scenarios that Tehran is working to achieve and emerged through the attempts and efforts of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, who is trying to bring the Shia parties to the same table to reach an agreement among themselves to avoid a Shia-Shiite clash that negatively affects the role of Shiites within the state and gives others the opportunity to exploit internal Shiite problems to impose more demands. It will thus gradually lead to a decline in Iranian influence in Iraq.
The Lebanese news revealed on the sixteenth of May that "Qassem Soleimani" began his visit to Iraq by meeting with the Shiite politician Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the head of the National Alliance (formerly) and asked him to play the role of mediator to bring together the Shiite parties because of his acceptability to them, but Jaafari asked for patience until the precise electoral sizes of each alliance are distorted. (2)
After the results of the elections were certified by the Federal Court and the accurate results of all blocs and political parties appeared, it is clear that this scenario can be easily achieved, as it is possible that all five large Shiite coalitions (Sairoon, Fatah, Nasr, State of Law, and Wisdom) will enter into one alliance in addition to some small blocs to form a bloc of (195) deputies, and the government will be formed comfortably later, and through attempts to understand between Fatah and Sairoon And part of the victory on the one hand, the alliance between Sairoon and Hikma on the other, and the freezing of the dispute between Sairoon and the State of Law on the other, the Shiite blocs will find themselves in one alliance. (3)
Tehran has invested a lot in Shiite political parties in Iraq to be ready to help Tehran in case of problems and open the doors to Iranian interference in Iraq, and during the past years Tehran has succeeded in penetrating into the entire facilities of the Iraqi state through these parties, and after the emergence of ISIS, Tehran has established many sectarian militias that receive material support and guidance from the Iranian leader Ali Khamenei directly, to be a ready alternative in the event of the advent of a national Iraqi government whose objectives conflict with Iranian interests in Iraq, and Iran is working to prevent the occurrence of a Shia-Shiite conflict inside Iraq because this scenario will lead to the weakness of Shiites in general, the strengthening of Kurds and Sunnis, the formation of a threat to Iran from a security point of view and Tehran's inability to move inside Iraq easily, so Iran sent the son of the Supreme Leader "Mojtaba Khamenei" to Iraq to restore life to the Shiite National Alliance to form the Iraqi government and unite Shiite forces and parties again in conjunction with the visits of General Qassem Soleimani" is evidence of the gravity of the situation for Iran. (4)
Motives for the Revival of the Shiite House
There are a number of reasons that may push for the return of the Shiite house again under Iranian auspices:
First: The survival of the sectarian and nationalist trench on the political scene, as the prominent and winning Kurdish blocs are working to form a large Kurdish alliance consisting of all seven Kurdish parties that succeeded in obtaining seats in the last elections to go to Baghdad through one strong bloc and impose unified national conditions and demands regarding Kirkuk, the budget and national rights on the Shiite parties in Baghdad and the requirement to achieve Kurdish demands on other blocs To ally with it to form the next government, which may also lead the Shiite parties to consider returning to the Shiite alliance and abandoning the national slogans that they were raising before the elections to win votes.
Second: Returning the Sunni blocs that were suffering from fragmentation and division to come up with one common vision for the Sunni house to negotiate with other Shiite blocs, and despite the many attempts of Sunni leaders to form a joint alliance, the large number of sponsors and supporters of Sunnis hinders the achievement of this Sunni goal but may push the Shiites to return to square one.
Third: The transformation of one of the main Shiite blocs of the opposition means hindering the work of the government and institutions and mobilizing citizens against the government, which may lead to increased problems, destabilization and the collapse of the government quickly and the political process as well, and this pushes Tehran to exert all efforts in order to participate all Shiite blocs in the government and satisfy it so as not to hinder the government in this fateful period for Iran because it needs Iraq to overcome the sanctions imposed on it.
Fourth: Iranian pressure on the Shiite parties to revive the Shiite alliance again, especially since Iran has the tools and means to pressure the Shiite parties and can destabilize and cause security problems in Iraq if the Shiite parties do not comply with Iranian directives, and it is clear that the Shiite parties can not rebel against Iranian directives unless a strong American intervention on their side with a real intention to weaken Iranian influence inside Iraq.
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Obstacles to the reactivation of the Shiite House
First: The presence of many Sunni members in the bloc (Sairoon, Fatah and Victory) and therefore it may not be easy to return to the Shiite house and sectarian trenching, which causes great embarrassment to those members who joined these blocs under the pretext that they are cross-sectarian and ideological blocs and that they are national blocs that prioritize the interest of Iraq only and not the foreign agenda. National and cross-sectarian in this case.
Second: The regional fear of the return of the alliance between Shiite parties, which is not favored by the neighboring countries of Iraq, because the experience of these countries with the Shiite alliance is not encouraging to repeat because of the problems and crises that have ravaged Iraq and threatened neighboring countries and caused the deterioration of diplomatic relations and opened the way for Iran to use Iraq as part of its foreign policies and monopolize the Iraqi market and prevent the rest of the countries from building sound and friendly relations with Iraq.
Third: The popular protests included many demands, including criticism of sectarian trenches and Shiite religious parties that have ruled since (2015) and have not succeeded in turning bright slogans into actions on the ground, and therefore it is clear that the orientation to this option may fuel the street more in light of the deterioration of services and humanitarian and health conditions in the Iraqi street and it is difficult for Shiite parties to risk heading towards a step that may lead to the collapse of the political process due to the increase in protests.
Fourth: American discomfort with Iranian influence inside Iraq, and the emergence of conviction among the US administration of the need to return Iraq and fight the parties allied with Tehran, and the US military presence in Iraq, especially in the areas of Anbar and the border areas with Syria, has increased with the construction of the largest consulate in the world in Erbil and this means an American intention to stay in Iraq and not allow sectarian militias that the United States of America considers terrorist to control the country again, and this may push some parties Shiites to stay away from parties close to Iran because they will not tolerate exposure to US sanctions.
Extended Government Scenario
The Federal Court announced on Sunday (August 19th) that it had confirmed the final results of the elections for the House of Representatives, after the Electoral Commission sent the results on August 16 to the Federal Court in order to certify the results after the completion of the consideration of the appeals.
Before the elections, Shia parties, political figures and some Sunni leaders were critical of the governance model in Iraq since (2003) until now and considered that past governments failed to provide the simplest services to citizens, and this is because of the coalition governments in which everyone participated and the quotas were divided between the parties without an effective opposition monitoring the performance of the government and working to correct the existing mistakes, so they were proposing the scenario of a political majority government because it may be the most appropriate for this stage.
One of the Shia parties that strongly calls for the formation of a political majority government is the "State of Law" coalition led by Iraqi Vice President Nouri al-Maliki, which "calls for a departure from the model of national partnership adopted since 2003 and which was based on the principle of the partnership of all political blocs, Shia, Sunni and Kurdish, in the government." (5)
But the other parties do not agree with this proposal because they believe that Iraq consists of three main components "Shia, Sunnis and Kurds" and if this model of government is applied, it is in the interest of the Shiite parties at the expense of marginalizing the Sunni and Kurdish parties and therefore there will be an imbalance between the components and cause deterioration of political conditions and destabilization in the next stage with the need for Iraq to stabilize after a conflict with ISIS and the possibility of inability to Opposition to holding the government accountable in this case.
But it seems clear that there are international demands to achieve an expanded government that includes all parties without excluding anyone, as the UN envoy in Iraq stated on the formation of the Iraqi government that "the United Nations hopes to form an expanded government away from sectarianism for the people of Iraq, and Kopeg called on politicians to achieve the demands of citizens and accelerate the formation of an expanded government, confront corruption and achieve job opportunities for all."
It is known that many federal countries have an expanded government under which they work to distribute powers widely among the parties participating in the elections, and one of the positives of this government is that political parties and blocs feel the importance of their presence in the government and in the decision-making process and this government is a factor of political, security and economic stability, and pushes the political parties to take responsibility in the government, in addition to the fact that minorities do not feel marginalized because they participate in the government.
But at the same time this government needs to have confidence and an excellent relationship between the political parties involved in it to ensure its success in its tasks, but in Iraq we see that there is a conflict between political parties, with the loss of transparency and the rule of law which may lead to its failure to achieve its goals, in addition to the lack of a real partnership according to previous experiences in Iraq, the Shiite party always works to monopolize positions and marginalize Sunnis, Kurds and other components and These parties therefore feel marginalized and therefore work not so much to achieve the government's programs and the success of its reform steps as they work to achieve special interests associated with them within the government.
In this context, researcher Sean McGovin wrote in the American website National Interest: Since the United States completed the withdrawal of its soldiers from Iraq in 2011, American policy has focused on the military defeat of ISIS with little attention to local Iraqi policies and this is a mistake, because Maliki has shifted government institutions to the benefit of the Shiite majority, and this can be seen largely in the Iraqi security forces, where the proportion of Shiites in the Internal Security Forces was 55%, But that percentage rose to 95 percent in 2015, and then ISIS was exploited in sectarian tensions to gain local support, and the United States should support a coalition government in the new Iraq that constitutes a period of stability and the United States participates in building the future leadership of Iraq." (6).
In the previous elections, the Shiite parties were united in the Shiite alliance or divided into two or three parties, but in these elections there are five Shiite blocs, while the Sunni parties are working to unite their ranks to get better gains in the next government, while the Kurds suffer for the first time since 2003 from division and fragmentation despite the continuous attempts to revive the Kurdistan alliance and bring together all Kurdish parties in one alliance to participate in the negotiations to form the government, and this division between the political parties has It complicates the formation of the next expanded coalition government compared to previous governments, but despite the opposition of some political parties to this model, which has proved to be a failure in the past, it may be positions built for the purpose of elections and winning votes only and do not turn into a practical position within the negotiations to form the government, everyone seeks to participate in the government and obtain the largest share of positions in state institutions without thinking of making a real change, especially in light of the continuation of demonstrations demanding the improvement of services and the provision of supplies Live.
If the model of an expanded government is repeated and all parties participate in it, it means repeating previous models, repeating mistakes and continuing failures regardless of the bloc that chooses the prime minister, because the prime minister will be a weak figure in the absence of an effective opposition that can monitor the government and be a source of concern for officials and parties to evaluate their behavior and review their actions, and thus will increase the complexity of the scene and not meet the needs of citizens, which will lead to an increase in demonstrations and protests in the streets due to the lack of change. In the mentality of political parties and the rotation of political faces through elections and the repetition of the same slogans and promises that were previously made.
1- The intensification of the US-Iranian conflict to drive out the largest bloc in Iraq https://aawsat.com/home/article/1368111/%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%80-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82)
2- Possible post-election scenarios / Hammurabi Center for Studies and Research (http://hcrsiraq.org/1957-.html)
3- The Struggles of Forming the New Iraqi Government (http://almasalah.com/ar/news/148125/%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9)
(4) https://www.lebanese-forces.com/2018/06/13/son-of-khamenei-in-iraq after Khamenei's son Soleimani in Iraq... And a new Iranian scheme/
(5)https://www.eremnews.com/news/arab-world/1214637
(6)http://www.alaalem.com/?aa=news&id22=48535
Conclusion of the joint research
The Federal Court approved the results of the elections, and the ratification of the Federal Court opened the door to binding constitutional timings for the convening of the new House of Representatives, and the election of the President of the Republic who will appoint the candidate of the most numerous parliamentary bloc, after the current President of the Republic, Fouad Massum, announced the convening of the House of Representatives on the third of September 2018.
The quorum of the first session may not be achieved if the formation of the largest bloc fails, and the political blocs fail to agree on the three presidencies with a single deal, and if a quorum is achieved without the largest bloc, the head of Hamhouriya may be assigned the candidate of Sairoon, as the most numerous parliamentary bloc, who may succeed or fail to form a new government, to transfer the mandate from one parliamentary bloc to another.
Until one of them succeeds in forming a new government, or the largest bloc is formed, or the repercussions develop into scenarios answered by the upcoming events, due to the intensification of the dispute between Abadi and the Popular Mobilization Forces of the engineer, Iraq's political crisis may remain open, waiting for a state of emergency or a repeat of the scenarios of Yemen, Samarra, or Mosul.
Whatever the scenarios, the birth of a new political map has become an imposed reality to change the equation of power on the ground, due to a number of fundamental differences referred to in the paper, and Iraq may remain hostage to a transitional scene and a caretaker government, until the developments of the US conflict against the regime and the regional protector of Iran mature.
Author Dr.Omar Abdul Sattar Mahmoud
الكاتب د.عمر عبدالستار محمود
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