The Shapes, Forms and Future of the Iranian-American Confrontation

Joint Search

index

Theoretical framework and introduction

First Search

Forms of confrontation - Dr. Omar Abdel Sattar Mahmoud

Second Research

Forms of confrontation - Dr. Abdel Nasser Al-Mahdaoui

Third Research

The Path of Confrontation - Professor Shahu Al-Qardaghi

Search Quarter

The Future of Confrontation - Dr. Muhannad Youssef

The end

Sources

Theoretical framework and introduction

This paper assumes that the U.S.-Iranian problem is a local, regional, and international problem.

The local problem concerns the mentality, the system and the model of Iranian governance, regional to threaten Iran's system of regional security in the Middle East, and international, being an impossible mandate in the international system, in addition to making the Middle East an arena of international battle, and leaving the Iranian problem without a radical solution may lead to a world war, and that a radical solution may require regime change in Iran.

Iran represents the last bastion of hostility in the Middle East to the international system, and America ignored the problem of Iran and extended its influence from Tehran to Beirut, and became its domestic and international arms and allies, until America's problem with Iran and the stability of the region reached an impasse.

The deadlock in the Iranian-American problem in the region is caused by a firm conviction among Iranians that America wants to change their political system completely, and the Americans' conviction that my guess can only be removed when the gun is pointed at his head.

The accumulation of U.S.-Iranian problems could lead to regional and international security spiraling out of control, as well as the possibility of Iran entering the spiral of creative chaos, both of which are dangerous enough domestically, regionally and internationally.

A spiral out of control in the Middle East could mean that the Middle East, along with Asia, could move from the American orbit to the orbit of the adversaries of the United States, Iran, Russia and China.

Perhaps it became clearer after the end of the tactical war against ISIS, which opened the door to the possibility of an international confrontation in the arena of Syria, where all countries and all problems meet.When Iran, Russia, China and America meet in the Middle East, the Middle East has become the arena of major international battle, between two camps as has happened in all three previous wars.

After this introduction, the paper will address the first research on the nature of the Iranian-American problem domestically, regionally and internationally, in the second on the forms of confrontation, the course of confrontation in the third, and in the fourth on the future of confrontation and then the conclusion.

First Search

The Iranian-American Problem

Dr. Omar Abd El , Sattar Mahmoud

Local Problem

Domestically, Iran's problem is centered on two fundamental things, one of which concerns the model of armed religious revolutionary rule that came to power after the 1979 revolution, and the Iranian personality, whose mental and religious system is linked together throughout history.

The Velayat-e Faqih model is a heterogeneous combination of a set of models that have made it closer to describing the "atypical model" than to any specific Islamic or non-Islamic model.Its revolution is not far from Marxism in its war with capitalism, its subsidiaries of the Supreme Leader are closer to capitalist companies, its militias are closer to gangs than to religion, and its democracy is governed by only those who are elected.

A state and a society based on Khomeini's Islamic Government Book, in an ancient Iranian society, is no different from Marx's materialist philosophy in a Kayseri society, or Hitler's fascism, which believed in the supremacy of the German race, or Nasser and Saddam, who adopted the nationalist illusion.

Although the ultimate failure has afflicted all those who preceded the velayat-e faqih in their insistence against the laws of social logic and the international community, the fate of the model of the atypical that the velayat-e faqih entails is no different from that of the previous ones.

Despite Wilayat al-Faqih's attempt to marry the state with the revolution to absorb the domestic and international rejection of its impossible project, its attempts are nothing more than an escape from the fate of any rogue state.

The contradiction practiced by Wilayat al-Faqih between its revolutionary religious discourse in support of the disadvantaged and its reformist behavior with the arrogant is caused by the contradictions of its complex system, which can no longer survive, except with more cruelty, at a time when its economic foundation can no longer afford it.

Even the marriage between revolution and democracy through elections, whose candidates are filtered, and elected not to rule, according to the constitution of Wilayat al-Faqih grants his powers to the Supreme Leader, has made the velayat-e faqih a system unlike any other in the history of Islam, in the history of Iran, or in the history of the regimes of government in the world.

Even the brother of former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, on the 39th anniversary of the revolution, said that there are three options for the regime to get out of its crisis with the people, the option of toppling the regime, the option of the survival of the regime, and the option of the Islamic Republic of Paris, which Khomeini called for from Paris, and then reversed when he took power.

Velayat-e faqih fought its men and there was no one left of them as Kabir, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, Karroubi and Mousavi Daleel, and annihilated its opponents, and the executions of 1988 evidence, and spoiled the religious life of minorities, so Sunnis did not find them a mosque in Tehran, nor an official position, but the rulers of Sunni provinces such as Kurdistan and Balochistan are Shiites, but the Kurds of Iran fought the Iranian regime during the Iran-Iraq War, while the Iraqi Kurds fought the regime of Saddam Hussein, in cooperation with the Revolutionary Guards.

Velayat-e faqih fought women, who make up more than half of society, by imposing the hijab and banned them from the public and private sphere, and was dominated by security men, until it was said that women had revolted against the Shah by wearing the hijab, and today revolted against the velayat-e faqih by removing the hijab, and even said that Iran is the only country in the world that considers the issue (nationality) a political issue.

Wilayat al-Faqih has strangled the public and private spheres, and people are worried not only about losing their freedom and livelihood, but also about losing their religion.Although Wilayat al-Faqih has succeeded in strangling the public and private spheres, it has failed to Islamize the public sphere, in favor of rentier mentalities and networks linked to the Murshid, and the result has been social hypocrisy, similar to the hypocrisy of Wilayat al-Faqih in its contradiction between its discourse and practice, a hypocrisy that is very costly if it continues, continuously Wilayat al-Faqih.

After 39 years, the Velayat-e Faqih regime has failed to be a political model as Erdogan's, or an economic security model as China's, and all it can do is to marry the revolution and the state in a repressive security way, as any repressive national or international regime does, and this is one of the regime's great predicaments.

The revolt of the poor in 79 Iranian cities, the strategic treasure trove of the velayat-e faqih of mankind, with the fall of the free riyal, under costly regional expansion, which has become more expensive to maintain amid international pressure, has exposed the velayat-e faqih and lost its cornerstone of the crushed class.

The crushed class, which represents the treasury of the velayat-e faqih al-Human, which finally revolted against it in the protests of 2018, and after it was keen for 39 years of the revolution to keep it away from the impact of the fall of the riyal that lasted from 79 to 2018, and pushed the impact of the free fall of the riyal towards the middle class, to distance Iran from the coming spring, but the high prices of basic materials and massive inflation reached its impact to the strategic reservoir of the revolution, revolted, and disbelief in the velayat-e faqih, to prove that the velayat-e faqih is an impossible model of Iran as it is impossible internationally.

Although Iranian society, with its minorities, classes and women, accepted it 39 years ago, as they found it the best choice between the Shah's model and the Toudeh Party model, the model of no model, has touched an impossible model.

As for the model of the Iranian personality, it is another local problem that guides America in the way of dealing with it, the Iranian personality and system throughout history has been characterized by the mixing of the religious, national and xenophobic factor formed a psychological alloy that resisted the factors of dredging until the arrival of Velayat-e Faqih.This psychological alloy has produced a deep-seated culture that extends from the Achaemenids to Khomeini, a rare language that dominated the ancient Silk Road, and a precious Iranian carpet that does not leave human memory.

The roots of the national factor in the Iranian personality go back to its affiliation with the Aryan race, which made it feel superior to the peoples of the region.Since the dawn of history the name of Iran has been Persia, so how did it turn into Iran? The answer to this question has led us to explain and understand the special relationship that was formed between Germany and Iran, and caused the American-Iranian problem domestically, regionally and even internationally until Khamenei was nicknamed the Hitler of the Middle East.

The story of Persia's transformation into Iran begins with the reign of Kaiser Wilhelm II, the last German emperor to rule the German Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia from June 15, 1888 until November 9, 1918.Encouraged by the emperor to stir up trouble for the enemies of Germany (Britain, France and Russia), the countries that ruled vast Muslim lands at the time, and in harmony with Persia (traditionally likened to Russia and Britain, the two powers controlling its north and south), Persia accepted German concepts.

Germany's loss in World War I did not diminish Iran's enthusiasm for everything German, and in the interwar years, Germany became the main supplier of industrial technology and technical expertise to Iran.Adolf Hitler's rise to power did not hinder these relations, and Shah Persia was not only very pleased, but a large part of Persian intellectuals and businessmen sympathized with National Socialism.

In 1934, at the request of the Iranian ambassador in Berlin, the Shah forbade the use of the name Persia and insisted on the use of the name Iran, which means the land of the Aryans. Hitler responded by exempting Aryan Iranians from Nuremberg's racism laws, and even today, German visitors to Iran are enthusiastically reminded by Iranians that Germany and Iran share a common Aryan heritage.

Iran's association with Germany through affiliation with the Aryan race made it like Germany when it felt superior to the rest of the peoples of Europe and caused two world wars.The American question in the face of this fascist German problem that pushed them to an industrial infrastructure that blew up two world wars, until the Americans proposed plans to sterilize the descendants of Germans or displace them was: How can we prevent Germany from carrying out any next war? U.S. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau's answer was: We turn Germany into an agricultural country, and we evaluate the development and eradication of what has to do with industry.

American generosity gradually transformed Germans from enemy to friend through development and reprogramming of the German mentality to limit the expansion of communism, which is what America is thinking today to solve the Iranian problem and its ilk and perhaps not allow a similar problem to emerge in any geopolitical region of the world.

This introduction shows that the American-Iranian problem was not only a nuclear or missile technical problem or a hostile foreign policy problem, but also a model of a cross-border fascist mentality that the world tried with Germany and withstood it, until two world wars broke out.

The 1939 Munich agreement between Hitler and four European countries is almost like the Iran nuclear deal of 2015, both of which are an international pause with a fascist mentality, which led with Germany to two world wars and could lead with Iran to a third world war.

The emergence of the model of Iran (Hitler) coincided with the wave of the rise of the model of jihadist Islam and Sunni and Shiite politics in the region, after the fall of the Arab and Iranian nationalist system, which caused the region to enter the era of creative chaos, and this opens the conversation about the regional problem that we will talk about in the second section.

If this is the story of America's problem with the Iranian nationalist mentality, the religious factor in the Iranian personality is another American-Iranian problem that has been mixed with the national factor, and its roots go back to Zoroastrianism since the fifth century BC, and then to Shiism in the sixteenth century AD.

The religious factor was associated with nationalism before and after Islam, and even the marriage of the Shahbano to Hussein ibn Ali after the Islamic conquest is a form of association of the religious factor with the national factor, which still supplies the velayat-e faqih with blood.

Just as it was the fault of the velayat-e faqih by imposing the religious factor by force from top to bottom, it was the Shah's fatal mistake, by imposing a radical nationalist policy that is anti-religious and Western-based from top to bottom, and despite the fact that Velayat-e Faqih benefited from the Shah's mistake, the approach of the revolution and the state then, necessarily, has led to the destruction of the pillars of the Iranian national and religious personality resistant to foreigners throughout history, and perhaps the Iranian personality, as the peoples of the four capitals have reached, to use the foreigner instead of resisting him, to get rid of the velayat-e faqih, and this is the result of the creative chaos that is Part of the U.S. National Security Strategy.

Velayat-e faqih has shattered or almost destroyed the genes of resistance inherited against foreigners among the peoples of Iran, who have been known throughout history for their violent resistance to foreigners, whether Arab or Western, Greek or Mongol, Ottoman or Afghan, Britain, Russia or America as it is today.

This is happening, despite the fact that Velayat-e Faqih is aware of the depth of independence in the Iranian personality, and from here it raised the slogan of fighting the Great Satan, and benefited from the inclusion of Bush Jr. in the axis of evil, and from making it the largest sponsor of terrorism in the world, on the basis that the West targets Iran yesterday, today and tomorrow.

This conspiracy mentality has dominated the Iranian personality over time, finding that the Arabs have destroyed its kingdom, because it is a country of civilization, and that the West imposed on them the Shah and seized their oil, and it is not possible to spread its democracy in them, and they have tried it more than once, and the coup d'état of 1953 from the evidence.

Although the nationalist side has opened the way for the conspiracy mentality of the Iranian personality, the Shiite religious factor has also helped to dominate the conspiracy mentality then as well, and this is a dilemma in the Iranian personality added to the problem of velayat-e faqih, which today is represented by the rejection of the model of velayat-e faqih by 73% of Iranians.

The 2018 protests alarmed Iran's Velayat-e Faqih regime, who discovered that the grassroots no longer accepted them.The question is, how did the 1979 revolution, which overthrew the Shah, give birth to another counter-revolution that, 39 years later, could continue to overthrow the Velayat-e Faqih regime?

Those familiar with the minutes of things say that Iranian society has lost its religious features after 39 years of medieval religious rule.Specialists add, that the pillars of the Velayat-e Faqih regime are keen to hide this fact, although Mohammad Javad Bahunar said a few days ago, we have to face reality, we have more than 5 million Iranians who are pro-American and pro-Israel in Iran.

The phenomenon of removing the hijab, which spread, as an act of opposition to the Velayat-e Faqih regime, within the activities of the recent Iranian protests, is similar to the phenomenon of wearing the hijab, as an act opposed to the rule of the Shah, during the revolution of 1979.The phenomenon of buying dollars and selling riyals that is spreading among Iranians today after the dollar has become equal to 70,000 riyals, is similar to the phenomenon of selling dollars and buying riyals, in the Shah's last days.

Iran's 2018 protests have shown that there is another Iran other than Iran, which Velayat-e Faqih wants us to deal with.The new Iran, which is rising today from under the soil, says that there is a clash in Iran, between the will of Wilayat al-Faqih, which integrates religion with the state, and hostility to the international order, and the will of the majority of people calling for the departure of the regime, the separation of religion from the state, and the return of Iran to the international community again.

The protests of 2018 answered a number of questions, including, why Iran lives in a crisis economic situation, despite its many human and natural resources?The protests also revealed that the export of the revolution, which pushes the regime to support terrorism outside Iran, is the cause of the economic crisis, which is the reason that prompted people to protest, and it is also the reason that may overthrow the regime of Velayat-e Faqih.

This may mean that it was the principle of exporting the revolution, which ultimately led to the revolution of the peoples of Iran in 2018, against the regime brought by the revolution of Iran in 1979, and that the recent protests, not only revealed the badness of the system of velayat-e faqih, but revealed that there is another Iran, which Velayat-e Faqih was keen to hide, and that there is a coming revolution taking place inside Iran.

However, a people who fall as a secular Shah who is alienated by the revolution of 1970 and comes to Khomeini, and then revolts 39 years later to bring down a revolutionary religious system brought by Khomeini, but a people that has revolted every fifteen years since 1890, and the revolution of 2009 about us is near, a people that may pose a problem in its system and mentality in Iran, the region and the world.

The story of the peoples of Iran is one with its rulers whom it overthrew in 1979, and today it revolts to bring down others, and another with its struggle with the West, and the coup d'état of 1953 from us is not far away, and it was traded by the Khomeini revolution, in the name of fighting the Great Satan.

Iran has a revolutionary nationalist people who hate foreigners, hate religious and leftist extremism, hate the rule of the Shah, and the revolution of 1906, 1953, 1979, and 2018 is proof.Every time the peoples of Iran tried to revolt, opponents at home and abroad gathered against him, returning him to absolute authoritarian rule in the name of the Shah once, in the name of the left once, and in the name of religion once.

Iran's patriarchal rentier regimes, whether marked or generalized, have failed to withstand Iran's society, despite the Shah's army and Savake, and despite the Basij and guard of the revolution, when they isolated themselves from society.

The new Iran that the Middle East may await, as the international community awaits, may necessarily differ from the regime's Iran, and may also necessarily differ from the image of Iran that the Iranian personality is looking for. The Iranian personality must leave the history that then linked religion to nationalism.

Leaving the history to which Velayat-e Faqih returned in Iran, and the history that linked the factor of religion and nationalism to the Iranian personality, necessarily means the search for a new model of the relationship of religion and state, away from the relationship of Zoroastrianism to Sasan, and the relationship of Shiism to Khomeini, and close to neutralizing the influence of religion and nationalism on the model of governance, without prejudice to the impact of religion and nationalism on the Iranian personality individually and collectively.

Regional Forms

America's regional forms with Iran are highlighted in Iran's armed religious-revolutionary model that combines state and non-state across national borders in light of the ongoing chaos in the region, from the Lebanese civil war to the Syrian civil war.

Thanks to its dual system and the principle of exporting revolution and the ongoing chaos in the region, Iran is in a position to exert enormous influence, throughout the Middle East and for years to come, if the international military preparations under way today in Syria do not break Iran's arrogance.

Over the past forty years, Iran has demonstrated its ability to infiltrate sectarian, operationally trained, and unwavering militias with unwavering loyalty on the one hand, and to integrate its militias into armies, police, and security forces of four Arab capitals, pending the accession of a fifth capital.

The past fifteen years have given Iran enormous opportunities to extend its regional political and economic influence and enhance its national security, within imagined borders deep within the territory of its neighboring countries, according to a strategy that says that our presence outside our borders is an internal Iranian affair.

Iran has taken advantage of the war against al-Qaeda and then ISIS, expanded its hegemony through Baghdad and Damascus to the Mediterranean, and is now preparing for an upcoming regional tour, perhaps against Jordan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, perhaps with another version of ISIS or al-Qaeda.

Having taken control of the Sunni Arab provinces and disputed areas, Iran is now working to deploy its militias on the borders of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey as a fait accompli.Having found a foothold on the Mediterranean and Red Territories, and on the borders of Jordan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, Iran may aspire to invade Jordan and limit the role of Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

Iran does not miss opportunities to flex its muscles in front of its Arab and Turkish adversaries, by creating chaos and filling the resulting vacuum, or by exploiting the differences of Turkey, the Gulf countries and Jordan, while employing Iran for the experiences of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which plays its role in obstructing the peace process, which Iran sees as an American hanger to isolate Iran.

Iran's Middle East policy has not only empowered Shiites in the region and traded the cause of resistance, but Iran has also used the need of international powers to establish security in the region to pass its expansionist agenda in the region.While logic requires that the international community put an end to Iran's contribution to destabilizing security in the region, providing significant assistance to America when invading Iraq and Afghanistan has enabled Tehran to re-nominate itself as a regional policeman.

The emergence of cross-border armed religious factors after the September 11, 2001 attacks, has led to a decline in the priority of confronting Iran and advancing the priority of confronting the threat of jihadist terrorism.Iran has succeeded in avoiding direct confrontation with the United States, and through its regional arms and coalition of minorities has been able to extend its influence and fill the vacuum created by its regional adversaries.

Iran has succeeded in consolidating Assad's rule in Syria and has held pressure cards in Syria through the Astana axis, and Jordan has become a goal at hand, through which it can add a fifth capital to the four capitals.The decision to move the embassy and the threat of the Popular Mobilization Forces, Hezbollah and Iranian militias linked to the Quds Force are two sides of the coin of the challenges Jordan faces, which may make Jordan's options very limited.

The fierce competition for influence between Iran and Saudi Arabia could exacerbate tensions in the region, especially as the threats of this war have crossed borders and reached within Saudi cities.While Iran (the kingdom's rival adversary) is allied with Russia, Riyadh believes that in the event of a Russian military presence in Iran, it will face a direct threat from Russia to its national security and vital interests.

Even the Saudi opening to Iraq to crowd out Iranian influence or rival it, not contain or end it, came late after Iran filled the political vacuum, and it became difficult to get it out of Iraq, except by using the same military and political tools together.

The challenges facing Turkey from the Popular Mobilization Forces are no less than those faced by Saudi Arabia and Jordan, in light of the tense relationship between Ankara and Washington, the intensifying rivalry between Ankara and Tehran in the region, and Iran's continued tendency to expand further and deeper at the expense of Turkey in the region, especially in Iraq and Syria.

It can be said that the failure of the Kurdistan referendum and the end of ISIS in Iraq, have left Turkey and the region with it in their weakest state since the Gulf War in 1991, at a time when Iran has given Iran a great push forward.

Iran's biggest strategic mistake is its dependence on Russia at one time and on America's need at other times to consolidate its tactical gains, and is therefore subject to veto when others decide to retreat, especially in light of talk of a possible U.S.-Russian deal that may isolate Iran and condemn it for sponsoring international terrorism.

But this does not mean that the region faces the prospect of an upcoming Iranian round, if its arrogance is not broken after the withdrawal of Trump and Pompeo's terms, US Treasury sanctions and the formation of an international coalition against Iran.The agenda of the new Trump against Iran by withdrawing from the nuclear program to push Iran to accept a new international agreement under Pompeo's twelve terms may be similar to the twelve Security Council resolutions passed by the Security Council against Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait.

This geopolitical similarity between the problem of Iraq and Iran comes within the framework of the US national security strategy that placed them among the rogue states in the "axis of evil" launched by Bush Jr. after the attacks of the eleventh of September.

The U.S. national security strategy toward rogue states depends on its definition of a rogue state within four criteria and then on trying to change the behavior of that rogue state or change its regime. Iran's regional policy has been characterized by four characteristics that it has placed within the term rogue state in the U.S. National Security Strategy, which it defines as a country that finds a chronic inability to integrate into the international system.

Anthony Lake, the U.S. National Security Advisor in Clinton in 1994, laid down four criteria in diagnosing this deficit: 1- Attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction, 2- Financing, arming, harbouring, and training terrorist organizations; 3- Mistreating the peoples they govern, and 4- Outright hostility to the United States of America.

These four characteristics put a rogue state like Iran under constant American pressure to change its regime, or this country pursues a different foreign policy.It may be these figures that prompted Obama with the Baker Hamilton report to turn to the nuclear deal, aiming to change Iran's behavior, and then Trump the Olybright Hadley report to withdraw from the nuclear agreement to change Iran's regime, because Iran proved incapable of changing its behavior after the deal was concluded.

Iran's inability to change its behavior is irrefutable proof that its revolutionary regime is irreparable, and this is what Trump has said a lot and confirmed by US National Security Advisor John Bolton.Throughout history, Iran has been accustomed not to surrender to the will of the enemy and not to collide with it as much as it can, but to evade confronting it forward violently or politically.

Today, it is trying to escape from an all-out confrontation with America or from a new international agreement, to trying to talk about a change in Iran's regional behavior, and this is Iran's foreign policy over time. Describing the Iranians, Monsteko once said: "They are fighting from afar, not aware of the weapons of the Romans, besieging their enemy more than they are fighting, and chasing them is useless because they have a kind of fighting, and they burn the land behind the invaders so that no grass grows in it.

As if Monstico was talking about a fascist system and mentality that characterized the regimes in Iran, old and new, today they are fighting with militias (remotely) and besieging their enemy with an alliance of minorities, and it is useless for them to hunt as Saddam fought them for 8 years until Khomeini called the ceasefire a cup of poison.

In conclusion, Iran is one of the medium-power countries in the region responsible to the international community for maintaining regional security, but Iran has abandoned its international function, unlike Turkey and Saudi Arabia, destabilizing regional and international security at a time when it had to preserve it.

The US occupation of Iraq after 2003 exemplified this Iranian abandonment of its regional role, which it accepted and employed to its advantage, unlike Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which Turkey rejected and blamed America.

Iran turned the madman's back on America and made Iraq a backyard and pushed America to withdraw and deployed ISIS and militias terrorism, instability and extremism in the region until Mosul and Sana'a fell in 2014, forming the Alliance of Firmness in Yemen, the Islamic Military Alliance and the Alliance of International Resolve in Iraq and Syria, which includes Turkey and Saudi Arabia, while Iran is not a member of any of them.

International Problem

The step of the international forms of the Iranian regime is embodied in the model of the impossible velayat-e faqih within the international system on the one hand, and on the other hand, this impossible model has pushed the Middle East to be an arena of international dispute pushing towards a third world war.

Although the international order has changed five times since the West Valley Agreement of 1648, the concept of West Valea – the nation-state – remains unwavering and resists anyone who tries to destroy it, from Napoleon to Hitler and the Soviets to Wilayat al-Faqih.

The international system moved from church rule to nation-state rule in Europe in 1648. He then moved to a multipolar system, in the Austrian Convention of 1814. After World War I, he moved to the League of Nations, remaining multipolar.

He then moved from multipolar to bipolar with the advent of the Soviets in 1945. He finally landed in a unipolar system within West Valea, but with a new version of regional geography, not nationalism, as Kissinger argues in his book On the International System.

The opponents of the international system took advantage of the transitions from one international order to another to torpedo the concept of West Valea.Vanapoleon tried with the French Revolution to blow up West Valea and Hitler tried after the League of Nations and the Soviets repeated the attempt after the advent of the United Nations and all destabilized the international system, but they failed and left and the concept of West Valia triumphed.

At the gates of the end of the Cold War, Iran has tried to velayat-e faqih with its constitution and its cross-border armed religious system to try its luck in reversing the foundations of the West Valea concept. The attack on the embassies of countries, the first of which is the US embassy in Iran in 1979 and the last of which is the Saudi embassy in Tehran in 2016, is a practical implementation of Iran's non-recognition of the foundations of the West Valley international system.

In addition, Iran has targeted foreign diplomats, employed al-Qaeda and ISIS, and established hundreds of Iranian religious militias across borders.The provisions of the Iranian Constitution state in its preface and articles that the duty of the Iranian armed forces and the Revolutionary Guards, which has become parallel to the army, is not only to protect the borders but to extend divine law in the world, but Nejad's speeches in 2007 at the United Nations talking about the Mahdi who will appear and rule the world.

This means that Iran's problem with the international system and the regional system is not a technique related to the details of the nuclear agreement and not a misunderstanding regarding its relationship with the countries of the regional system, but rather the dilemma of the velayat-e faqih regime is deep enough and needs to eradicate its regime as Napoleon, Hitler and the Soviet Union did.

The dilemma of Wilayat al-Faqih deepened in its pragmatism that it benefits from the concept of West Valea in theory through its ambassadors and membership in the United Nations and international organizations, but refuses to recognize national states, the regional system and the foundations of the international system in practice and is similar to that of ISIS, but ISIS does not benefit from West Valea.

The Middle East may today stand at the gates of a historic station of the West Valea model, it may repeat the scene of Europe with the absolute religious model of the Church in the Thirty Years' War of the seventeenth century (1618-1648), the scene of Europe when it came together in the Vienna Agreement of 1814 against the Napoleonic model, the scene of the world with the model of Hitler, or a scene that may resemble the scene of the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Iran represents the last bastion of hostility in the Middle East to the international order, and America has ignored Iran's influence and expanded from Tehran to Beirut, and has domestic and international arms and allies, until the stability of the region and the conflict between the two sides reached an impasse.

The deadlock in the Iranian-American conflict in the region is caused by a firm conviction among Iranians that America wants to completely change their political system, and the Americans' conviction that Khamenei can only be removed when the gun is pointed at his head.

It is these two opposing convictions that are pushing America today into an upcoming fourth war in West Asia (the Middle East) against Iran, having fought World War I and II as well as the Cold War for Asia as well.

When Iran, Russia, China and America come together in the Middle East, the Middle East has become the arena of great international battle, between two camps as in all three previous wars.

Today's war camps in the Middle East are represented by the international coalition against terrorism, which was formed against ISIS in 2014, the camp of Russia and Iran and the three heads of terrorism in the region represented by the models of religious revolutionary and Arab, Kurdish and Iranian nationalism.

The argument of those who say that the balance of power may be disturbed if the Iranian regime falls, because it may further ignite the Arab religious revolutionary model, has called on Saudi Arabia to perhaps overthrow the Arab religious revolutionary model, before potentially toppling Iran's (religious revolutionary) regime.

Russia and Iran, which lead the anti-coalition camp, have since 2011 stood as a stumbling block to achieving the goal of the international coalition to combat terrorism, and the boundaries between the two camps have become clear between the end of ISIS.

The clarity of the picture of the conflict of the two camps in Syria after ISIS is due to the fact that the war on ISIS is a war of tactics, and therefore the two sides came together against it, while the strategic war began with the end of ISIS.

The end of the ISIS phase has opened the door wide to the outbreak of a war led by the international coalition against the axis of terrorism led by Iran and sponsored by Russia and starting in Syria.

The meeting of the major powers in the arena of a complex region of problems, such as the arena of the Middle East, which is linked to each other by terrorism, revolution, wealth and an international dispute over dominance, may move the entire region from the orbit of America to the orbit of Russia, China and Iran, if the region continues to be trapped in terrorism, revolution and instability, and to prevent the transition of the region from axis to axis, war is coming, we do not know when and how, but it is coming to achieve its goals.

In addition to preventing the region from moving from axis to axis, cutting off Iran's crescent and its three heads represented by the religious and nationalist revolutionary model (Arab, Kurdish and non-Iranian) (terrorism), connecting China to Europe via the Silk Road (oil), and opening the way to the "deal of the century" are also among the goals of the next war.

America believes that the "deal of the century" is a big goal that can contribute to the stability of the region while America maintains its traditional alliances with the Arabs, and at the same time may push the Arabs to support the stability of the region themselves, as Wali Nasr says.

The dilemma of the Middle East in the United States of America is concentrated in terrorism, wealth and the "deal of the century", and it all meets in Syria today, hence the history of the North Korea deal, the date of the expiration of the Trump deadline with the Iranian nuclear, was linked to the date of the transfer of Washington's embassy to Jerusalem.

Trump of the North Korea deal at the gates of the nuclear Trump deadline with Iran may have succeeded in severing the nuclear relationship between North Korea and Iran with Chinese mediation on the one hand, and China on the other hand alone in America's conflict with Iran and Russia in the Middle East;

On the other hand, he may have annulled Putin's Russian-Iranian deal with Iran in 2011, through which Putin wanted Iranian terrorism to continue in the region and Russia to use it as a card to threaten Europe and America.

Putin struck an unprecedented deal with Iran when he visited Tehran in 2011, the content of which is for Russia to stand with Iran against America, so that cross-border terrorism in the region continues, and the question of Palestine cannot be resolved, in exchange for Iran moving away from exporting its energy to Europe and replacing it with exporting it to China, and with this deal Putin hit more than one bird with one stone.

He tried to win Iran and China, with a single deal (wealth), and tried to stop the expansion of the historical divider that the Middle East is going through to Russia's backyard in the Caucasus and Central Asia (revolution), while continuing in the region, while at the same time imposing his presence in the Middle East at the expense of Europe and America (global status).

Because the goals of the two conflicting camps cannot meet in a central region, war must take place; war must take place, because the continuation of America's conflict with Iran, with the presence of a Russian-Iranian deal, will move the region from orbit to orbit.

For Iran to accept these conditions, the Russian-Iranian deal must be dropped, and for the Russian-Iranian deal to fall, there must be a war to come before the next international deal is completed.Not to drop the Russian-Iranian deal, it may enable Russia to control Europe economically (wealth), and cut off China's path with Europe, to pull China away from Europe and America;

China may benefit from the Russia-Iran deal, as it controls Middle Eastern oil, prompting Middle Eastern countries perhaps to turn to China and not to Europe and America, and this may give Russia a global position competing with the United States of America (status).

The sum of these Russian goals represents a net political and economic strategic loss for America, and the loss of its leadership in the Middle East, the Far and Near East, and Europe as well, which is what America does not tolerate and does not allow to happen, so war must take place in the Middle East.

Iran's agreement with Russia has made Iran the hen that lays gold eggs for Russia in the region and the world, and Iran has also made Iran an important Russian commodity that forces America to pay Russia a politically high price.

To drop this deal, Obama turned to the Pacific in the same year that Putin struck his deal with Iran, to contain the Russian-Iranian deal, and to put a second step in the thousand-mile road that Kissinger opened with China in 1970, to be completed by Trump with a third step today with the North Korea deal.

Nixon and Obama's steps, as well as Trump toward China, mean that America has been interconnected at the door of China from 1970 to 2018, to resolve the conflict over Asia, because the Far East and the Middle East are two sides of the same conflict coin; and that resolving the conflict at Al-Aqsa in America's favor may be a prelude to its resolution in the Middle East.

The Chinese-Eurasian Belt and Silk Road, which links the Far East, the Middle East, the Near East and Europe, is perhaps one of the most important fruits of the historic American Almoravids at the Chinese door.

The Middle East oil, which Putin opened with his deal with Iran on China, may not compensate China and may even isolate it internationally, as it is important for China to strategically penetrate the American and European economy, to open up more to the international system, which is an American goal in itself, as it may curb any possible Chinese attempt to clash with the international system.

The secret here is that it is China that joins the international order established by America and not the other way around, and this is what prevents China from colliding with it, although the theory may one day happen.The Chinese beauty in politics that brought it close to America, or that it (the Sino-American deal that Kissinger made with China), may boil down to China's difference from Iran and Russia, China does not have and does not want to be a military empire outside the borders.

It may not matter to China that the Belt Road has geopolitical dimensions, such as being the geopolitical alternative to the Soviet Eurasian project that fell by demolishing the Berlin Wall, and the project of Aroasia Putin, which fell with Ukraine's exit from its hegemony in 2014, nor does it care that it is the crescent that besieges the heart of the earth (Russia), as much as it cares about its economic penetration into Europe and America.

If so, Putin's deal was not to darken the eyes of Iran or Syria, but rather a Russian attempt to break the blockade that America intends to weave its threads against its neck with the crescent of the Euro-Chinese belt on the one hand, and to stop the expansion of the historical comma to its backyard in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

If this is the Russian strategic objective of its deal with Iran, the deal of Trump and Kim Joon Un may open the way to the downfall of the Russian-Iranian deal.The Trump-Kim deal may achieve a Sino-American-European rapprochement, tighten the siege of the heart of the earth (Russia), besiege Russia in western Syria, and may distance Iran from Russia and push it towards China and Europe.

To achieve these goals, the deal Trump Kim aborted the possibility of war in the Far East, while at the same time opening the door to an upcoming war in the Middle East in which America would drop the Russian-Iranian deal as a strategy that was a tactical deal.

Sources

1- Iran and the Aryan myth* David Motadel– http://www.davidmotadel.com/wp-

content/uploads/2016/08/MotadelAryans.pdf

2- Persian Iran: The Challenges of Aryan Myth and Persian Ethnic Intolerance

https://ajammc.com/2015/06/30/

3– A “Persian” Iran?: Challenging the Aryan Myth and Persian Ethnocentrism

A “Persian” Iran?: Challenging the Aryan Myth and Persian Ethnocentrism

4–https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GudEhGJqAwM

5- Wali Nasr: The dispensable nation - Iran between war and containment

5- The Arab world needs a new Westphalia Treaty - Development and Nuclear Energy for the sake of peace http://arabic.larouchepub.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/salam-westphalia.pdf

6- Economy-Crescent-Shia https://www.newiraqcenter.com/2018/05/24/

7- Will NIAC allow Washington to destroy Tehran https://www.newiraqcenter.com/2018/05/28/ Will it allow-nayak-niac-to Washington-from-destroy-Tehran/

8- The Popular Mobilization Forces are a local and regional threat https://www.newiraqcenter.com/2018/04/30/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-

9- Iran The Hidden Revolution - Thierry Coville - Translated by Dr. A. Khalil Ahmed Khalil - Dar Al-Fafarbi Beirut Lebanon.2008

10- Targeting Iran - Scott Ritter - Arab House of Sciences - 2007

Second Research

Forms of Western confrontation with Iran

Dr.Abdul Nasser Al-Mahdaoui

New Iraq Center Advisor

Preface

The Western-Iranian Relationship in Iraq

First of all, some terms need to be defined precisely in order for the concept intended by the text to flow according to the correct context, so when we deal with the West necessarily, we mean mainly the largest actor in it, which is the United States of America, and when we monitor the US-Iranian relationship, we focus on this relationship in two dimensions; the first is its impact on the reality of the Middle East in general and in Iraq in particular, and the second we focus on the nuclear agreement between the West and Iran and focus mainly on the repercussions of exiting the nuclear agreement on the region.

In a historical and sequential monitoring of the nature of the US-Iranian relationship, it is confirmed to us that it is in two directions, the first direction is cooperation, integration, coordination and even identification between the two projects, especially in the Middle East in general and in Iraq in particular, and in the second direction the American compass has changed since the Republican Party and President Trump came to power, and the relationship has descended sequentially to the intersection and gradual American targeting of Iran and the confrontation has become great between the two parties, and perhaps in this topic we will detail the forms of this confrontation after we pass through the spring Which brought the two parties together quickly.

Years of honey between the two parties

The researcher says that the stages of US-Iranian coordination in Iraq can be divided into four stages, the first of which preceded the US invasion in 2003 and witnessed direct coordination between Washington and Tehran, and here the former US ambassador to Iraq and Washington's representative to the former Iraqi opposition, Zalmay Khalilzad, reveals a communication that took place between him and Iran's representative to the United Nations, at the time, and its current Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, to ensure that American aircraft are not exposed to Iranian fire during their attacks on Iraq. Khalilzadeh states in a book published in 2016 that he asked Zarif that Iran urge Iraqi Shiites to engage constructively in the establishment of a new government in Iraq. In the second phase, it encouraged the United States to rely more on Shia political forces close to Iran, empowering them with the tools of power in the military, police, and the state in general to counter rising Sunni resistance. The third phase was after President Barack Obama took office in the United States in early 2009, where his policy was based on the exit strategy from Iraq, which represented the essence of his election promises. Of course, he needed direct and strong coordination with Iran to ensure a smooth and rapid withdrawal, and it is not excluded that his direct and decisive intervention to take power by Nouri al-Maliki after the 2010 elections instead of the first winner, Iyad Allawi, was part of a coordination with the Iranians to give their man Maliki a second term in exchange for facilitating the process of troop withdrawal.During Obama's second term, specifically since 2013, secret negotiations between Iran and the United States began in Oman that later established the Iran nuclear deal, but those talks It has also seen a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement within a "comprehensive deal that gives Iran internationally recognized regional roles in areas highly sensitive to the security of the Gulf states. The fourth phase begins with the emergence of the Islamic State, and its control over large areas in Iraq and Syria, and at this stage the Obama administration was forced weeks after the fall of Mosul to return militarily to the region to confront the organization, and here it had to coordinate militarily and intelligence with Iran and its extensions in Iraq, whether it included the military level represented by the army and militias, or the political level.

Years of confrontation between the United States of America and Iran

In international reality, the crisis in the relationship between America and Iran was not the result of Trump's handling of power in the United States of America and making the tearing up of the nuclear agreement one of his electoral promises, but rather that the forty-third president of the United States from 2001 to 2009, George W. Bush, his reign was the golden age to curtail Iran's role in the region and the opportunity that will not compensate after Iran makes concessions and its desire to negotiate the nature of its relationship with America, but the condescension of Republicans and the American administration to negotiate with Iran, The fact that U.S. powers are capable of limiting any rising powers was the reason why Iran expanded its influence after that period (2).

Trump and Iran

On October 13, 2017, Trump announced a new strategy in dealing with Iran and the new strategy, according to a White House statement, includes seven key elements: (3):

Neutralize the "destabilizing" influence of the Iranian government as well as restrict its aggressiveness, particularly its support for terrorism and militants.

Revitalize traditional U.S. alliances and regional partnerships as "a repellent against Iranian sabotage and a greater restoration of the stability of the balance of power in the region."

Depriving the Iranian regime, particularly the IRGC, of funding its "malign activities" and opposing the activities of the IRGC, "which squanders the wealth of the Iranian people."

Counter threats of ballistic missiles and other weapons directed against the United States and its allies.

Mobilize the international community to condemn the "gross violations of human rights by the IRGC" and its "detention of U.S. citizens and other foreigners on spurious charges."

Depriving the Iranian regime of paths leading to a nuclear weapon.

Forms of U.S. Confrontation with Iran

First, the reimposition of sanctions

On 8/5/2018, US President Donald Trump officially announced the withdrawal of the United States from the nuclear agreement with Iran. At the White House, the US president signed a decree reimposing sanctions lifted on Iran under the nuclear deal,4 and the US media earlier published an analysis in which it stated that the withdrawal of the United States from the Iran nuclear deal means that Trump will ask Congress to resume economic sanctions against Iran, and these sanctions will almost certainly eliminate the commercial dealings of companies with Iran.[5]

Withdrawing from the nuclear deal will negatively affect global oil markets and will also disrupt many trade deals with a number of foreign companies, including the Americans, worth tens of billions of dollars.The "return" of sanctions on Iran will not be immediate, as there is a period of more than 6 months that may allow enough time to negotiate a new agreement, either by replacing or completing the agreement signed during Barack Obama's presidency in 2015.It is prohibited Trump's decision to conclude any new contracts immediately, sets a deadline of 90 days and 180 days, for companies with existing Iranian trade obligations.6

European Position on Withdrawal

In The Guardian, we read an analytical article by Patrick Wintour entitled "Is the EU in crisis over the challenge of the United States or not?The author of the article said that EU leaders are determined to try to save the nuclear deal signed with Iran even if it leads to a clash with the United States.

Tony Blinken, a former US deputy secretary of state under former President Barack Obama, was quoted as saying that "Europe's ability to salvage the nuclear deal with Iran depends heavily on its ability to reap the economic benefits even without the United States.

He noted that this "will become clear over time," adding that it will depend on how companies react to the new situation and how America will try to punish companies that do business with Iran."European leaders are at a crossroads, either risking turmoil in the Middle East or challenging their closest allies about his foreign policy," he concluded.[7]

Researcher Abdulrahman al-Rashed (8) says; the speech of the US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, yesterday came to put an end to the bargaining. Officially, Washington has started the war on the Iranian regime, with the weapon of economic sanctions threatening the existence of the whole regime and not just restricting it.

France's Total left the gas fields in the Gulf and left. The head of the Italian ANI also informed the company's management that they had closed their offices in Tehran, and stopped searching for oil and gas. «Airbus» signed the sale of Iran a hundred aircraft and only three aircraft arrived at Tehran airport from the historic deal, the company announced its cancellation. A Norwegian solar company left last week and has been in its contract for four years. Other major companies, such as Germany's Siemens, Italy's Danielli Steel, and Merci's shipping, have also fled. Dozens of European companies have rejected Iran's temptation to stay out of fear of Donald Trump's administration, that those who have not stopped doing business with Iran within the next 180 days will be banned from doing business with the U.S. market.

Why are European and giant companies afraid? Simply put, all of them have greater interests with the United States, and even those that are not interested in the U.S. market by denying Iran a dollar would expose them to bankruptcy.

Therefore, relying on the European Union to save the nuclear agreement without the United States of America is useless for the above reasons, in addition to that most of the giant European companies are governed by American capital, there is no real opportunity for the European Union except to resort to a new agreement on American terms.

Terms of the Secretary of State of the United States of America

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo put forward 12 demands from Iran, including withdrawal from Syria, threatening sanctions against it that may be the harshest in history, this came in a press conference held at the American Heritage Institute in Washington, D.C., within the first speech of the new foreign minister, in which he presented a road map and his country's strategy towards Iran, and "Pompeo" stated that Iran entered the nuclear agreement in bad faith, and exploited it to try to control the Middle East, and the nuclear agreement allowed Iran to strengthen its financial resources to destabilize Stability of the region.

Pompeo pointed out that Iran threatens the stability of Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Israel, through its support for the militias of Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iraqi militias.The number of US conditions reached 12 conditions, namely:

Withdrawal from Syria and withdrawal of IRGC militias

Reveal all the details associated with Tehran's nuclear program and allow the IAEA to continuously inspect.

Stop enriching uranium, shut down the heavy-water reactor

IAEA granted comprehensive access to all Iranian nuclear plants

End the proliferation of ballistic missiles and missiles that can carry nuclear warheads

Release of Americans and all citizens with nationalities from countries allied to Washington detained in Iran

End Support for "Terrorist Groups in the Middle East"

End support for the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups.

End support for the Quds Force in the Revolutionary Guards.

Put an end to Tehran's actions toward Israel and Washington's allies in the Middle East.

Disarming Shiite militias in Iraq.

End support for Houthi militias in Yemen.

Pompeo threatened Iran in the absence of a tangible change in Iranian policy, to apply previous financial sanctions and impose new sanctions that will be the strongest of their kind in history, and his country will work to invite its allies to join it in condemning the actions of the Iranian regime, and work with these allies to put an end to Iran's actions.

The return of sanctions on Iran again will be divided into two instalments: the first batch of sanctions will return 90 days after Trump signed the decision to withdraw from the agreement, that is, on August 6, 2018; while the second and last batch of sanctions will return again to Iran 180 days after Trump signed the withdrawal decision, that is, by November 4, 2018. (10)

Second, targeting Iran's proxies in the region

In a report for Al-Muntour, it said(11) "The terrorist designation battle that Washington wants to fight against some factions of the Popular Mobilization Forces, will open a new front in the conflict inside Iraqi territory, if not security and military, it will be political, but this time with dangerous indicators, including the reaction of those factions and the position it can take from the Abadi government." Deputy Chairman of the Popular Mobilization Authority Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis is a "terrorist". More than seven leading figures in the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces have been designated terrorists by the United States of America.

The United States of America has not limited itself to counting many leading figures in the Popular Mobilization Forces in the lists of terrorism, but there are relentless efforts to list many of the factions that make up the Popular Mobilization Forces and are affiliated with the Iranian Velayat-e Faqih as terrorist organizations, and later(12) the US Congress adopted a draft resolution, in which Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat al-Nujaba and Hezbollah are considered terrorist organizations, while referring it to the Senate for a vote, and showed documents for Congress carried by local media, followed by Sky News Agency. Press shows the categorizations of Asaib Ahl al-Haq led by Harakat al-Nujaba, as well as Iraqi Hezbollah. The United States has blacklisted Iraqi businessman Aras Habib.

The tightening of Iran's military arms beyond its borders13 included not only Iraqi figures and factions but also Iran's other arms, the most important of which is the Lebanese Hezbollah, and the US State Department had earlier announced a financial reward of up to twelve million dollars for those who help arrest two of the party's most prominent leaders; the first is Talal Hamiya, who is rumored to be the head of the so-called "external operations unit of the party", and the second is Fouad Shukr, known as (Haj Mohsen), a member of the so-called ( The party's jihadist council, calling on countries around the world to "join it in punishing and preventing the party's activities." At a news conference by a department official, the State Department said it had "monitored continued activity on behalf of Lebanon's Hezbollah" in the United States.

The law, which was approved earlier by the House of Representatives and the Senate, adopted the designation of the IRGC and the Quds Force as terrorist organizations, describing the Quds Force as "the original arm of the Iranian government in implementing its policies in support of terrorism and insurgent groups," and also held the IRGC "responsible for implementing the program of activities causing instability, supporting international terrorism measures and Iran's ballistic missile program." There is no doubt that this designation presents a major challenge for the Iranian government, which will find two of its most important official institutions on the list of terrorism, with the confusion it poses at home and in its relations with the outside world (14).

The U.S. effort is not limited to Iran's arms directly, but extends beyond it to U.S. allies in the region and at the forefront of allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Dr. Abdulaziz bin Othman bin Saqr, head of the Gulf Research Center,15 believes that the Saudi leadership and its allies have realized a fundamental fact that Iran's interventionist and expansionist policy cannot be combated, which is destabilizing and threatening regional security and stability, without dealing constructively and decisively with Tehran's agents of armed militias that have been planted throughout the country. The Arab World as a Tool for Implementing Iranian Policy

He told Asharq Al-Awsat: "These militias are just terrorist organizations, which do not differ in their essence, content, method of work or objectives from any other terrorist group, there is no difference between (Hezbollah) or Asaib Ahl al-Haq and others and al-Qaeda and (ISIS).

Third: Military confrontation with Iran

The U.S. approach to relations with Iran from the perspective of "crisis management" has made the principle of "non-collision" a postponed option.16 This confirms that relations have gone through dangerous junctures and disagreements at various stages have reached a peak, but the United States has not made the option of military confrontation. It seems that there is an American keenness to direct interactions on the crisis away from this option, which also seems to have remained on the table in the political discourse as a kind of threat and pressure on Iran in order to modify its policy, and this may have tempted Iran and given it a fair amount of movement, as a result of American fears of possible reversals of any uncalculated armed movements, as American interests in regional circles around Iran are dense, intertwined and complex, and Iran's ability to influence those interests is great, and therefore By calculating the political cost, the option of managing interactions and pressure to reach satisfactory results remains an indispensable option when dealing with Iran as one of several files that affect the trends of US policies in the Middle East. Trump There is no doubt that a state of doubt has dominated successive US administrations, and even domestic public opinion, about Iran's behavior, which in turn has been reflected in the options of dealing with Iran for decades, but the Obama administration came to reassess the US relationship with Iran, and to put an end to internal contradictions on the proposed policy towards Iran, as the course of the relationship shifted from the logic of conflict management through the mechanism of pressure and isolation, to conflict management. Through the mechanism of understanding and conditional engagement, or what is known as the policy of "brinkmanship". The nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 was the fruit of this policy, a promise that would transcend historical barriers and experiences affecting U.S. policy toward Iran.17

Researcher Makram Mohammad (18) says that the most dangerous thing that could result from the withdrawal of the United States from the Iranian nuclear agreement and the return of the application of economic sanctions on Iran, that the Middle East is exposed to a new war, it seems that we are witnessing its beginnings now in the large-scale aerial bombardment of Israel for vital Iranian targets inside Syria, including the infrastructure of the Iranian military presence inside Syria, represented by 14 military bases of Iran and more than 100 thousand Iranian forces that include the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Israeli bombardment has come In response to an Iranian missile that targeted Israeli forces in the Golan Heights, the broad failed to achieve any of its objectives.

According to the admission of Avigdor Lieberman, the Israeli defense minister, the Israeli bombardment targeted all the equipment of the infrastructure of Iranian forces in Syria, and of course Israel justified its large-scale aerial bombardment of Iranian targets inside Syria by maintaining its security, preventing Iran from approaching its borders, and stopping the flow of Iranian supplies to Hezbollah, Iran's ally and military arm in the Middle East, although Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu added another reason: Iran leaked to Syria the most dangerous weapons that could destroy Israel. Which means that Israel is fighting the war in defense of its existence, and it is already clear that Iran avoided a direct military response to Israel before the withdrawal of the United States from the nuclear agreement despite the fact that seven deaths were made on Syrian soil, perhaps because it was careful not to provide the US president with an excuse for his possible withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear agreement, but now that the United States has already withdrawn from the nuclear agreement, we may be facing another Iranian option after Netanyahu confirmed that he will not hesitate to bomb nuclear facilities on the Iranian land.

The Times is unique among the British newspapers (19) in publishing an analytical article on the area of two internal pages on the war in Syria and the crisis situation in the Middle East under the title "Rivalries that push the Middle East to its next war", and the article written by the editor of diplomatic affairs Roger Boyce, believes that the secret conflict between Iran and Israel is now open and public, and no one knows where the so-called "titans" conflict in the Middle East will end... He adds that a special war has unfolded with at least 100 strikes on undeclared Iranian weapons convoys, the implantation of viruses in the computer systems of Iran's nuclear program and assassinations of atomic scientists, which became known after the lifting of the curtain on the Syrian war.

The writer Hossein Karkosh (20) argues that the war has begun and says in an article entitled When the war against Iran ends,

When U.S. President Trump removed former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, known for his rationality and preference for dialogue and diplomatic solutions in solving America's problems with other countries including Iran, and chose Mike Pompeo, as his replacement, those familiar with Trump's intentions said that the amendment meant that Trump would tear up the Iran nuclear deal.

As soon as Trump removed the national security adviser, McMaster, and chose John Bolton, the world held his breath, and everyone said that Trump would not stand out of the agreement, but that he is now entering the path of war against the Islamic Republic, and will not back down.The two, Pompeo and Bolton, especially Bolton, are generals in civilian clothes. By having the two with the secretary of defense, professional Gen. James Mattis, the Trump administration has become a war administration. The war is against Iran, not against any other country. Trump and the pillars of his administration are not their problem with the nuclear deal, and they do not want to get out of it because its terms are bad. If their goal was to change the terms of the agreement they would have negotiated Iran about it, and the Islamic Republic would certainly accept; it would accept more than this condition; it would accept with overwhelming joy after seeing Trump's knife approach its neck.

The proof is Iran's continued adherence to the agreement and its non-exit from it, flouting all previous fiery statements by senior Iranian officials that were stressing that Iran would exit once America left and resume its nuclear project.

The other proof is, the shuttle tours that the Iranian Foreign Minister is currently undertaking to the capitals of European countries, Russia and China, repeating, urgently, in every visit to him: We will remain in the agreement if our rights are guaranteed, and he knows very well that Europe is completely incapable of granting any guarantees, Russia and China are eagerly waiting for the tightening of sanctions on Iran and the removal of European companies until their companies replace them, Trump is determined to overthrow the existing political system in Iran, and he has entered Trump is the road back road. The nuclear deal is an excuse, not a tool. Trump's call for Iran to join negotiations to draft a new agreement with U.S. dictates is nothing but a call to offer the Iranian neck to the guillotine, which is an insurmountable request.

References and Sources

Makki Meeting, Iraq and the Borders of Escalation between the United States and Iran, Al Jazeera website, 22/5/2018, http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/reports/2018/05/180522085516090.html.

Amr Ahmed, the U.S.-Iran conflict. Strategies and Tactics, International Club website, 4/3/2018, http://theinternational.club/news/.

Ibid.

Seen https://montada.echoroukonline.com/showthread.php?t=378860. And look http://mowatine.com/article.php?id=27847 .

Seen http://arabic.people.com.cn/n3/2018/0503/c31663-9456143.html.

6- Sky News Arabia / What comes after Trump's decision? Who is affected by the resumption of Iran sanctions? 9/5/2018.https://www.skynewsarabia.com/world .

7- BBC Arabic website, Times: Trump takes a big risk of withdrawing from the nuclear deal with Iran

9/5/, 2018, http://www.bbc.com/arabic/inthepress-44049374.

Abdulrahman al-Rashid, Europeans flee Iran, Asharq al-Awsat newspaper, Issue 14420, 22/5/2018.

https://aawsat.com/home/article/1275871/ Abdurrahman-Rashid/Europeans-fleeing-from-Iran.

http://arabic.euronews.com/2018/05/21/pompeo-asks-iran-to-withdraw-from-syria-and-halt-its-support-hezbollah> .

https://www.sasapost.com/these-are-the-most-important-us-sanctions-that-will-return-to-iran-again/ .

Seen https://www.sasapost.com/have-the-end-of-the-popular-mobilization-units-pmu-started-3-reasons-to-make-it-possible/ .

http://www.skypressiq.net/2018/5/28/ Documents-Asaib-Ahl-Haqq-Movement-Al-Nujaba-Hizbullah-Hezbollah-Terrorist Organizations-According to the U.S. Congress.

The Center for Strategic Thought for Studies, Trump's Strategy with Iran... Motives and Trends, 18/10/2017, http://fikercenter.com/position-papers.

Feridun Khound: Arab Gulf Center for Iranian Studies (translator), America, the Revolutionary Guards, and the fate of the nuclear deal, website of the Arab Gulf Center for Iranian Studies, 27/7/2017.http://cutt.us/UdxB2

Abdulhadi Habtoor, Differentiating Hezbollah's military and political wings is illogical, Asharq al-Awsat, 18/5/2018, https://aawsat.com/home/article/.

Mahmoud Hamdi Abu al-Qasim, U.S. Policy Toward Iran After Trump... Intense pressure and non-excluded confrontation, International Institute of Iranian Studies, 14/8/2017,

https://rasanah-iiis.org .

Ibid.

Makram Mohamed Ahmed, Are We Witnessing the Beginnings of a New War in the Middle East, Al-Ahram website, 14/5/2018, http://www.ahram.org.eg/News/.

The BBC's Arabic website, in The Times, a future war between Iran and Israel will change the Middle East, 21/4/2018, http://www.bbc.com/arabic/inthepress-43846562.

Hossein Karkosh, when will the U.S. war against Iran stop? And not when will it start?, Echo of the Gulf, 27/5/2018, https://www.sada-alkhaleej.com/news/2370.

Third Research

How long does the confrontation against Iran take?

Shahu Al , Qaradaghi

After US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's statements that the policy of the administration of former US President Barack Obama with satisfaction towards Iran has died" and the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement, it seems that the doors have become open to all forms of US-Iranian confrontation, which may include all areas and aspects up to a military solution and regime change inside Iran by force.

In the period of former US President Barack Obama, when he realized that sanctions and pressure on the Iranian regime could not change Tehran's behavior, he avoided war and decided to head to the negotiating table to reach a solution and the nuclear agreement, but there is no indication that Trump will repeat the same scenario, especially with the presence of Pompeo, Secretary of State, and John Bolton, the national security adviser against the Iranian regime, and the US strategy at the moment is to impose sanctions on Tehran. To push it to surrender and give up its influence in the Middle East and not to compete with the United States of America or pose a threat to Israel, and in the absence of this scenario, which is Iranian surrender, the way is to pave the way for war, which is Plan C for the US administration. (1)

According to the former CIA director, with Donald Trump's withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, the United States has finished offering the islands to the Iranian government and instead it is time to take out the stick (2) and discipline Tehran for non-compliance with the terms of the nuclear agreement and put an end to its negative interference in the region, and according to the statements of Manning spokesman of the US Department of Defense the United States will take the necessary steps to confront and address Iran's influence in the region," he added, "If This would have meant doubling down on the steps and actions that will be taken, I will not talk about future operations that could include new measures as well" and it seems that the phrase "new measures" includes any action that the Pentagon may take in the future to deter Iran, and the emergence of war depends on Iran's way of responding to these American actions, the Iranians will not succeed this time in evading these sanctions or avoiding confrontation, but they have to choose between surrender or negotiations. Cruel or military confrontation and hitting its arms in the region,

The German expert and researcher Professor Joseph Bramel expects that the administration of US President Donald Trump will wage war on Iran with the participation of Israel and possible support from Saudi Arabia, where he says: There is no explanation for the announcement of US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, but the Trump administration's war with the participation of Israel and perhaps Saudi support against Iran has become a matter of time, and German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier said when he was Secretary of State We signed the nuclear agreement with Iran in order to prevent war, and the logical repercussions of the withdrawal of the United States From this agreement is the occurrence of this war, and the mere fact that Iran keeps the field open for its return to its previous nuclear activities will be responded to by the Americans with the "preemptive strikes" they have planned, and this is the strong orientation of the new US National Security Advisor John Bolton, who declared in 2014 that stopping Iran's nuclear ambitions requires striking it. (3).

Although no all-out war has been declared on Iran yet, there are those who believe that the war against Iran has actually started through repeated Israeli attacks against Iranian targets in Syria: "The war on Iran, which has been brewing for some time, has now actually begun, and Russia must understand that these are not just Israeli security concerns, but that Israeli attacks on Iranian targets in Syria are aimed at Eliminate any chance for Iran to build a deterrent in Syria before the all-out war against it begins."

It is possible to imagine the beginning of this war that may be destructive, but it is not easy to imagine its end due to the complexities that exist in the region, the next confrontation is not limited to two states only, but the conflict includes many countries of the region, the United States of America, Israel and the Arab countries that consider the Iranian threat an existential threat to them stand in one trench in this confrontation, while Iran will exploit its influence in the region to carry out strikes on the interests of these countries, and it is worth noting that Iran has worked to expand and spread in the region in order to form a line of defense against any future attack on it, as the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei previously pointed out that Syria and Lebanon are part of the front defense of Iran, in addition to Iraq, in which it is possible to exploit the presence of local militias affiliated with Iran against the interests of the United States of America and its allied countries, especially since the sectarian and ideological link brings together these militias that have spread in the region and brought chaos with them Sectarianism, wars and corruption, and therefore it is self-evident that it will be part of the future confrontation with Iran in the event that it insists on being associated with the regime of the Wali al-Faqih and not dismantling its relationship with Tehran.

Confrontation Fields

It is clear that there is international pressure on Iran to get out of Syria, and repeated Russian statements about the need to withdraw all foreign forces from Syria suggest a Russian tendency to pressure Iran to withdraw from Syria amid Israeli urgency and repeated visits by Israeli Prime Minister Nathanu to Russia to convince Putin of the need to abandon the provision of cover and cooperation with Iran in Syria and work to keep the Syrian regime away from Tehran, and it is clear that the Israeli strikes have not faced any Russian intervention or opposition. If Syria is neutralized from Iran, sectarian militias inside Syria are liquidated, and military bases that the Revolutionary Guards have built in Syria over the years are terminated, this would mean depriving Iran of using Syria to attack Israel and preventing it from taking advantage of Syria as a line of defense against Israel.

As for Iraq, the parliamentary elections led to the progress of the Sairoon bloc of the Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr, which emphasizes the patriotism of the Iraqi decision, not to submit to Iranian influence, reject Iranian interference and stand against Iraqi militias that go to fight in Syria, and this is positive if the Sadr bloc succeeds in forming a strong government that puts an end to Iranian influence, Iraq can be neutralized from this confrontation, but the dilemma is that the blocs close to Iran, which includes sectarian militias, Which is ready to go to fight in Syria came in second place and now there are relentless Iranian attempts with these parties to form a government affiliated with Iranian influence and thus Iraq is a real threat to the United States of America and its presence inside Iraq and Iraq becomes an arena for conflict.

As for Lebanon, it is clear that Hezbollah will be ready to fight the battle directly because of its direct association with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, but the party's leaders are aware that their entry into the war against Israel only for Iran may lead to devastating results, as the Israeli Minister of Transportation said, "We will bomb Lebanon and return it to the Stone Age" and also will be a reason for the decline of the party's supporters, especially from the class that considers the party to be Lebanese defending Lebanon and is not ready to support the party's actions if it is To achieve Iranian goals.

The Limits of Iran's Resistance

About twenty deadly missiles or sorties could wipe out Iran's economy in a matter of hours, about 12 power plants producing nearly 60 percent of Iran's electricity, and destroyed bombs could take all these facilities out of operation, in addition to targeting the port of Kharj, from which Iran exports 90 percent of its hydrocarbons, and after Israeli intelligence succeeded in obtaining half a ton of Iranian secret documents in an operation that involved 100 Mossad agents, it is certain Iran is aware that its enemies have all the weaknesses in Iran, and the ability to target these targets and disrupt them from working. (4).

Iran does not have a sophisticated air force compared to Israel, and may find it difficult to send forces that may be prey to the Israeli Air Force on the way, so the war may be limited to missile strikes, which increases Iran's dependence on Hezbollah militias in Lebanon, while Israel may resort to attacking airports in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq to prevent the movement of Iranian military forces and equipment, according to an analysis of possible war scenarios by the writer Helen Fresh. (5)

In March 2018, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman called on the international community to exert more economic and political pressure on Iran in order to avoid a possible war between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the near future, "and added, "If we do not succeed in doing so, we are likely to enter into a war against Iran within 10-15 years" (6). After the imposition of US sanctions on Iran, the decline in the price of the Iranian currency and the increase of social problems within Iranian society, the time may be right to confront and strike Iran because of the presence of popular discontent over the political and economic conditions that the country is going through under the intervention of the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guards in all the facilities of the country, because military sanctions may not lead to satisfactory results and do not serve as a deterrent to Iranian external expansion, but in the event of a serious threat. The Iranian regime may retreat and decide to surrender instead of confrontation, and although this scenario is difficult to happen, it is possible because of Tehran's realization that an attack on it would be destructive and costly amid losing popular support to enter into such wars.

The end

If Tehran decides to confront and not surrender, it will be the first loser in the battle, because the balance of power between it and the opposite party is unequal, and it may be able to disturb security and stability and fire missiles at the countries of the region and the allies of the United States of America, but the American and Israeli air forces are stronger and can destroy all military targets in Iran within a short period, and once the Iranian regime collapses at home it will weaken the external arms of the regime, and will try to components and The nationalities in Iran exploit the events, carry out revolutions against the regime, clean up their areas, and exploit the weakness of the state in this case, and if this scenario is realized, the confrontation will not last long regardless of the losses inflicted on all parties.

1 – https://www.thenation.com/article/why-abandoning-the-iran-nuke-deal-is-likely-to-lead-to-war/

2-http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/america-about-go-war-against-iran-25965

3-http://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2018/5/25/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D8%A3%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A8-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A3%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%AA

4- https://finance.townhall.com/columnists/davidpgoldman/2018/05/09/an-israeliran-war-is-unlikely–for-the-time-being-n2479004

5 https://www.skynewsarabia.com/world/1045876-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%95%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%94%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%95%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B9%D8%AA

Third Research

The Future of Confrontation

Dr Muhannad Yousef

Sectarianism, particularly Shiism, is a prominent feature of the landscape in the Middle East. The bloody civil wars in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen have led to regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The impact of the rise of the popular Shia current is linked to the movement of chaos, chaos and the manifestation of Shia identity without national identity as a result of sectarian mobilization according to the feelings of the oppressed. This issue is related to the issue of arming minorities in the Middle East to balance the power of the majority and Sunni majority spread over the area of this region.

The use of minorities by the West comes at several stages: it starts from the stage of extravagance in social differentiation through a set of behaviors in which the sects of society move from coexistence to avoidance.

For example, we see that the Shia minorities in the Middle East, after coexisting with the Sunni majority, began to avoid dealing with the Sunni majority at the beginning until it reached a new stage, which is discrimination from the rest of the different categories of people, which led to the creation of aggressive behaviors for the Shiite community.

Differentiation, non-coexistence and thus discrimination will create a parallel economy to the economy of the State and thus will activate the smuggling and evasion and black trade of various goods and goods permitted and prohibited by law.

The process of linking the ruling systems to sect and sectarianism and raising the issue of the absolute majority and the disadvantaged minority, the issue of oppression and revenge, such as Fatima's tomb in Baqi' for example, and other vocabulary that have been considered the political engine of the Shiite mass circles since the time of the Ottomans and these messages continued to flow at a high pace in the different Hajj seasons to achieve the required mass momentum or in order to turn the masses into internal conflicts.

Shia mobilization occasions such as the killing of Hussein, the Tatbeer and the death decrees of the twelve imams, for example, are a periodic agenda in which contentious issues are deepened in many mass forms and collective practices, and represent an element of provocation and defiance, in addition to the accompanying rituals, and without criticism, guidance or reform in order to raise the element of provocation.

Then comes the reproduction of Hezbollah's model in Lebanon in countries such as Yemen, Iraq and Syria to be the protector of the sect without the state and government.

Sectarianism is difficult to measure or separate from other factors it can interact with, but it is certainly not permanent and stable. It will end one day and soon because its survival factors are weak or non-existent and the factors of its emergence and development have ended its causes, and therefore the possibilities and future images of the fate of the Shiite minority and its program in Wilayat al-Faqih must be enriched.

We have developed future visions of the alternative to velayat-e faqih in Iran based on assumptions and motives that we consider important for how the next U.S. strike on Iran or the outcome of the six-month-old Iranian popular movement will evolve, and we have based the process of developing these perceptions on these assumptions and factors that are mostly social and cultural factors and without looking at military factors.

These assumptions are based on criteria that ensure that each assumption is reasonable, distinct and supported by realistic constraints, as the classification of these assumptions comes within the questions of demographic, identity, and political and economic context in the Middle East.

The global distribution of Muslims will continue to show Sunni dominance and that they constitute the majority of the Muslim world, surpassing Shiites by an average of 5 to 1. But the ratio between Sunnis and Shiites along the sectarian rift that encompasses the Arabian Peninsula, Iran, and the Levant is closer to 1 versus 1.

But this almost equal sectarian balance between Sunnis and Shiites along this sectarian rift will not be modified or that the sectarian balance will "reverse" in specific countries where this rift is going through in the near future and no country will see a change in the dominant sect. But the factors that will affect this balance are refugee flows, internal displacement, and the different birth rate between Sunnis and Shiites as well.

The people of the Middle East will balance multiple identities whose importance changes over time and according to circumstances, and the beneficiaries of sectarian strife will try to rally communities around the sect and compete with others who will seek to rally the masses around other identities and interests.

The Middle East will be replete with sectarian conflicts that the beneficiaries of the sedition will seek to exploit, and the Shia-Sunni rift will pass through weak states that lack widespread legitimacy and the ability to control their territories.

Identity in the Middle East will continue to change over time according to circumstances.

The results of the Iraqi elections showed that the number of Sunni Arabs in Iraq ranked third after the Kurds. In Lebanon, Shiites are believed to be a simple majority compared to Maronite Sunnis and Christians, but no official census has been conducted since 1932.

Under normal circumstances, we expect the supposed Shia majority to take root over the next decade as this community has historically seen higher birth rates among Lebanon's various sects.

But Lebanon's reception of too many Syrian refugees eliminates any impact of differences in birth rates; within a few years, these migrants make up almost a quarter of Lebanon's total population, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 2016.

There is no reliable information available on the distribution of the refugees' sectarian identities, but the majority of them are believed to be Sunnis and this may correspond to Syria's overall demographic balance and disproportionate representation of this sect in the opposition. This influx could lead to the formation of a Sunni majority in Lebanon.

As mentioned, there is clear Sunni control in the Muslim world but they enjoy equality along the sectarian rift that penetrates the heart of the Middle East. However, we recognize that in matters of identity the recognition of the importance of identity is often greater than reality.

This means that while Sunni Arabs have become a minority in Iraq, many individuals who truly belong to this identity believe that they are the majority. Similarly, while Shiites and Sunnis are roughly equal in number along the sectarian fault line, the Shia community often rallies its members under the banner of vulnerability and persecution.

Internal displacement, particularly in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, is likely to have counter-effects on the sectarian level. On the one hand, the entrenchment of sects in certain enclaves may lead to a reduction in sectarian tensions as communities become geographically separated. On the other hand, reduced interaction between communities may lead to increased intolerance towards "other groups". In the transitional phase, when families are resettled in a new place, they become particularly vulnerable to acts of sectarian violence.

So identity in the Middle East will continue to change over time according to circumstances. It is not possible to assert that sectarianism will increase or decrease or that nationalism will increase or decrease in the Middle East until 2026. Thus, this will affect our vision of the future through these two tracks.

We can recognize that the population of the Middle East will continue to define their affiliations at different levels including religion, ethnicity, nation-state, socioeconomic class and gender. In the interest of this, the "beneficiaries of sectarian strife"—that is, those who rally the masses in communities around the sect—will continue to make efforts but will find strong competition from those who will try to rally people around the determinants of other identities.

Others will nevertheless try to forge alliances beyond sectarianism and nationalism, which constitute exclusive "ideologies" and potential drivers of conflict in various ways.

The power of sectarianism is associated with interim conditions and the choices of leaders and peoples, not something predetermined by culture. For example, good governance and a long national history will prepare people to prioritize national identities while bad governance and artificial boundaries will make them more vulnerable to competing identities, including sectarianism and tribalism.

This means that the Middle East is not destined to suffer from sectarianism but the level of sectarianism in the region will be associated with factors some of which may be structural in nature and others will be determined by the choices of actors on the ground.

The Middle East will also see a high incidence of conflicts over the next ten years even if the absolute level is lower than in 2016. Countries where the Sunni-Shia rift is going through will be weak, will lack legitimacy from the point of view of a large segment of their population, and will lack the ability to control their entire territory. It is possible that regional States will become more legitimate and more powerful within our time frame.

The motives of the Sunni-Shiite conflict in the Middle East.

There are several motives for the continuation of the Sunni-Shia conflict in the Middle East in the near future, the most important of which is how the masses self-determine their affiliations, especially the strength of sectarian identity compared to alternative identities. It will form national identities through which individuals determine their belonging to a particular society.

Iraqi Shiites will feel a stronger connection with their Iraqi compatriots, regardless of sect, clan, or social class, than with the Shiites of Iran or Lebanon.

On the other hand, sectarian identities will overshadow other types of self-identities. Using the same example, Iraq's Shiites can feel more solidarity with their community in other countries than with Iraq's Sunnis.

Iraqis can also determine their affiliations at other levels based on, for example, their links to local places, tribal groups, or socioeconomic classes.

Another motive is the nature of sectarian discourse in society. Religious scholars advocate tolerance and how society values notions of religious diversity. Religious leaders can mediate between different sects or religions. But on the other hand, religious leaders focus on what differentiates between believers and non-believers.

Another most important motivation is non-state actors such as civil society organizations, militias that can trigger or quell sectarian conflict according to their behavior, just like religious scholars. But under the right circumstances, civil society organizations can build bridges between communities.

For example, civil society organizations can organize demonstrations against divisions sown by sectarian acts such as the bombing of a Shia mosque in a Sunni-majority town. Conversely, non-state actors may play the role of a saboteur and disrupt government and community initiatives to reduce sectarianism. For example, Shia militias—such as Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces—may carry out revenge killings against Sunni communities, leading to continuing cycles of sectarian violence.

More important than these motives is the foreign policy orientation of regional powers. Iran, the most populous country along the Sunni-Shia rift, could be a driver of sectarian conflict when Iran seeks to extend its influence by mobilizing its Shia affiliate in neighboring countries. Conversely, this regional power can maintain stability when Iran respects the principle of non-interference in the affairs of neighboring countries or when Iran seeks cooperation.

On the other hand, the relationship between economic well-being and sectarian affiliation is a cause of sectarian conflict. When a sectarian minority, like Iran's Sunnis, is economically and culturally disadvantaged, inequalities and competition for natural resources will reinforce sectarian divisions. High youth unemployment may also make this group more vulnerable to sectarian recruitment. On the other hand, economic growth and improved economic conditions reduce societal pressures that may foster sectarian violence.

The trends of conflict, which is represented by the scope, unity and characteristics of regional conflict. On the one hand, regional conflict and violence further harden sectarian identities and produce additional violence. On the other hand, conflict trends act as a phenomenon that reinforces itself. This constitutes a precedent for the resolution of the conflict in one country and a positive impetus for the resolution of the conflict elsewhere.

The international impetus for the conflict is the United States and Russia, which have influence and interfere in regional affairs. On the one hand, actors are isolated or active in working to reduce sectarian conflict. On the other hand, they are participating, deliberately seeking or inadvertently contributing to sectarian conflict.

An example of this motive, which serves to reduce the risk of sectarian conflict, is the U.S. urging Iraq's Shia-majority government to seek political reconciliation with the Sunni community. An example of this impulse acting in the opposite direction is Russia's possible decision that the only way to protect its interests in Syria lies in working closely with the Alawite community to extend its influence.

These motivations work in multiple ways. Sometimes they may operate independently of each other or one may have the power to overshadow the influences of other factors. For example, the contagion of violence may be so strong that a country may succumb to violence extending from the neighboring country even if accompanied by motives that reduce the risk of sectarian conflict.

Other times, motivations may interact with each other in ways that provide mutual reinforcement. For example, improved governance and strong economic performance may enhance the sense of patriotism of the country's population and thus entrench national identity rather than sectarian identity.

In the end, motives may cancel each other out or cause trouble when one or more motives point toward a less sectarian conflict while others point toward a more sectarian conflict. For example, the two most important powers from outside the region, the United States and Russia, may prioritize regional stability at a time when the region's two most important powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, seek to increase their influence through destabilizing activities.

Future possibilities alternative to velayat-e faqih.

Iranian Shiite Camp Entrenched Amid Sunni Chaos

The Sunni and Shiite camps are moving in opposite directions. On the one hand, it mobilizes a smaller Shiite camp but

More united than followers to continue what its leaders portray as a delayed historical rebalancing of sectarian forces in the Middle East. On the other hand, infighting and conflicts of interest within the Sunni camp limit its effectiveness and enable Shia actors to gradually control its spheres of influence.

Despite the significant delay in realizing the economic benefits, the Iranians are beginning to make economic promises and ensure multiple mega investment projects by European companies.

It has begun to increase oil production, grow the technology sector, and revive the Iranian government's treasury, thereby giving Tehran deep pockets to support its allies and partners in the region. Like Mellat Investment Bank is a private company established by Mellat Bank under the Contracts and Property Organization, the company's general office for registration of Mellat Bank in Tehran. Its capital today is worth 2500 billion riyals. It finances more than $2 billion in sukuk and other debt sukuk including underwriting and market making for customers. Finance is the core business unit of Mellat Investment Bank, including debt and equity financing and project finance services.

Hezbollah, which is supported by its performance in foreign campaigns, enjoys wide popularity at home, large money laundering operations, drug and arms trades, and maintains strong representation in Lebanon's parliament.

Haider al-Abadi, who has a strong majority, also supported his successes in retaking northern Iraq from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). His successes in fighting political corruption, maintaining a power-sharing agreement with the Kurds, and rebuilding war-torn areas have also contributed to the consolidation of central authority in Baghdad, though Shia parties control the government.

There are also multiple factors ahead of relations between Iran and Iraq. Sistani's death without being succeeded by a spiritual leader of his stature could reduce competition for religious status between Najaf and Qom. If Mahmoud al-Hashemi al-Shahroudi is chosen as Iran's supreme leader after the death of Ali Khamenei, he will use his dual Iranian-Iraqi citizenship to build better relations with Iraq, where he enjoys wide popularity among Iraqi Shiites.

This relative unity of Shia actors and their wealth is abundant with chaos in the Sunni camp. It will result in Saudi Arabia ending its military operations in Yemen and tensions within the kingdom will force it to redeploy to eliminate the threat at home. Concern about Yemen's slide into the axis of Iranian influence will weaken the cohesion of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) with signals from the United Arab Emirates that the blame lies with Riyadh.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad will regain control of all major Syrian cities, despite some small opposition enclaves. While Syria maintains good relations with Russia and Iran that it considers effective for defeating ISIS and the rebels, a joint victory in Syria has not consolidated Russian-Iranian relations.

The end result is that Shia actors are looking for opportunities to expand their influence while Sunni actors stand on the defensive. The dynamic will reinforce itself as the Shia masses realize that their gains are possible thanks to their unity and increase their commitment to this principle. In turn, the decline of the Sunni camp leads to more mutual accusations and disagreements at the leadership level and thus deepens discord.

Thus, we return to our statement that when nations defend themselves in times of danger, they lose.... Nations that benefit, manage and control the conflicts around them remain and triumph.

The emergence of the local tendency of the Persians

If the influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran declines due to either U.S. strikes, a prolonged international blockade, or the continuation of internal Iranian protests, Persian identity as one of the dominant identities in the Middle East will emerge significantly. This will be helped by the suffering of the Iranian government across the region, its decline in performance, and the emergence of growing authoritarian tendencies.

A phenomenon we call "localism" will follow this, in which Iranian communities will demand a greater role in their affairs and the provision of key services.

Localism is the response to the failures of Islamist parties in particular. Hamas, for example, after being unable for months to provide electricity or water to Gaza, has lost control of the Gaza Strip to a technocratic group that promises to improve service delivery.

The general disappointment with the transformations initiated by the Arab Spring has also reached its peak. Islamist parties are losing their members and support across the region when these groups have repeatedly failed to provide a framework for effective state governance and a growing number of people blame them for their responsibility for empowering radical Islamist extremists. It's the same for Iran.

In order to fill the void, "Persian localism" will emerge as a dominant motive for self-identity. It is generally a reaction to the rise of religious militancy and the lack of local diversity that Iran will experience.

Tehran's authority to build a cohesive Shiite camp will collapse as Shia minorities in other countries see themselves as distinct from and independent of the Iranian leadership.

Conversely, Sunni-majority areas may see the beginning of a modest return to Sufism as evidence of acceptance of local change in customs and a refocus on local issues that are more important than sectarianism in advancing political agendas and mobilizing the population.

Even today, Tehran gives greater autonomy to local councils and regional authorities and strikes a better balance for these domestic pressures. This explains why turnout in local elections is higher than in national elections. This gives preference ratings, to local bodies that are more popular than national leaders.

But sometimes localism doesn't always present itself in positive ways. Previous "ideologies" such as Islamism are sometimes replaced by exclusive identities that will lead to a renewed focus on Persian nationalism as an organizational structure of the local community. This localism will clearly limit the influence of sectarianism but will reduce the ability of beneficiaries of sectarian strife to mobilize the masses on broad grounds such as religious affiliation.

Brinkmanship and regional conflict

The escalation of sectarian conflict is heading toward a regional conflict that puts Saudi Arabia and Iran in direct military confrontation before eventually backing down. Fear of consequences prompts efforts to contain critical areas of unrest before they rise to this level.

Saudi and Iranian investment in the proxy conflict under the rubric of sectarianism has reached a new peak. This rivalry is particularly evident in Syria and Yemen where both sides continue to fuel the conflict through their different partners. The United States has largely abandoned its efforts to find a solution to the conflict and opted instead to allow the warring parties to exhaust each other.

After Russia secured its sea port on the Mediterranean Sea via Tartus, it focused on Europe and left conflicts in the region to those involved.

If Tehran and Riyadh want to fuel the conflict by funding sectarian minorities in both countries, Iran will re-establish Saudi Hezbollah in the Eastern Province and Saudi Arabia will fund Sunni Baloch nationalists in southeastern Iran. These two groups do not limit themselves to border areas but will successfully launch a series of terrorist attacks in their representative capitals.

Saudi Arabia and Iran will respond with hostile air and sea forces in the Persian Gulf. With rising tensions mounting, a Saudi fighter jet will accidentally sink a large Iranian merchant ship and Iran will respond by shooting down the plane. Instead of this brief confrontation of the two powers leading to an escalation, the shock will push both sides to a temporary cessation of operations. This pause will extend to become an unstable breakthrough as Saudi Arabia and Iran seek to de-escalate tensions rather than risk a protracted direct conflict.

As each side looks for ways to ease tensions, Riyadh and Tehran will tighten the noose on those pushing for sectarian agendas for fear of causing events that the two regional powers cannot control. The Saudi royal court will quietly begin to dismiss religious scholars who are burning the street, while Iranian Basij forces will be deployed to disperse demonstrations against Saudi Arabia's symbols.

Ethnic conflict and displacement lead to self-segregation

The net impact on sectarianism does not lie in reducing tensions, but the process adopted to this end puts sects in real danger and is based on segregation rather than acceptance.In the international campaign against ISIS, the international Shiite coalition launched a bloody and repulsive campaign on its way to victory and its results showed the effectiveness of the purge that targeted the Sunni majority.

These divisions have been evident in Iraq, where ethnic killings and internal displacement have almost wiped out the multi-sectarian communities that previously existed alongside the Sunni majority. Mosul, for example, has become from almost an entire Sunni city to a mixed city with a Shia force in control of it. Shi'ite militia groups have also responded by launching reprisals against the Sunni population, prompting them to move out of northern and central Iraq in what the United Nations has described as ethnic cleansing.

The Saudi-led Arab coalition has not prevented the Houthis from eventually taking control of Sanaa, nor has the weak new central government repelled Houthi control of the north and Houthi forces are still extending their control over the port city of Hodeidah. Both sides believe that it is useful to maintain the illusion of an end to the war despite the absence of a formal peaceful solution and it does not seem that this de facto division of Yemen will change in the near future.

In Syria, the peace process resulted in recognized "areas of control" divided between the PYD, the regime, and the opposition, and after the announcement of the areas, a wave of internal displacement concentrated the Kurdish population in the PYD-controlled area, minorities including Alawites, Christians, and Druze gathered in the regime-controlled area, while Sunni Arabs concentrated in the opposition-held area. Mixed cities and border areas where control areas contiguous are sites of special ethnic and sectarian bloodshed.

Even in very small and indivisible states, Sunnis and Shiites separate themselves into neighborhoods, particularly in Manama and Kuwait City, which are clearly divided into entirely Sunni neighborhoods and entirely Shia neighborhoods.

As for Iran, the continuation of the revolt against the mullahs' rule in Tehran in Ahwazi province, as well as the Baloch Qaffi in the east, the Kurds in the west and the Turkmen in the north, will lead to a de facto separation between the Iranian parts and will affect Iran's sectarian relations comprehensively. The lack of interaction between sects and the occurrence of conflicts on a daily basis will entrench the separation of sects and foreshadow a conflict that is slowly worsening and heading towards explosion in Iran.

Our predictions are in stark contrast to what Bernard Lewis predicted about Iran: despite its ethnic and sectarian differences, Lewis believes that Iran is not a candidate for fragmentation in the near future. The reason is that Iran is an ancient country, which for centuries, even millennia, has enjoyed a sovereign presence and a strong sense of cultural identity.

Lewis says the Middle East will see wars over two key issues in the near future: oil and water.

As Iran's oil reserves come to an end, the Persian state is expected to try to expand to control the sources of nearby oil fields, which fall into the hands of its Arab neighbors. The idea that oil stocks in the Middle East will end up foreshadows a significant change in the region's global importance. The conflicts in the region will then become marginal to the agendas of the major Powers, and the world will view the conflicts and turmoil of the Middle East with the impartiality and extreme indifference with which the civil wars in Somalia and Liberia are seen today.

As for the freshwater problem, Lewis expects it to provoke a lot of turmoil in the region, but believes that a just settlement and cooperation between a number of countries is possible.

References

Armanio, Febe, Islam: Sunnis and Shiites, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, February 23, 2004.

Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, individual country entities, undated. As of March 2017

Chamie, Joseph, Religion and Fertility: Arab Christian- Muslim Differentials, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Dobbins, James, Philip Gordon, and Jeffrey Martini, A Peace Plan for Syria III: Agreed Zones of Control, Decentralization, and International Administration,

Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, PE-233-RC, 2017. As of April 14, 2017:

Izady, Michael, “Gulf 2000 Project,” New York: Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs, 2013. As of April 13, 2017: Bernard Lewis was born

Author Dr.Omar Abdul Sattar Mahmoud

الكاتب د.عمر عبدالستار محمود